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 This thesis is a comparative study of the ideology of isolationism in interwar Canada and 
the United States. It proceeds with that comparison using an individual subject from each 
country as a case study. For Canada, the subject is the historian and social scientist Arthur R.M. 
Lower; for the United States, it is the journalist and fiction author Lincoln Ross Colcord. Both 
men are worthy of study as individual isolationists of note, but they are also appropriate for the 
comparison because of the similarity of their isolationist positions and due to their personal 
backgrounds. Through the 1930s, Colcord and Lower publicized their support for foreign 
policies centered on unilateralism, neutrality, a limited but strictly prioritized national interest, 
and a potent fear of war. But at heart, they each had different ends based on their highest ideals 
for their respective countries. 
The core of this project is to explore isolationism as an ideology of North American 
themes and national variations. Comparing an American and a Canadian example of this mindset 
  
also brings a broader perspective to a subject too commonly associated with the United States 
alone. The parallels between Colcord and Lower show that isolationist thinking was not an 
American possession, but that its reach extended to the other half of the continent as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many Americans during the 1930s participation in foreign conflicts was a national 
dilemma as serious as the Great Depression. As that decade progressed and the possibility of war 
loomed larger, an ideological battle ensued between two loosely formed yet bitterly hostile 
camps, one side favoring U.S. isolation, and the other for more active American intervention in 
the Old World. This period of intense public debate about national foreign policy, however, was 
not just a phenomenon of the United States. It had a northern counterpart in the country’s closest, 
most economically important, and least considered foreign relation: Canada. North of the border 
raged another foreign policy debate, one defined by many of the same military, economic, and 
moral dilemmas as that in the south, and one likewise divided between roughly formed factions 
for more versus less involvement in world affairs and world organization. 
In Canada, as in the United States, the anti-interventionists were resoundingly defeated; 
ultimately, they were the losers of those struggles to determine the two countries’ national 
destinies.1 Yet this does not diminish their historical importance for their time or the present day. 
Although they were the defeated party of the interwar foreign policy debate, the anti-
interventionists were nevertheless a recognized faction which deeply carved its positions into the 
public discourse. Their cohort was diverse, dynamic, and a powerful voice of opposition against 
the trend toward entanglement in American and Canadian external policy. Their failure is neither 
a reason to forget their struggle nor to neglect its many faded details. 
                                                 
1 Indeed, one of the pioneer scholars of American isolationism, the late Wayne Cole, claimed that this defeat was 
nothing short of inevitable, an outcome pre-determined by a simultaneous domestic transition from a rural, insular 
“old” America to an urban-industrial nation fixed on asserting itself around the world. Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt 
and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (Lincoln, NB.: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 555-56. 
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This project, however, will not cover the full breadth of American or Canadian anti-
interventionists in the decade preceding Pearl Harbor. The existing scholarship on those subjects 
is substantial in both quantity and quality; another macro-level treatment would require space 
and additional research far beyond the limitations of a thesis. 2 More importantly, however, is the 
fact that neither country ever produced a truly unified movement against intervention in foreign 
wars. Binding together either the American or Canadian opponents of involvement in overseas 
wars under a single banner has thus been a complicated exercise, one made even more difficult 
in the Canadian case by the existence of largely separate English- and French-Canadian 
factions.3 Constructing such a singular history has only been possible only using as broad a title 
as anti-interventionism. Justus Doenecke, the premier scholar of American anti-interventionism 
before, during, and after the Second World War, justifiably favors this term for his 
comprehensive work. Anti-interventionist is less politically loaded, more inclusive (hence more 
unifying), and validates one of the most common labels that the diverse multitude of its 
                                                 
2 Historians of anti-interventionism and isolationism in the United States have been noticeably more productive and 
more direct in their studies than Canadians addressing their own country’s strain of the ideology. The body of work 
on the American side is truly immense and wide ranging, and while the most fruitful period of work was done in the 
1960s and 1970s, the output of new analyses has been steady since the 1950s. Canadian scholarship overall offers 
valuable insights on interwar Canadian anti-interventionism and isolationist sentiment, but generally that research 
has come in piecemeal fashion as part of works dedicated to other topics or to the 1930s broadly. See, for example, 
H. Blair Neatby, The Politics of Chaos: Canada in the Thirties (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972), 163-70, 
Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 15-17, and C.P. 
Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Vol. 2, 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1981), 231-34. Robert Bothwell’s "The Canadian Isolationist Tradition." International Journal 54, 
no. 1 (1998), 76-87, is a half-exception to the rule; only a fraction of the article is actually dedicated to the 1930s. 
David Lenarcic’s “Bordering on War: A Comparison of Canadian and American Neutralist Sentiment During the 
1930s,” The American Review of Canadian Studies (Summer 1994), 217-228, also fits the pattern in part. Since his 
article was a comparative study, Lenarcic naturally devotes only half his attention to Canadian anti-interventionism, 
and despite his title, the focus of that half leans mainly towards the futile efforts of Canadians to pass neutrality 
legislation in the wake of the American Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937. 
3 At least one Canadian scholar has attempted to bridge the gap between these two branches of Canadian anti-
interventionism, see P.B. Waite, “French Canadian Isolationism and English Canada: An Elliptical Foreign Policy, 
1935-1939,” Journal of Canadian Studies 18, No. 2 (Summer 1983), 111-43. For the purposes of this thesis, though, 
any unqualified “Canadian” isolationism will by default refer to English-speaking Canadians, who were more than 
half the country’s population during the 1930s and the main group responsible for shaping its foreign policy debate. 
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adherents actually applied to themselves.4 David Lenarcic, author of the most thorough treatment 
to date of English Canadian anti-interventionists, asserts precisely the same point for very similar 
reasons.5 
Anti-interventionists in both the United States and Canada came in many varieties, from 
mainstream pacifists and economic protectionists to fascists and communists with ties to Nazi 
Germany and Soviet Russia. Each subgroup had its own motivations for keeping their country 
detached from the problems of the wider world. This project lays aside the largely settled issue 
of whether the United States’ or Canada’s foreign policies between the world wars were even 
“isolationist” at all.6 Instead, its focus is only a single but important subset of the broader 
American and Canadian anti-interventionist groups: ideological isolationists. Several American 
historians have gone notably far in dissecting the mentality of interwar isolationism, and my use 
of the term ideological isolationists stems partly out of their analyses.7 In the most basic sense, I 
                                                 
4 In addition to “anti-interventionist,” Doenecke has also noted that labels such as “neutralist,” “nationalist,” and 
“unilateralist” were more common terms of self-identification during the 1930s and 40s than isolationist. See Justus 
Doenecke and John E. Wilz, From Isolation to War, 1931-1941 (Wheeling, IL.: Harlan Davis, Inc., 2003), 4, and 
Justus Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowan 
& Littlefield, 2003), x-xi. 
5 David Lenarcic, “Where Angels Fear to Tread: Neutralist and Non-Interventionist Sentiment in Inter-War English 
Canada” (dissertation, York University, 1991), 12-19. Citing the bewildering diversity of even English Canadian 
non-interventionists alone, Lenarcic gave his broad study an axis point in a particular but critical dilemma faced by 
that whole group, Canada’s constitutional and legal right to neutrality in the event of a British war. While the non-
interventionists’ struggle to resolve this issue was important to the Canadian foreign policy debate of the 1930s, it 
was not a driving concern for the Canadian subject of this thesis. This section of Lenarcic’s dissertation was 
subsequently converted into an article, “Pragmatism Over Principle: The Canadian Neutrality League, 1938-1939,” 
Journal of Canadian Studies 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), 128-46. 
6 Several Americans have made convincing arguments against that proposition, see Bear Braumoeller, “The Myth of 
American Isolationism” Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (2010), 349-371, and the eminent William Appleman Williams, 
“The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s,” Science and Society 18, No. 1 (Winter 1954), 1-20. For an authoritative 
Canadian debunking of the Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s oft-labeled isolationist foreign policy, see  J.L. 
Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, “’A Self-Evident National Duty’: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-1939,” The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 3 (January 1975), 212-33. 
7 I refer here to Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990), the 
“Strains of Isolationism” appendix in Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a 
Global Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 347-52, and especially Ross Kennedy, “The Ideology of 
American Isolationism: 1931-1939,” Cercles 5 (2002), 57-76. 
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define ideological isolationism as a kind of formula – nationalism over internationalism – one 
whose “quotient” must be calculated on an individual basis. Their degrees of national 
detachment from the world, however, were always selective rather than total. More particularly, 
ideological isolationists were individuals whose view of world affairs centered around a variable 
medley of principles: prioritizing the national interest over the interests of other countries, 
appreciation of North America’s geographic security and continental insularity, skepticism of 
international organization, a jaded view of the First World War and its legacy, a preference for 
neutrality in foreign policy, a denial of national responsibility to participate fully in the 
international scene, and above all, a fundamental fear of the negative consequences of 
participating in wars abroad. 
This project will use a representative example of ideological isolationism from the United 
States and Canada as a frame for studying the larger groups. Two public intellectuals of the 
interwar period – American author and journalist Lincoln Ross Colcord (1883-1947) and 
Canadian historian and social scientist Arthur R.M. Lower (1889-1988) – are appropriate for this 
comparison because of the similarity of their isolationist positions and due to their personal 
backgrounds. Both were professional writers prominent in their respective fields (political 
journalism and maritime literature for Colcord, and Canadian history and social commentary for 
Lower), both were self-described liberals and enthusiastic pundits on social issues like civil 
liberties and political dissent, and both were dedicated “realists” with keen personal interests in 
international affairs before and during the Second World War. 
Colcord and Lower both left marked impressions in important areas of American and 
Canadian history, a fact reflected by their prominent places in a variety historiographies. By the 
mid-1970s, Lower’s reputation as a scholar was high enough to warrant a lofty title, “the dean of 
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Canadian historians.”8 While peers like Donald Creighton also earned that same label, Lower’s 
body of work indeed influenced a generation of post-war Canadian students and historians, 
particularly his conception of Canada’s gradual socio-political evolution from “colony to 
nation.”9 As such, the historical work of Arthur Lower has been the subject of intense study since 
the 1970s.10 So, too, have Lower’s passionate nationalism, anti-immigration activism, liberalism, 
and civil libertarianism made him a popular subject for Canadian histories in those quarters.11  
Although in his lifetime most of his fame sprang from his maritime-themed fiction and 
literary criticism, Lincoln Colcord’s work as a journalist in Washington during and after the First 
World War have been his most lasting legacy as an historical figure. Beginning the war with the 
Philadelphia Public Ledger as a liberal ally of the Wilson administration and a close confidant of 
Edward House, within a year of the armistice he had moved to the Nation and politically to the 
left, becoming an implacable enemy of the president and a critic of his foreign policy failures.12 
                                                 
8 Richard A. Preston, review of History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism, edited 
by Welf H. Heick, International Journal 31, No. 3 (Summer 1976), 548-50. 
9 For Lower’s magnum opus on this theme and several others prevalent in his oeuvre – Canada as a “North 
American” nation and one necessarily formed by the coexistence of English and French together – see A.R.M. 
Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green & Company, 1946). 
10 The outstanding and pioneering work here is Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-
Canadian Historical Writing, 1900-1970 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), whose chapter-length analysis 
of Lower’s work and personal background touches on the full breadth of the historian’s methodology, tropes, and 
political views. Useful, too, is the festschrift of respectful essays by Lower’s students and peers, His Own Man: 
Essays in Honour of Arthur Reginald Marsden Lower, edited by W.H. Heick and Roger Graham (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1974), although none of the essays in this collection delve into their subject’s 1930s 
isolationism. Lower as historian also figures large in Donald A. Wright, The Professionalization of History in 
English Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
11 See C.P. Champion, The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), Jose E. Igartua The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities 
in English Canada, 1945-1971 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), Damien-Claude Belanger, 
Prejudice and Pride: Canadian Intellectuals Confront the United States, 1891-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2011), Kristi Corlett, “A Dream of Homogeneity: Arthur Lower's National Vision and Its Relationship to 
Immigrants and Immigration in Canada, 1920-1946,” (MA Thesis, Queen’s University, Kingston, 1995), Scott 
Fleming, “Of Balance Wheels and Bodies Politic: Arthur Lower and the Liberal Vision of Canadian History,” 
History of Intellectual Culture 10, No. 1 (2012/13), 1-20, and Christopher MacLennan, Towards the Charter: 
Canadians and the Demand for a National Bill of Rights, 1929-1960 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2003). 
12 Drawing from both men’s personal papers, Christopher Lasch offers the most intensive analysis of Colcord’s 
relationship with Edward House and Colcord’s psychology as a liberal with radical inclinations, see The New 
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Colcord’s reputation as an extremely outspoken sympathizer with the Bolshevik Revolution and 
an American advocate for Soviet Russia has also earned him special historical attention.13 
Despite these massive bodies of historical work assessing both men in such a range of 
fields, their legacies as isolationists have been under-explored. In contrast with other confirmed 
Canadian isolationists like Frank Underhill,14 F.R. Scott,15 O.D. Skelton,16 and William Arthur 
Deacon,17 and with less extreme anti-interventionists like Escott Reid,18 Lower lacks a 
comprehensive intellectual biography tying his isolationism in with the many other shifting 
strands of his worldview. Besides Lower’s own memoir of 1967 – which, while remarkably 
frank, is naturally a self-selected history leaving out important and unflattering details – his 
isolationism has been only periodically studied.19 Much the same can be said of Lincoln Colcord, 
                                                 
Radicalism in America: The Intellectual as a Social Type (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 225-50. More on 
Colcord’s relationship with House, his place House’s circle of followers, and his wartime journalism can be found in 
Igna Floto, “Woodrow Wilson: War Aims, Peace Strategy, and the European Left,” in Woodrow Wilson and a 
Revolutionary World, 1913-1921, edited by Arthur S. Link (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1982), Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), James Startt, Woodrow Wilson, the Great War, and the Fourth Estate (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2017), Brad Snyder, The House of Truth: A Washington Political Salon and the 
Foundation of American Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), and especially John Reinertson, 
"Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson and European Socialism 1917-1919," (PhD dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin, Madison, 1971), who is second only to Lasch in his work with Colcord’s papers. 
13 Colcord appears extensively in Christopher Lasch, American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1962) and with variable frequency in Michael Cassella-Blackburn, The Donkey, the 
Carrot, and the Club: William Bullitt and Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1948 (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2004), 
David W. McFadden, Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993), Markku Ruotsila, British and American Anti-Communism before the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 
and Kathrine Siegel, Loans and Legitimacy: The Evolution of Soviet-American Relations, 1919-1933 (Lexington, 
KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1996). 
14 R. Douglas Francis, Frank Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). 
Kenneth Dewar, Frank Underhill and the Politics of Ideas (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015). 
15 Sandra Djwa The Politics of the Imagination: A Life of F.R. Scott (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1987). 
16 Terry Crowley, Marriage of Minds: Isabel and Oscar Skelton Reinventing Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003). Norman Hillmer, O.D. Skelton: A Portrait of Canadian Ambition (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2015). 
17 Clara Thomas and John Watt Lennox, William Arthur Deacon: A Canadian Literary Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1982). 
18 Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar, edited by Greg Donaghy, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2004). J.L Granatstein’s contribution for this very biographical festshrift, “Becoming Difficult: Escott Reid’s Early 
Years,” details the young Reid’s anti-interventionist streak at some length, see ibid., 11-22. 
19 Arthur R. M. Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967). The three most direct 
historical analyses of Lower’s isolationism can be found in Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 131-34, 
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whose isolationism has been even less probed than his Canadian counterpart’s. Unlike some of 
his closest isolationist friends and colleagues, Edwin Borchard and John Bassett Moore,20 Amos 
Pinchot,21 Oswald Garrison Villard,22 and John T. Flynn,23 Colcord’s personal evolution and 
worldview as an isolationist have been woefully neglected. Only his role in the 1939-41 debate 
over American entry into the war in Europe has featured in a smattering of recent histories. 24 His 
activities during the foreign policy debate of the 1930s, however, work which earned him 
citations in some of the most prominent isolationist monographs of the period, have been almost 
totally neglected by modern historians.25 Indeed, no less an authority than Justus Doenecke has 
noted this deficit, singling out Colcord as one of many anti-interventionists of the journalistic 
                                                 
the dissertation of David Lenarcic, “Where Angels Fear to Tread,” and R. Douglas Francis, “Historical Perspectives 
on Britain: The Ideas of Canadian Historians Frank H. Underhill and Arthur R.M. Lower,” in Canada and the 
British World: Culture Migration and Identity, edited by Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2008). Berger, while covering much essential ground, is nevertheless brief, 
and thus overlooks much of the context, nuances, and even some whole elements of Lower’s isolationist worldview. 
Most glaring is Berger’s dating of Lower’s isolationism to the mid-1930s, when in reality, Lower was publicly 
advocating for the position as early as the spring of 1933 and showing shades of it even earlier. For Lenarcic, Lower 
is only one of many characters in his massive study, and not one who played a significant role in the central focus of 
his research, the dilemma of Canada’s legal right to neutrality as a Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Francis’ 
piece is useful for its focus on Britain as an element of Lower’s isolationism, but the main subject of the article is 
clearly Underhill, who gets a larger share of the author’s attention. And as with Berger, Francis also drew only from 
Lower’s published work. 
20 Justus Doenecke, “Edwin M. Borchard, John Bassett Moore, and Opposition to American Intervention in World 
War II," Journal of Libertarian Studies 6, No. 1 (1982), 1–34. 
21 Nicholas Pinchot, “Amos Pinchot: Rebel Prince,” Pennsylvania History 66, No. 2 (Spring 1999), 166-98. 
22 Stephen Therstrom, “Oswald Garrison Villard and the Politics of Pacifism,” Harvard Library Bulletin 14 (Winter 
1960), 126-52. Michael Wreszin, Oswald Garrison Villard: Pacifist at War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1965).  
23 John Moser, Right Turn: John Flynn and the Transformation of American Liberalism (New York: NYU Press, 
2005). 
24 Colcord’s activism against Lend-Lease and revision of neutrality legislation during the year of 1941 comes up 
with some frequency in Justus D. Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon (2003), and a transcription of his letter to the 
head of the America First Committee is included in Doenecke’s sourcebook for the organization, In Danger 
Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-41 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First 
Committee, edited by Justus D. Doenecke, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 220-22. Colcord also has a 
biographical entry in a catalogue of prominent national-level isolationists and America First supporters, Bill 
Kauffman, “Who Were the America Firsters?” in Ruth Sarles, A Story of America First: The Men and Women Who 
Opposed U.S. Intervention in World War II (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2003), 185-86. 
25 Those references to Colcord can be found in Lothrop Stoddard, Lonely America (New York: Country Life Press, 
1932), 255, 311-12, The Neutrality Policy of the United States, compiled by Julia E. Johnson, (New York: The H.W. 
Wilson Company, 1936), 184, and Edwin M. Borchard and William Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 298. 
8 
 
world in need of new and focused research.26 That need, however, is as true for Arthur Lower as 
for Lincoln Colcord. 
Through the 1930s, Colcord and Lower publicized their support for foreign policies 
centered on a unilateralism, neutrality, a limit but strictly prioritized national interest, and a 
potent fear of war. In addition to these broad principles, they were hostile to Britain through the 
1930s as the most dangerous of all foreign connections. Both roundly denied Britain any 
measure of moral advantage over Germany, a country which neither saw as a direct threat to 
their own states. While both men shared a basic set of isolationist tenets, in each those impulses 
were essentially an extension of their nationalisms: one American, the other Canadian. The basic 
function of both their isolationisms was the same – to keep their countries out of war – and 
around this center were many additional shared principles. But at heart, they each had different 
ends based on their highest ideals for their respective countries. Lower’s isolationism reflected 
his desire to draw Canada away from Britain’s influence and become a more distinct, 
independent nation in its own right. Only by the act of choosing isolationism and neutrality, he 
argued, could Canada continue onward towards that goal. In this way, Lower made his 
isolationism part of a distinctly positive and constructive national project. Colcord’s 
isolationism, by contrast, was more preventative. It was strongly connected to his contemporary 
drift to the right. Although he supported Franklin Roosevelt early on, by 1935 he had become a 
staunch enemy of the New Deal and the president’s initiatives generally. FDR’s foreign policy 
was only one area where Colcord stood in the opposition, but from 1937 on it was far and away 
the focus of his political efforts. At its deepest root, though, Colcord’s isolationism was born out 
                                                 
26 Doenecke, Justus D. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History. "Isolationism." Accessed 1 Oct. 2017. 
http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-
49. 
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his horrendous recollections of the Woodrow Wilson years – presidential deception of both the 
public and Colcord himself, political repression, and the disastrous settlement of 1919 that made 
the entire Great War so futile – and his determination not to see them repeated. 
 Colcord and Lower exemplify interwar isolationists as an ideological group within their 
respective countries. Through comparison they also illustrate how strikingly similar the two 
branches were even within their unique national forms. Although Lower came to the term far 
earlier than Colcord, both applied the label isolationist to their perspectives on world affairs and 
to themselves personally. They were aggressive and vocal promoters of a distinctly isolationist 
worldview, incessantly asserting their positions in public forums and private channels through 
the 1930s. Both held wide-ranging connections to like-minded isolationists and anti-
interventionists in the professional world and the realm of politics; all advising, strategizing, and 
networking with one another through an intensive correspondence and direct meetings. For both 
men, taking a position as controversial and divisive as isolationism was well within their 
characters. They were habitual iconoclasts who challenged established dogmas and reigning 
authorities as a matter of course. As individual intellectuals, and as prominent members of larger 
isolationist currents in American and Canadian life, they consciously strove to shape the public 
minds of their nations. Capturing the drift of public opinion away from the surging wave of 
internationalism and British sympathy was the struggle they shared and the struggle they lost. 
Although neither shied away from criticisms of their own countrymen, both Colcord and 
Lower were driven to isolationism by strongly protective visions for their homelands. Love of 
and fear for their nations in an era of ceaseless turmoil acted as their ideological fuel, inspiring 
confidence in the rightness of their views and steeling their will to assert them with vigor. Yet 
pressures to adapt, relent, and conform to ascendant internationalism came like an ever-rising 
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tide, putting the two men in the same dangerous corner. The decision they both faced – to defend 
or abandon their deeply held isolationist principles – was settled at different times and with 
different outcomes. By forces in world affairs, in the domestic scene, and by cumulative personal 
experience, one man reversed course, while the other held firm. 
This is not a flaw in the comparison, but a valuable opportunity for understanding 
national differences between American and Canadian isolationism and cultures of the two 
countries. Arthur Lower was a nationalist before he was an isolationist. But during the 1930s, 
isolationism was not only essential to his nationalism, it was paramount. Isolationism for Lower 
was matter of national security and national interest, of national self-respect and national 
cohesion. If Canada could not stand for itself first and itself only, it did not count as a truly 
independent nation in his eyes. The English-Canadian connection to Britain was a plain and 
simple liability in Lower’s estimation; culturally it was the biggest roadblock between Canada 
and potential national unity, politically it meant involvement in another world war, one whose 
likely outcome would be a Canadian civil war and the disintegration of the country. 
Yet isolationism for Lower was not an end in itself, but rather a means to achieving his 
real goal; a more independent and self-validating Canadian nation. His transition away from 
isolationism and towards internationalism can be understood as the product of that constant aim. 
Lower’s nation-building mentality, one which so enveloped him that it also fired his stark 
opposition to non-Anglo immigration, was not the pattern of his American counterpart. Lincoln 
Colcord’s nation was one that already existed, but also one which he felt was under constant 
threat through the years of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency; first, by the policies of the New 
Deal, and second, from the negative domestic and global effects of American participation in 
another world war.  
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The core of this project is to explore isolationism as an ideology of North American 
themes and national variations. Comparing an American and a Canadian example of this mindset 
also brings a broader perspective to a subject too commonly associated with the United States 
alone. The parallels between Colcord and Lower show that isolationist thinking was not an 
American possession, but that its reach extended to the other half of the continent as well. 
Lower’s retreat from his isolationism at the outset of the Second World War, and Colcord’s 
stalwart insistence on retaining his even after Pearl Harbor, ultimately reveals how isolationism 
as an ideology must be delineated by type and then measured by degrees. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LINCOLN COLCORD: EVANGELISM 
Introduction  
At his death in 1947, Lincoln Colcord left behind a story riven with irony. Here was a 
man born and raised at sea (in his elder years a nationally recognized authority on all things 
nautical), who never in his life owned a boat of his own. Here, too, was a prolific author of sea 
stories favorably compared with those of Jack London and Joseph Conrad, who published the 
first of them while working as a civil engineer deep in the woods of Maine.1 And here was a man 
who dedicated the whole of his career to letters of all kinds – fiction and poetry, history and 
biography, rigorous journalism and open polemics – but whose grave stone bears no epitaph. 
Even stronger contradictions are to be found in Colcord’s politics. During the two years of 
American involvement in the First World War he was, by his own account, “among the 
staunchest advocates of Mr. Wilson’s liberalism.”2 At the war’s bitterly unsatisfying conclusion, 
he morphed into an openly anti-Wilson, pro-Bolshevik radical. The pattern repeated just over a 
decade later. In the opening years of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, he embraced the new 
administration and supported its New Deal. By 1935, he was a vicious opponent of both.  
Yet through the four decades of his public life, Lincoln Colcord’s political identity was 
strikingly consistent. He defined himself as a “liberal,” an eternally ambiguous label that 
becomes even murkier in his individual case.3 He was a liberal when he supported Woodrow 
                                                 
1 In a cover story for Collier’s magazine, Colcord clarified his own preference between those two popular authors. 
“Jack London’s sea stories are all false – and rot besides. Joseph Conrad, of course, has written truly of the sea…” 
Lincoln Colcord, “Landlubbers and Ships,” Collier’s 59, No. 26 (September 1917), 6. 
2 Lincoln Colcord, “Proposing a Return to Lawlessness,” New York Herald Tribune (February 19, 1937). 
3 At least for the period before 1919, Colcord’s liberalism was objectively closer to the progressivism of the era that 
bears its name, but “liberal” was the term he used to describe himself and his outlook even then. Alan Dawley notes 
that the two terms were often used interchangeably at that time, but the essential “quarrel” between the two in both 
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Wilson in 1917 and 1918, and after when he relentlessly condemned the president’s foreign 
policy and championed the cause of the young Soviet Union. Likewise, he was a liberal when he 
supported Franklin Roosevelt during the first two years of his presidency, and after when he 
denounced the New Deal and effectively realigned himself with the Republican Party.  
In the broad view, Colcord’s strain of American liberalism had several basic components: 
intellectual tolerance, a suspicion of centralized authority, a distaste for bureaucracy, and an 
insatiable impulse to criticize established ways, leaders, and institutions.4 These, however, were 
only the practical benchmarks of his liberal worldview. At its deepest foundation was a sweeping 
vision – of society purged of its selfish vices and archaic inefficiencies, of a universal 
“brotherhood of man” to replace violent national competition, of the whole world broken down 
and made anew.5 As a young man immersed in the Washington, D.C.-scene at the crest of World 
War I, he bubbled over with this fiery idealism. His dreams of national and global reconstruction 
were spurred on to impossible heights by the electrifying rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson and an 
intimate personal connection with Wilson’s top aide, Edward House. But these hopes were 
gradually broken on the wheel by reality, and the ultimate legacy for Lincoln Colcord of Wilson, 
                                                 
domestic and foreign affairs was over the principle of laissez-faire. The progressive instinct to “regulate” private 
interests at home naturally extended to the regulation of affairs between nations. Although Colcord’s affinity for 
regulation was limited to curtailing monopoly power, he was in line with progressivism in reorganizing the 
international system. Alan Dawley, Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 4-5. 
4 For an illustration, see Lincoln Colcord, “Appendix,” in John McConaughy, Who Rules America? A Century of 
Invisible Government (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1934), 318-19. Colcord helped edit the 
manuscript of this book for publication after its author’s death in October of 1933. 
5 Colcord’s case fits perfectly into the thesis of a recent survey of the American left-liberal tradition. At the basis of 
twentieth-century liberalism was a “coherent vision of progress,” an “idea of transformation” – embodied by 
socialism by not exclusively socialist – which “prodded [its adherents] onward” from one reform to the next. Doug 
Rossinow, Visions of Progress: The Left-Liberal Tradition in America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2008), 11. Rossinow tags Colcord specifically as a “new liberal” of the ACLU-“laborite liberalism” variety. 
Ibid., 85. 
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the Great War, and liberal internationalism were painful memories of futility and 
disillusionment. 
Never did he forget the lesson. In the mid-1930s, with almost two decades of retrospect, 
Colcord saw the beating heart of his First World War-era mentality: “[the] question is,” he asked, 
“how badly do you want [the] reconstitution of society? Lib[eralism] to me was concrete and 
definite – [it] believed in [the] transition step to [a] new world… [but] few so-called lib[eral]s I 
have found are willing to face the logic of their own conclusions.”6  Facing those conclusions – 
his own and his nation’s – determined his response to the events of that tumultuous new decade. 
“Absit Omen!” he cried in 1937, in an editorial blasting F.D.R.’s plan to expand the Supreme 
Court. “The search for the new, the faith in progress, the vision of the future, ends in tyranny!”7 
Almost exactly twenty years earlier, in the spring of 1917, Colcord was totally devoted to 
just that search, that faith, and that vision. Despite an initial preference for the United States to 
remain out of the European war, his dedication to the possibility of a better postwar world and 
his confidence in Wilson to achieve it spurred a great change in his thinking. Responding to an 
overzealous patriot criticizing some of the young journalist’s suspiciously “pacifistic” newspaper 
editorials from before America joined the war, Colcord explained himself calmly: 
I simply wanted to make a final expression of my liberalism before closing the door of 
my mind. The door is now closed. But if I admit that it will open again at a touch, I am 
not running counter to my convictions… I believe that there are always two everythings – 
two Englands, two Americas, as well as two Germanys – and two sides to every question. 
I even believe that there are two Doctor McConnells, and that the time may come when 
the other Doctor McConnell will think a good deal as I do. Unfortunately, however, there 
                                                 
6 These lines come a large bundle of handwritten notes almost certainly written around 1936, when Colcord was 
working on a book combining his experience during the First World War with a study of the relationship between 
Edward House and Woodrow Wilson. Colcord Family Archive [Hereafter CFA] Box 23 Folder 594 “Notes.” 
7 Lincoln Colcord, “Proposing a Return to Lawlessness,” New York Herald Tribune (February 19, 1937). 
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is a chance that we may still be at odds. By that time, I may have shifted over to the side 
of the other me.8 
Even in these, the headiest days of his youth, the singular moment when his soul was 
most captivated by idealism, Lincoln Colcord recognized his own nature and predicted his own 
future. There were two Lincoln Colcords – one of liberalism and another of conservatism, one of 
internationalism and another of nationalism, one dedicated to the prospect of a new world and 
another desperate to preserve his own world as it was. There were two Lincoln Colcords, and 
there could have been never have been one without the other.  
Lincoln Colcord the isolationist was reared upon the grave of Lincoln Colcord the 
Wilsonian internationalist. He recognized the transition himself. In 1941, another struggle was 
under way to decide America’s course between peace and war, isolation and international 
engagement. William C. Bullitt, Colcord’s closest journalistic colleague during the First World 
War but more recently FDR’s ambassador to France, put himself on the latter side of that 
struggle. In setting himself against this old friend – a man whose cycle of infatuation and 
disillusionment with Wilson ran strikingly close to his own9 – Colcord for the first time 
identified himself as an isolationist, and explained with clarity the deeply personal basis of that 
worldview. 
Bill Bullitt’s speech certainly was dreadful, but I really thought it overreached itself. He 
got off one line that made me laugh. He said: ‘Isolationists are those who love the past of 
America, which is dead.’ Leaving aside the question of whether it is dead or not, a more 
correct definition couldn’t be uttered. That is exactly what I am – an isolationist, because 
I love the past of America. And dead or not, the principles on which it is based are 
eternal. If they are dying or dead, they will arise again. 
How strange, sad, and significant that a fellow like Bill could say such a thing, and look 
at it with entirely different eyes from yours and mine. To him, if the past is dead, to hell 
with it – we will make a new world… Well, we only have to learn once more that 
                                                 
8 Lincoln Colcord, “Mr. Colcord Makes Answer,” Philadelphia Public Ledger [Hereafter PPL] (April 14, 1917). 
9 For the details, see Michael Cassella-Blackburn, The Donkey, the Carrot, and the Club: William Bullitt and Soviet-
American Relations, 1917-1948 (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2004). 
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everything ‘new’ is old as the hills, and that it’s all been tried over and over again by 
deluded people suffering the same dream. The shocking thing, of course, is that we 
ourselves tried it and failed only twenty-five years ago.10 
The Undercurrent, 1883-1916 
Lincoln Colcord’s unique childhood foreshadowed the unique course of his adult life. 
Indeed, Colcord himself recognized its supreme importance to his identity and his reputation. 
While he never wrote a full autobiography, he did produce an article-length memoir of his birth 
and formative years for public consumption. Its title, “I Was Born in a Storm at Sea,” points to 
the heart of his experience.11 He was born at sea on August 14, 1883, during a midwinter storm 
off the east coast of Cape Horn. The birth occurred in the cabin of the Charlotte A. Littlefield, a 
548-ton Bangor-built bark on the return leg of a two-year voyage to Australia, Japan, and Chile. 
The master of that bark was Lincoln Alden Colcord, father of the newborn and of another child 
born at sea the previous year, Joanna. For most of the next fourteen years of his life, the younger 
Lincoln was raised on the water, travelling with his parents from New York and Boston to ports 
of call around the world – up and down both coasts of South America, to the Pacific Northwest 
of the United States, through the maze of the East Indian islands toward Singapore, and most 
important of all, along the coast of China between Hong Kong and Shanghai.12 
The six earth-spanning voyages of Lincoln Colcord’s youth, all made aboard sailing ships 
captained by his father and most running two years in duration, were the foundation of his entire 
life. But while he loved and prized his seaborne childhood, he knew early on that it was a way of 
                                                 
10 Lincoln Colcord [hereafter LC] to Oswald Garrison Villard, March 3, 1941. Privately Held. Courtesy of Professor 
Parker Albee, Falmouth, Maine. 
11 Lincoln Colcord, “I Was Born in a Storm at Sea,” The American Magazine 96, No. 1 (July 1923), 19, 74-80. 
Reprinted in Lincoln Colcord, Sea Stories from Searsport to Singapore, edited by Donald Mortland, (Thorndike, 
ME.: North Country Press, 1987), 175-90. 
12 A beautiful and comprehensive account of these voyages can be found in Parker Bishop Albee, Jr., Letters from 
Sea, 1882-1901: Joanna and Lincoln Colcord’s Seafaring Childhood (Gardiner, ME.: Tilbury House and Searsport, 
ME.: Penobscot Marine Museum, 1991), a reprinting of dozens of letters written between Colcord, his sister, and 
their parents that were compiled by Colcord himself not long after his father’s death.  
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life in terminal decline. In a very real sense, Lincoln Colcord was born and raised on an 
anachronism. The 1880s and 90s were the waning days of deep-water sailing ships. After the 
turn of the next century they were comprehensively replaced by motor-powered, steel-hulled 
vessels under the ownership of massive corporations. Fittingly, this moment of transition in 
maritime trade was when young Colcord left the sea for good. In 1897, his parents settled him in 
Maine to begin his education ashore. After graduating from high school in 1900, he enrolled in 
the University of Maine in Orono to pursue a degree in engineering.13 
In retrospect, Colcord described this new phase of his life with dreamy sadness. A boy of 
his “upbringing,” he wrote, “didn’t properly fit in anywhere. I left my heart moored, I think, in 
the fairway of the Straits of Sunda, the gateway of the East… I have a notion that it will never 
drift ashore.”14 During his traumatic years in Orono, however, he used much harsher language to 
describe the shock.15 A life of writing was Colcord’s only satisfying alternative to the impossible 
life of the sea. He discovered it early in his time at college, but only though much struggle did he 
bring it to fruition. He dropped out in 1906 to work with the Bangor & Aroostook Railroad as a 
field engineer and remained there until 1908, the year he sold his first short story and dedicated 
himself full time to literature. Over the next seven years – the same period in which he would 
marry his first wife, Blanche M. Nickels; have his first child, a daughter Inez; and settle himself 
in his father’s ancestral house in Searsport, Maine – Colcord would publish more than a dozen 
                                                 
13 These details can be found in a useful biographical essay by Donald Mortland, “Lincoln Colcord: At Sea and at 
Home," Colby Quarterly 19, No. 3 (September 1983), 125-43. 
14 Colcord, “I Was Born in a Storm at Sea,” in Sea Stories, 189. 
15 In 1905, Colcord confronted his father for about life he and his sister were forced to live at sea; “did you ever 
think what abnormal lives we both had, up to the time we went to college… I have thought of that a lot; it was the 
wrench from that abnormal life to the normal that I seem to be living now, that took so much of my time and thought 
when you left me at home. It was the best training in the world to make a thinker, but it absolutely destroyed my 
claims to naturalness, my human side.” LC to Lincoln Alden Colcord, August 11, 1905, CFA Box 74 Folder 1264. 
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stories in some of the major illustrated magazines of the era, a full-length novel in 1912, The 
Drifting Diamond, and a compilation of his best stories in 1914, The Game of Life and Death.16  
His fiction was generally well received, earning special accolades for his vivid portrayals 
of China and the Chinese. His publisher, Macmillan of New York, recognized this from the start 
of their relationship with the promising young author. Macmillan’s chairman, George Brett, cited 
The Drifting Diamond’s stirring depiction of “the Eastern attitude as opposed to the Western 
attitude in regard to things both material and of the mind” as one of the strong points of the 
book.17 Indeed, Colcord used an enigmatic Chinese gentleman – Lee Fu Chang, a man of 
seemingly infinite wisdom, wit, and stoic poise – as one of his most frequent characters and an 
obvious outlet for his own voice. 
In his memoir-article, Colcord made it clear that his birth did not affect his nationality. 
“The question of citizenship involved in birth at sea,” he wrote, was a simple one to answer. He 
was as American as “children born in American embassies abroad… I am far from being a man 
without a country.”18 But even so, his personal identity was not at all attached to the world he 
was left to mature in. Years would pass before Colcord allowed either Maine or the United States 
itself into the center of his personal spirit. On the contrary, coursing through the first decade of 
his fiction writing was an open hostility toward American society – particularly its materialism – 
and a glowing admiration for the society of China as its antithesis.19 
                                                 
16 Mortland, “Lincoln Colcord: At Sea and at Home," Colby Quarterly. 
17 George P. Brett to LC, October 22, 1912, CFA Box 12 File 266. 
18 Colcord, “I Was Born in a Storm at Sea,” in Sea Stories, 178. 
19 One story in particular – first published in 1922 but written in 1915 -  illustrates this theme clearly. In it, a 
“Chinese sage” debates an American visiting China on the ideal of “progress.” Under serene but exacting scrutiny, 
the sage coaxes his guest to admit that America’s sole measures of progress are the advance of technology and the 
increase of wealth. In China, “five thousand years of uninterrupted history” revealed that only “spiritual increase is 
the true advance.” Lincoln Colcord, “Conversation in a Garden,” The Freeman 5, No. 123 (July 19, 1922), 443-45. 
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So powerful was this undercurrent in Colcord’s thought that at one point it slipped above 
the surface. In an open letter to The American Magazine (the same periodical from which he 
drew the lion’s share of his income) Colcord revealed his inner distance from his country in 
startlingly frank terms. The letter was ostensibly a reaction to the recent Chinese Revolution, the 
overthrow of the 400-year old Qing dynasty and the founding of a Republic of China. But 
Colcord was beyond enthralled by that faraway upheaval. “The most wonderful transformation 
in the world is going on there. I want to more than see it; I want to be a part of it. China is my 
real home, the Chinese are my native people; in this grim land, I’ve always been an alien.” 
China will not take up with the West as Japan has done. The problem is a deeper one… 
Yuan [Shikai, second President of the Republic] is a wonderful man; the future will show 
how sincere he is. Is he the Sage, too, I wonder, that China needs more than the Admin-
istrator? Is he a superior man, according to Confucius? Will he be the Prophet of China, 
as well as her savior – the Chinese Charlemagne? Such a man, with powers, in a reign of 
thirty or forty years, could accomplish the transformation of a quarter of the population of 
the world!... The result, I think and have always thought, is inevitable; the supremacy of 
the yellow man over the white. Such a statement sounds incredible; but stranger things 
have taken place in history. Imagine yourself for a moment the editor of a Roman 
magazine, and myself a struggling author in the palmy days of Rome. These Goths, these 
Teutonic tribes – I write you from a northern province – they must be reckoned with. And 
you, perhaps, lean back sumptuously in your editorium, and smile as your eye follows the 
line of skyscrapers along the Tiber. Well, it won’t happen in the old way, surly; the time 
of fighting, razing, burning has gone by. But if the yellow race is superior to the white 
race, it will happen – perhaps in a way so new that it has never yet been seen.20 
Written several months before the final revisions of Colcord’s novel and eight months 
before its actual publication, it is unlikely that this letter was just a sales-boosting publicity stunt. 
Rather, it was a logical (if extreme) extension of the dominant sentiment in his fiction. Colcord 
was venting a feeling of alienation from the United States and American society that went to the 
very core of his being. Moreover, the letter revealed another vital aspect of this self-distancing 
from the world around him. Colcord’s vision in his letter was one of radical upheaval, and of 
                                                 
20 Lincoln Colcord, “An American Who Believes in the Superiority of the Yellow Race,” The American Magazine 
73, No. 4 (February 1912), 507. Emphasis in the original. 
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great social-political overturns that would inevitably follow in its wake. In 1912, it was only in 
his wildest fantasies that he could ever be part of such a thing. But in years soon to come, the 
door was opened wide to just the sort of titanic change that he craved to see with his own eyes. 
 The outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 captivated Colcord as nothing had before. 
Although he continued to publish short stories into 1915, his output of fiction dwindled to 
nothing by the end of that year. The great conflict overseas became the focus of his literary work. 
It demanded a response, and respond he did through the fall and into the summer of the 
following year. The final product – published in October 1915 but with the bulk of the original 
manuscript sent to Macmillan in December 1914 – was Vision of War, a 149-page epic poem 
written in free verse à la Walt Whitman.21 The poem received high praise from some quarters, 
with the most glowing review of all coming from William Stanley Braithwaite of the influential 
Boston Evening Transcript who declared it “the most important piece of literature of the year.”22 
Less sympathetic reviewers, however, found much to criticize in its incendiary core theme, the 
spiritual power of war to purge society of its materialism and selfishness.23 Colcord gave ample 
evidence for this throughout the poem, such as this verse out of the sixth canto: 
The actual fighting is not of the least importance; 
The killing and being killed are not worth talking about;  
The willingness to be killed is the only vital issue;  
The spirit of war is its only argument.24 
                                                 
21 George P. Brett to LC, December 17, 1914, CFA Box 12 Folder 266. Colcord sent the manuscript to New York 
via his sister Joanna, whom he also relied on for help revising it. 
22 William Stanley Braithwaite, “A Modern Poet’s Vision of War,” Boston Evening Transcript (October 9, 1915). 
23 A belief in the socially rejuvenating qualities of war was a genuine phenomenon among middle- and upper-class 
Americans at the turn-of-the-twentieth century. For an overview, see chapter 3, “The Destructive Element: Modern 
Commercial Society and the Martial Ideal” in T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the 
Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 98-139. 
24 Lincoln Colcord, Vision of War (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 39-42. 
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 But there was a singular purpose for all this killing in Colcord’s scheme, one far more 
monumental than spiritual purification alone. The pain, destruction, and death of the Great War 
would set the world on fire, but out of the flames would come a new and better world unified by 
its suffering and dedicated to peace and conciliation. Writing twenty years after the poem’s 
publication, he could be perfectly frank about his original intent. “[It] was more or less a 
philosophical celebration of war in the midst of a semi-barbarous world, as a means of getting 
things ironed out and working forward to an ultimate civilization.”25 Although he used other 
names in the poem itself – the “Democracy of the World,” the “Republic of Humanity,” the 
“Brotherhood of Man” – he illustrated that ultimate vision at length in the second canto: 
Spirit exalted! Above the armies of men in battle it hovers, valorous, undefiled;  
There, on the field of carnage and death, stand forth the highest instincts of the soul; 
There find ye courage, strength, nobility, ungrudging service; 
There find ye infinite tenderness and compassion, the generosity of worthy foemen; 
… 
There near-appearing, the dream that stood far off in times of peace; 
Love without bound, love compassing the enemy and friend alike; 
Unselfish love, a flash of the ideal; 
Love of humanity – the Brotherhood of Man!26 
Colcord’s response to his critics at the time did not deny their accusations that he 
idealized the struggle of war. He could not, of course. Instead, he pointed them in another 
direction. “The war is making us all over,” Colcord said in a long interview with Braithwaite, 
“showing us our true relations and purposes, clearing up our minds.” The greatest benefit 
Americans could reap from the European war was to realize a fundamental truth of human 
                                                 
25 LC to Edwin Borchard, June 10, 1937, CFA Box 7 Folder 97. 
26 Colcord, Vision of War, 24-26. 
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nature. “I do not believe that England or France or America are purely democratic and Germany 
purely autocratic… The two [democracy and autocracy] cannot be separated. One isn’t right and 
the other wrong. Both are tightly interwoven in the heart of man.” Thus “the real issue in this 
great war” was not a moral one, but a struggle for “mutual enlightenment” between “the two 
contending groups.” Colcord elaborated: 
How much democracy – the democracy which she once had, but has now thrown 
overboard – is Germany to relearn from the Allies? How much autocracy – true 
autocracy, of the sort which we once had in good measure [Colcord refers here to the 
kind of meritocratic hierarchy embodied in the social order on sailing ships], but have 
now pretty generally thrown overboard – are we and the Allies to relearn from Germany? 
Let us attend to our high part in the matter, which is not to teach, but to learn.27 
 That subtle metaphor of “learning” rather than “teaching” was no doubt meant to indicate 
his position on American involvement in the war. In verse, Colcord exalted the spirit of war to 
the limit, although he painstakingly debunked any supposed moral high ground of the principle 
belligerents in the conflict – including Germany, England, and even Belgium.28 But in prose, by 
contrast, his judgement leaned decisively towards non-intervention for his own country.  
In a June 1915 letter to the New Republic he excoriated the Wilson administration for the 
“absurd and evil censorship” of its diplomatic correspondence with Japan and China. “The fact 
of the matter,” he wrote, “is that, from the first, public opinion in the United States was 
determined to hold aloof from any entanglements with the European war; and this state of mind 
was so widespread and made itself so evident that there could be no question of its sound and 
permanent quality.” It was full awareness of the realities abroad that had kept Americans from 
                                                 
27 William Stanley Braithwaite, “The War Finds a Real Poet at Last,” Boston Evening Transcript (March 15, 1916). 
28 Most of these critiques centered on chiding the belligerents for their current and historical imperialism; for 
instance, Belgium for “tainting the spirit of the whole world” through its Congo atrocities, Britain for crying “wrong 
of conquest” against Germany when it was a “born arch-conqueror,” Japan for Westernizing with the malevolent 
intent of using technological advantage to seize territory from China. Colcord, Vision of War, 82, 89, 101. 
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becoming “embroiled” thus far. Losing access to that reality risked fomenting the “jealousy, 
suspicion, apprehension, or other influences which make for war.”29  
Although he never referred back to it as a watershed in his intellectual development, this 
brief piece was, in effect, the seminal expression of the same isolationist impulse that would 
totally dominate his political priorities two decades into the future. Indeed, the distinctive 
language of the letter was the direct antecedent of his anti-interventionist writing through the 
decade before Pearl Harbor. It was one of many tragedies in Lincoln Colcord’s life that in the 
nearer term this deep-seated isolationist impulse was subsumed by another, much stronger one – 
the dream of a new world. 
 Colcord’s letter followed the anti-interventionist editorial line of the New Republic, then 
less than a year old but fast becoming a major voice for American liberal opinion.30 Although he 
declined a formal role in the magazine offered by one of its editors, over the next two years he 
did publish a number of poems, letters, and several articles as a freelancer.31 The first and most 
important of those articles was “The Truer Germany,” a commentary on the “change in German 
thought from internationalism to nationalism.” Colcord’s reading of German history led him to 
“a single disquieting conclusion: the world persistently refused to leave Germany alone,” thus 
forcing a people once known for their “broad and tolerant internationalism” to “develop power” 
for the sake of their own survival. In this way, “scoring the cloak of hypocrisy, and feeling no 
                                                 
29 Lincoln Colcord, “Making Diplomatic Correspondence Public,” New Republic 3, No. 31 (June 5, 1915), 124-25. 
30 Christopher Nichols notes that the New Republic in the opening years of the war promoted a peculiar balance of 
isolationism and internationalism, calling for the United States to preserve its neutrality while also encouraging it to 
exert its national influence to bring about peace in Europe. Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: 
America at the Dawn of a Global Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 127-29. 
31 In December 1914, after reading a letter of his views on the war forwarded from George Brett, Herbert Croly 
personally approached Colcord about having him “on our list as a permanent, and more or less regular, contributor.” 
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sentimental drawbacks,” its “power for defense was easily and naturally metamorphosed into 
power for conquest.”32 
 But despite this brutal reality, Colcord still did not take a side in the European conflict 
and favored a “drawn campaign” as the best possible outcome. Presaging the famous phrase 
“peace without victory” – coined in the New Republic in December 1916 and taken up by 
Woodrow Wilson in January 1917 – he warned that “[a]n absolute defeat on the one hand means 
an absolute victory on the other; and history proves that nothing is more potentially dangerous 
than an absolute victory… such a victory could easily become disastrous to humanity at large.” 
“If there is ever to be a sound peace,” he concluded, “faith in the true Germany must be the chief 
article of the terms,” just as “Germany’s mission, if she is to have a mission, must be to teach 
nations how to leave each other alone and how to govern themselves at home.”33 
 It was this provocative article, according to historian John Reinertson, that first brought 
Lincoln Colcord to the attention of Colonel Edward M. House.34 A Texan by birth but with 
primary residences in New York City and Massachusetts, by 1915 the independently wealthy 
former politician was the closest single advisor to President Woodrow Wilson despite holding no 
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official post in the administration. But even without a title, House was a man of real power, a 
fact that Colcord would directly benefit from as the two grew closer.  
In late 1916, it was House who paved the way for Colcord to join the Philadelphia Public 
Ledger, a traditionally Republican newspaper whose owner, Cyrus Curtis, and editor, H.B. 
Brougham, were collaborating with both House and Wilson himself to realign with the 
Democratic administration.35 House initially pushed for the paper to send Colcord to Europe. 
There he could serve as both its overseas correspondent and as one of House’s unofficial 
“agents” monitoring European affairs and building connections with European liberals.36 In the 
end, rising U.S.-German tensions in early 1917 forced Colcord’s impromptu reassignment to 
Washington, D.C.37 Nevertheless, the prelude to the original scheme involved Colonel House 
mailing a copy of “The Truer Germany” and an advance proof of his latest New Republic piece 
directly to the president for vetting.38 “Colcord is a man of fine integrity,” House testified to his 
chief in the accompanying letter; “[he] is a progressive and an ardent admirer of yours. He is, I 
think, the best man we could have to make a start in the direction planned.”39  
 In a broader context, Colcord was but one man in a wide circle of liberal journalists 
whom Edward House gathered around himself. Walter Lippmann and Herbert Croly of the New 
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Republic, William C. Bullitt of the Public Ledger, Frank Cobb and Herbert Bayard Swope of the 
New York World, David Lawrence of the New York Evening Post, Ray Stannard Baker, and 
Raymond Swing were among the other members of House’s informal clique. “Together,” writes 
Christopher Lasch, “they constituted a personal following, all of them dedicated to the Colonel, 
all of them convinced that he represented the pinnacle of political wisdom and convinced, 
moreover, that his views were those of the administration as a whole.” As willing accessories to 
a colossal “publicity” project for shoring up American opinion behind the president before and 
after the United States joined the war, “[i]t was through their innocent efforts, in part, that the 
liberal public was so long deceived about the real direction of Wilson’s foreign policy.”40 
 But Colcord was more than just another of House’s agents, and likewise, House was 
more than just a convenient patron whose support could be parleyed into a successful career in 
journalism. In many respects, the two were made for each other. All through the years leading up 
to 1916, Colcord was intensely interested in the spiritual decay of American society and the need 
for bold, sweeping change to remedy it. And as was suggested by his 1912 letter hailing Yuan 
Shikai, Colcord was also in search of a great man to follow into a brighter future. Such a man – a 
“Man of God,” as he wrote in an April 1916 article titled “Religious Democracy” – would 
necessarily stand “outside” the organizations of the status quo to cultivate the “prophetic spirit of 
[his] ministry.” An “outright and uncompromising idealist,” he would challenge the “majority” 
to break their complacency, shun the “conventions of materialism,” and ultimately, shake “the 
very foundations of the established order.”41 
                                                 
40 Lasch, The New Radicalism, 234-35. David McFadden notes that, in fact, House’s full circle spread much wider 
than mainstream liberal journalists like Colcord and Lippmann. It also included outright leftists and socialists like 
Lincoln Steffens, Max Eastman, Albert Rhys Williams, Bessie Beatty, and John Reed. David W. McFadden, 
Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 43. 
41 Lincoln Colcord, “Religious Democracy,” The Forum (April 1916), 385-97. 
27 
 
Colcord believed he found that man in Edward House. Indeed, such was the magnitude of 
his respect for the Colonel, that in special, confidential correspondence with his editor in 1917 
Colcord sometimes gave him the alias “Lee Fu,” the name of the infallible Chinese sage from his 
now dormant fiction.42 So much trust did House place in his acolyte in turn, that he revealed to 
him a fact which, according to Reinertson, he scrupulously “sought to conceal.” House admitted 
that he was the author of an anonymous 1912 novel – Philip Dru: Administrator – the story of a 
mysterious bureaucrat who seizes power over a corrupt and unstable United States after a second 
civil war in order to reform it under his absolute, all-knowing authority.43 
In his thorough study of the relationship between these two unique men, Christopher 
Lasch found them mutually captivated by “the politics of fantasy.” House could not afford to 
show it in his public life as Colcord did, but in the fictional world of Philip Dru and in private 
conversation with the idealistic young writer, he revealed that there was another man beneath his 
placid façade of subordination to the president. His “daydreams,” writes Lasch, “were dreams of 
subversion and civil strife,” prompted by “a fierce resentment” against American society and all 
its faults. With Lincoln Colcord, House found a man of similar bent. His dreams, too, were 
dominated by “apocalyptic” change, and particularly the conviction that the current war would 
be “the cataclysm from which the brave new world would arise.”44 
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28 
 
It was initially through House that Colcord built up his faith in Wilson to bring that world 
to fruition. Before 1917, he took a dispassionate view of the president and his foreign policy. He 
had certainly warmed to Wilson since his scathing June 1915 letter to the New Republic. Yet in a 
letter to his mother written just days after the 1916 election, he admitted that while he voted to 
reelect the president, he did so on the rather simple grounds that “it would have been a great 
mistake to change just now – and I didn’t like the way Hughes shaped besides.”45 His December 
1916 article in the New Republic, then, marks the real turning point in his perspective on Wilson.  
It bears repeating that an advance proof of this article was sent by Edward House directly 
to the president. In light of Colcord’s ambivalence only a month earlier, its approving tone 
strongly suggests he had forewarning that Wilson might read it.46 The crux of the piece was to 
heartily applaud Wilson’s policy of naval expansion short of rivaling Britain. “The present 
administration,” Colcord wrote, “seems to have aligned itself with the liberals on this question”; 
challenging British naval supremacy now would mean following the recent path of Germany, “a 
voyage which leads nowhere but to defeat or imperialism.” But while he validated Wilson’s 
acquiescence in Britain’s frankly “reactionary” wartime sea policies, he also insisted that out of 
the inevitable peace must come fundamental change; “a new and more liberal order of 
internationalism, whereby vital matters may be settled without resort to arms.”47 
With this last line, Colcord was decisively aligning himself with the president. Before 
and after 1917, such a global reconstruction laid at the center of Wilson’s scheme for the postwar 
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world.48 But all the same, Colcord was also asserting a war aim of his own. His “new order” of 
1916 was basically the “sound peace” he called for in 1915 in “The Truer Germany.” His hopes 
for fulfilling that dream had not abated, but were primed to rise exponentially. For the previous 
two years, he had tackled the war in Europe with earnestness and wild idealism, captivated by 
visions seismic change at home and abroad. In the year to come, he would choose to submerge 
himself even more completely in the greatest political currents of the time. 
Fair Winds and Foul, 1917-1918 
Colcord served as the Philadelphia Public Ledger’s Washington correspondent from 
January 1917 to the summer of 1918, although for most of 1917 he actually lived in New York 
City to be closer to his primary “source” within the Wilson administration, Colonel House.49 
Like the other journalists in his circle, House used Colcord as a vehicle for distributing his news 
and perspectives on Wilson, administration policy, and the war all through that period. In kind, 
Colcord was thus privilege to true insider information that made for invaluable newspaper 
stories.50 Writing long in hindsight – and in the decade when his personal experience during the 
First World War was an essential part of his argument for isolationism – he had no qualms about 
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labeling himself “Colonel House’s mouthpiece in the press” during his Washington years.51 But 
this jaundiced self-assessment did not do justice to his real journalism, nor to his real relationship 
with House. Christopher Lasch notes that Colcord had unusually frequent and close contact with 
House, seeing him multiple times per week through the winter and spring of 1917 and, by May, 
making daily visits to discuss his articles for the paper and their personal views of current events. 
This is indicative of a relationship based on more than convenience. Even with the inescapable 
factor of mutual self-interest, “there was,” Lasch writes, “for a time at least, a deeper bond as 
well, made firmer by Colcord’s unconcealed admiration.”52  
Lincoln Colcord was indeed a relay man for the Colonel’s insider news and speculation. 
But in his actual reporting, his interpretations of that news were ultimately his own. And in any 
event, for the majority of 1917, he and House had a natural alignment on political issues and 
blended their individual perspectives virtually into one. Both men held a passionate desire to see 
a fundamentally “new world” born out of the European war. In more practical terms, they were 
united in their preference for a moderate, or “liberal,” peace to resolve the issues that created the 
war in the first place. They were also convinced that such a peace required the ascent of liberal 
or even socialist governments within Europe’s waring states.53 Finally, and most importantly, 
they shared fantastically high expectations for Woodrow Wilson to carry that peace through at 
the war’s conclusion while laying its foundation as the conflict dragged on. 
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House’s unique and powerful influence aside, Colcord found solid ground for his faith in 
Wilson early and on his own. The president’s monumental address to Congress on January 22, 
1917 – a speech best remembered for its two stirring demands from the waring powers: freedom 
of the seas and a peace without victory – stirred Colcord’s spirit at the core. Even in his later, 
bitter days two decades after Wilson’s failure to achieve those ends, he still granted that the 
January 22nd speech was an act of “real liberalism” to the president’s credit, “a vision of the 
complete reformation of the Am[erican] gov[ernment] and of the world.”54 In Wilson’s address, 
Colcord found mirrored several of his own vital convictions. The “revolutionary” proposal for 
freedom of the seas, while only applicable after the cessation of hostilities, promised nothing less 
than to “automatically do away with many of the direct causes themselves of the war.”55 
Likewise, the “peace without victory” refrain revealed to Colcord Wilson’s understanding that 
there could “no lasting peace without forgiveness and faith towards the enemy,” and that out of 
the war must come a “new world” where “nations may rise or fall according to the measure of 
their energy and creative ability rather than by resort to arms.”56  
The German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare at the start of February not 
only steeled Colcord’s support for the president, it reaffirmed his overall view of the conflict. 
Since his 1915 “Truer Germany” article, Colcord believed that beneath imperial Germany’s 
reigning “militarism” was a “liberal” essence that could reemerge and guide the country into the 
new international system Wilson was proposing. This perspective was shared by his mentor 
Edward House and the president himself in no uncertain terms.57 Colcord thus sided with the 
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administration in his reaction to the submarine move. German militarism “betrayed” the 
president’s faith by rejecting his “concrete” proposal for “a moderate world peace.” Only change 
within Germany itself, getting “Liberal Germany firmly in the saddle” of government, offered 
hope for real progress in ending the war.58 
After Wilson’s severing of diplomatic relations with Germany, Colcord grimly predicted 
his country’s future; “now America stands on the brink of war… [and i]f we enter the war we 
will have been forced into it by German junkerdom.” That perilous prospect, however, was not 
necessarily for the worse. Colcord had not forgotten his Vision of War. Now, that vision loomed 
on the real horizon. “War has a spiritual value whole equivalent has not yet been supplied in 
times of peace… a spiritual value whose profound reaction is plainly to be seen throughout 
Europe today. It may be that only through war can the true organization of human forces be 
accomplished. It may well be that America today needs war more than she knows.”59 
Much as the fulfillment of this personal fantasy tempted him, Colcord was not yet 
converted to a true war mentality. He recognized that in Europe, the spirit of war had grown into 
a “Frankenstein’s monster” where “liberals tend to become conservatives, the rule of reason is 
threatened, and the passions of men are loosed in force and power.” America, too, had its 
“junkers” who relished the possibilities war opened for them. Even as peace persisted, Colcord 
saw all around him “the forces which make for war, which assume that war is inevitable, which 
will have war whether or no… They are the forces which, if war comes, will make the most of 
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patriotism. We must watch them closely then, lest we serve to contribute only another arm to the 
octopus of world junkerdom.” But concluding on a positive note, he encouraged his readers to be 
thankful for their national leadership. “It is well for us,” he wrote, “that we have in our chief post 
of authority one of the most uncompromising liberals the world has ever seen.60 
With a final line like that, it was little wonder that House took the initiative to send this 
article to the president for his opinion.61 Replying to the Colonel, Wilson explicitly referred back 
to Colcord’s domestic fear and smoothly allayed it. He rejected the prospect of a “coalition” with 
“certain once hostile quarters” as merely “the Junkerthum trying to creep in under the cover of 
the patriotic feeling of the moment.” He assured his aide that “[t]hey will not get in… I know 
them too well, and will hit them straight between the eyes, if necessary, with plain words.”62 
Considering the frequency of Colcord’s visits to House and the closeness of their relationship, 
the contents of this letter must have reached the eager young journalist in good time. In this way, 
he would have had the most personal of guarantees that Woodrow Wilson was a man who could 
be trusted to stand firm on his liberal principles. In the year to come, as his initial confidence 
wavered in the face of new events, Colcord would need further (and more direct) confirmation 
from the president about his intent. But for the moment, his faith in Wilson was fixed.  
His doubts about the war, however, lingered through weeks leading up to the United 
States’ official entry on April 2, 1917. In that brief interim period, Colcord held out hope for “a 
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moderate victory and a moderate peace” without American involvement in the fighting. 
“America has never felt that this was her war,” he wrote, harkening back to his anti-
interventionist perspective of June 1915, and “no nation of the world had less part in the making 
of it,” a fact which “has stood solidly at the base of our neutrality.” Nevertheless, unbreakable 
economic and cultural connections between the old world and the new had played their part. 
“America little by little finds herself involved in the war.” As an alternative, though, Colcord 
favored a peace conference of belligerents and neutrals alike, one where the “staunch liberalism” 
of American representatives could “swing the balance in favor of a moderate course.”63  
These deep-seated feelings did not disappear completely after April 2nd, but they did go 
dormant in favor an enthusiastically pro-war and pro-Wilson line. Three days into the war, 
Colcord endorsed wartime press censorship. His only plea was for it to be “a liberal censorship” 
dedicated to the policy that speech, and especially political speech, would “remain unhindered” 
except in cases obviously involving “military intelligence.”64 The following week he endorsed 
conscription, then under debate in Congress. Dismissing fears that universal military service 
would allow “the specter of militarism” to infect American society, he argued that it was, in fact, 
spiritually superior to the “volunteer system.” Conscription, he wrote, “would only take us young 
and train us, more for the purposes of peace than of war. It would supply the gravest lack in 
American life – the lack of discipline, the lack of a respect for authority… [and also] the sober 
realization of the dangers and duties of war.”65 
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In May, Colcord took his position to its logical conclusion. Americans were living at the 
dawn of a new era, he declared. They were realizing that “the world has changed overnight, that 
it has changed radically and irrevocably, that it can never again be the same world.” The “old 
gods” of “privilege and autocracy” were “falling from their pedestals” one by one. The “new 
gods” of the “new world” would be “co-ordinated government and centralization of executive 
power.” No longer could “the political sores of America” – the worst of which Colcord cited as 
Congress itself, corrupted by greed and dedicated to obstructing the president’s action – be left to 
fester; “they will soon need the surgeon and the knife.”  That knife could be wielded by “one 
man” alone, for “the only force powerful enough to break down the new autocracy of wealth, to 
bridge the widening gulf between the classes, to restore freedom and liberty in their true 
definition as equality of opportunity, is the force of an unfettered elective authority.”66 
This was the zenith of Lincoln Colcord’s public confidence in Woodrow Wilson. In this 
article, Wilson the president became nothing less than a total social panacea, a kind of domestic 
compliment to Wilson “the great Liberal” who was leading America out of its “isolation” and 
into a new role as the leader and protector of a “world-union of democracies.”67 Although 
Colcord qualified that the office of the president had been given “too much power” already, he 
also admitted that the expansion of executive authority was a longstanding trend that “the 
people” themselves approved. So did he.68 And lest this be read as the voice of House projected 
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through his acolyte, Colcord repeated exactly this sentiment in public just over a week later in a 
speech before the Academy of Political Science’s National Conference on Foreign Relations.69 
Much of that speech was shamelessly recycled from his Public Ledger articles, including 
the line he concluded on; that Americans were fortunate to have as their leader “one of the most 
uncompromising liberals the world has ever seen.”70 But one element was very different. As he 
saw before, “[o]ld gods are falling from their pedestals; new gods are rising on every hand.” But 
now, two months after the abdication of the Russian Czar and the installation of a Provisional 
Government promising comprehensive social and political reforms, Colcord saw a new light in 
the east, a powerful omen for the new world being born. 
Today Russia has spoken, and in her utterance gathers the whole significance of the war. 
Through the splendid Russian Revolution, the French Revolution has at last come into its 
own; and hand in hand with America, Russia now stands ready to take the next step 
onward for democracy… However it may be, I think there can be no doubt that, even if it 
were to fail for its own generation as did the French Revolution, history will mark the 
Russian Revolution as the end of our old era and the beginning of our new.71 
If Woodrow Wilson was the great liberal statesman leading the way to the new world, 
revolutionary Russia was that world’s spiritual harbinger. But at this point in the war, Colcord 
could have been comfortable with such a double faith. Just a week after the March Revolution, 
Wilson officially recognized the new Russian government and gave it additional, moral 
validation in his speech calling for war against Germany on April 2nd. The Russian people, he 
memorably declared, were now “a fit partner for a league of honor” fighting for “the freedom of 
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the world.” President Wilson, writes historian David McFadden, was thus responsible for linking 
together “democracy, Russia, and world crusade.”72 
This was precisely the geopolitical sequence that Lincoln Colcord followed for the 
remainder of the war and into the chaotic postwar era. Full acceptance of the new Russia (and 
soon, of another, more radical Russian government), combined with his original insistence on a 
liberal peace, were now Colcord’s benchmarks for judging the legitimacy of Wilson’s wartime 
leadership. Indeed, he meshed the two seamlessly in a June 5th editorial reminding the president 
that “the Russian policy” for war aims was now officially in line with his own promise from 
April 2nd for the United States itself – “no conquest, no indemnity.”73 
But Colcord would have to wait half-a-year for a formal statement of Wilson’s war aims. 
In the interim, events at home and abroad would inject dangerous doubts into his faith in the 
president. In early June, he privately vented his dissatisfaction with two of the Wilson’s recent 
policies: the dispatch of a mission to Russia under the notoriously imperialist ex-Senator Elihu 
Root, and the denial of passports for Americans to attend an international peace conference in 
Stockholm, Sweden meant to bring together leftist and socialist leaders from countries on both 
sides of the war. Colcord’s sympathies were already beginning to turn, and as his faith in Wilson 
waned, his faith in House and the forces of the European left rose to compensate.74 
                                                 
72 McFadden, Alternative Paths, 52. 
73 “‘No Conquest, No Indemnity,’” PPL (June 5, 1917). Again, this unsigned editorial can be found in Colcord’s 
personally compiled collection of his articles among his archival papers. CFA Box 19 Folder 503. 
74 “‘The point is that the Russians and the Socialists have got hold of the truth this time – the truth that must set us 
free. But it can’t be accepted by the [Allied] Governments because of a capitalistic tradition. You are the one man in 
the world that I know of who stands in an irreproachable position with all the Governments, and who at the same 
time faces and believes in the truth that they are talking in Stockholm and Petrograd. You could bridge the chasm. I 
doubt if anyone else could.’” LC to Edward House, June 4, 1917, quoted in Reinertson, “Colonel House, Woodrow 
Wilson and European Socialism 1917-1919," 249. 
38 
 
It was the peace and the president’s ability to make it which troubled Colcord most that 
fall. “The war cannot be won in the spirit manifested by the President to-day,” he wrote to House 
in early October, referring to Wilson’s recent rejection of a call for peace from the Pope. Wilson 
“unquestionably is thinking very muddled liberalism.” The “true liberal, the true man of peace, is 
the best warrior… while in a flame of energy and passion he makes ready to fight, the true liberal 
with a flame of love in his heart at the same time makes ready to forgive. The President is rapidly 
placing America in a position where she can do neither.” To his mentor, the man who he now 
held personally responsible for “the best of his [Wilson’s] liberalism,” he wondered aloud, “Is 
the President, like all the heads of governments abroad, allowing himself to become more afraid 
of peace than of war?”75 
Colcord was entirely right to be so suspicious. The gulf between the president’s liberal 
words and his illiberal actions was real, and ultimately, a fatal weakness to his entire project of 
creating a new and better international system with the United States at its head. Historian Ross 
Kennedy has described this as the “fundamental paradox of Wilson’s national security strategy.” 
Reforming international relations to create a permanent world peace was, indeed, Wilson’s 
highest ideal before, during, and after American intervention in the war. But the means he used 
to achieve it – refusing to make peace with Germany during the war and allowing the Allies to 
press it too hard at the peace – were precisely the opposite of that ideal. By “practicing power 
politics to end power politics,” not only did Wilson compromise his own reputation, he ensured 
that there would be no real “end” to the old international system at all.76  
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In November, the time for testing Colcord’s question of Wilson’s sincerity finally came. 
His interest in Russia following the March Revolution was significant, but not predominating. 
After the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7th, his imagination was captured completely. In a 
series of bold strokes, the new Russian government released the contents of secret treaties signed 
by the Allied nations promising each other massive imperial spoils after the war’s conclusion, 
and then issued a flat proposal for a general armistice. Following conversations with the old 
Provisional Government’s Ambassador, Boris Bakhmeteff, on November 14th, Colcord was 
immediately convinced that the Bolsheviks’ true goal was to “reaffirm the original intent of the 
[March] Russian revolution… to push home the original demand for a revision of the war aims 
of the Allies… [for] upon the issue hangs the fate of the war.”77 He made this imperative public 
in an article later in the month, but that alone was not enough to put his fears to rest.78  
On December 3, 1917, Colcord wrote Wilson directly to offer his perspective on Russia 
and its future. His letter was long, but had three key elements, all grounded with a tactful pledge, 
“I am not a socialist.” The first was to assure the president that “the Bolsheviki were not so black 
as they have been painted,” and they had brought “order, not chaos, to Russia.” The second was 
to defend their release of the secret treaties as a brave attempt to hold the Allies to task. And the 
third was to call on Wilson to send a new, more “sympathetic” mission to Russia and to 
recognize its Bolshevik-controlled government. “Unless it is recognized,” he warned, “America 
and the Allies must thereafter stand frankly on a basis of imperialistic war aims.”79  
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The letter was expertly timed. The very next day, Wilson used his State of the Union 
Address to give his sympathy to the Russian people (but not their government). Although not 
what he had pled for, Colcord still lavishly praised the speech in one of his usual articles, calling 
it a clear reaffirmation of the January 22nd “Peace Without Victory” address despite its 
completely avoiding the issue of the secret treaties.80 He found some additional comfort in a brief 
letter from Wilson himself thanking the journalist for his “generous and comprehending” article, 
but also courteously declining to send a new mission to Russia.81 
Undeterred by this polite rejection of an issue so important to him, Colcord promptly 
replied to the president. Again he praised the recent speech but also reiterated his confidence in 
the Bolshevik government; “Lenine and Trotsky, under the pressure of responsibility, will suffer 
a change of heart” and “modify” their program “to force social revolution upon nations which 
are not prepared for it.” More than this, though, Colcord threw back the curtain on the faith that 
went deeper into his soul than his faith in Wilson alone. A new world was the amorphous dream 
both men shared, but Colcord put no limits on how far he would go to see it made real: 
Not being a socialist myself, I cannot contemplate with equanimity the frightful measures 
which are surely imminent in the world to-day… Ultimately, of course, there can be no 
disaster in revolution. But I believe with all my heart that there could always have been 
an orderly way to accomplish what revolutions have accomplished… The new world 
which is plain before us, which is inevitable, cannot and must not come through anarchy. 
Yet that, too, is plain before us as the next step, if wise and brave things are not done… 
But the difference [between compromise and conviction], slight in definition, is vast in 
results. If there is no other way, and if the time has come, then I am for revolution.82 
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Wilson did not reply to this letter, but remarkably, it did not close the door of the White 
House to the journalist the following month.83 Nor, for that matter, did Colcord’s bombshell 
editorial of New Year’s Day, 1918 – an open declaration of his sympathy with Russia’s 
Bolshevik government, a condemnation of the “western imperialistic democracies” and their 
secret treaties, and a call for the president to reply to both forces with “a great message of 
Liberalism that will be will be translated now into great Liberal acts.”84 A flurry of letters to the 
Public Ledger ensued, some praising the piece and others denouncing it along with the paper’s 
editorial line more generally.85 The critics were not without due cause. H.B. Brougham was in 
lock-step with Colcord in his distaste for Allied imperialism and in seeing the necessity of 
Russia’s cooperation with the United States to forging a liberal peace.86 By mid-March, 
Colcord’s articles and editorials on Russia created such a stir in Philadelphia that the paper was 
forced to respond to accusations of white-washing the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary ideology.87 The 
Public Ledger’s official statement did not rebuke its reporter, but took an open-ended stance on 
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the Bolsheviks themselves; “the question is not one of detail, but of principle. We are for 
whatever party represents the cause of liberty in any country.”88 
Colcord found much needed relief in Wilson’s course through the early months of 1918. 
On January 8th, the president finally announced the war aims that Colcord had so long waited for, 
his Fourteen Points – a joint production between Wilson and Edward House. In his article 
editorializing the speech, Colcord conceded that Wilson’s terms for the peace were not perfect, 
and on territorial issues like Alsace-Lorraine and a Polish state it was downright “vague.” But it 
did take two vital steps in the right direction: Wilson “implicitly recognized the government of 
the Soviet” through his sympathetic message to “the Russian people,” and gave a positive 
reference to an anti-war declaration by German Socialists in the Reichstag from the previous 
summer as a means of stimulating “German Liberalism” to push for the reins of government. 
Wilson’s speech, Colcord wrote, “his message to the new world,” was the “outright stroke of 
liberal and farseeing statesmanship” that world had been waiting for. It would “accomplish more 
than many armies could do toward a true solution” to the war.89 
These were, indeed, two of the effects Wilson and House intended to achieve with their 
document. But as shown in Colcord’s individual case, it also achieved their desired domestic 
effect as well, rallying American liberal opinion behind the president after months of anxious 
waiting for a real move towards peace and a postwar new order.90 In February, Wilson gave 
Colcord more rhetorical fodder for his hopes. Replying to recent statements by German and 
Austro-Hungarian diplomats, the president struck a conciliatory tone toward Austria but kept up 
his hard line against Germany in a move to create a split between the Central Powers and 
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encourage change of government in Germany. In addition, he reiterated his ultimate goal for the 
war, “‘a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice.’” 
Just as in 1917, Colcord continued to read into such vague lines absolutely everything he desired 
of the president. “What does all this mean,” he asked his readers, “if it does not mean a complete 
avowal of all that the Russian revolution asks for, all that the new world requires?”91 
But this was a tenuous fantasy, and a new issue – Allied military intervention in Russia’s 
ongoing civil war – brought the reality home. In early March, news began to circulate that Japan, 
with the encouragement of Britain and France, was planning an invasion of far eastern Russia on 
the pretense of preserving the territory from the civil war in the west. Colcord saw in this nothing 
more than rank imperialism and warned the president against joining the venture. “Liberal critics 
here assert that in so doing America would destroy the foundations of her moral position in the 
war, legitimize the distrust which the people of Russia have for American democracy, and make 
it impossible for her to enunciate a clear message of liberalism to the world.”92 
This was a prophecy painfully close to the future, but Colcord used his voice in the press 
to push hard against intervention through the month, a strategy mirrored by Colonel House 
working with the president directly.93 Colcord’s initial articles on the subject almost quake with 
rage at the prospect of American military intervention in Russia’s internal affairs, an attack not 
just on a wartime ally (at least until the Bolsheviks made peace with Germany on March 3rd), but 
also on a living symbol of Wilson’s own dream of a new international order coming to fruition. 
“Such a compromise,” Colcord wrote of U.S. intervention, “would too clearly land America in a 
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moral position in which it would be impossible for her to maintain with sincerity those principles 
of international idealism which President Wilson had laid down.”94 
 Colcord was fortunate that in mid-March, the president expressed what he saw as a 
veiled opposition to intervention through yet another ambiguous message of “sympathy” with 
“the Russian people.”95 But neither this transitory policy nor Colcord’s faith in Wilson was to 
last. Geoffrey Hodgson sums up Woodrow Wilson’s shifting responses to revolutionary Russia 
as “a special case of his general tragedy.” His initial idealism was never resolute, and it eroded 
steadily in the face of real Allied demands for support in their campaign of intervention. “As in 
Mexico,” writes Hodgson, Wilson “began by professing his sympathy for a people and his 
contempt for their rulers, and he ended by making war on both government and people.”96 
Signs of Colcord’s looming break with the administration were showing across his public 
life. At the annual meeting of the Academy of Political Science in late April, Colcord instigated 
what was reported as “an almost belligerent debate” with George Creel – head of the Committee 
on Public Information and another member of Edward House’s circle – over the issue of wartime 
censorship. Without mentioning his own position from April 1917, Colcord charged that “‘the 
censorship, as it has been used almost from the beginning of the war, is in effect a denial of 
almost all that we mean by democracy and of all that we aim to be fighting for… The press of 
the country is pitiful in its dearth of intelligent comment on the good issues of the war; a blight 
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seems to have fallen on independent thought and candid understanding.’”97 He was speaking 
from personal experience. After the letters of protest in March from its largely conservative 
readership about the leftward drift of the paper, the Public Ledger slowly returned to a more 
conservative (but still pro-Wilson) line. As a consequence, Colcord’s articles and editorials 
became less frequent after the spring, and in August, he was dismissed from the paper outright.98  
By July, “the inconsistencies and contradictions in American and Allied policy” had 
become so acute that he was privately moving to organize his own circle of liberal journalists to 
use their influence to alter the course of the war.99 But before his confidence in Wilson 
evaporated, Colcord made one more direct appeal to the president to stay out of the Allied 
intervention in Russia. On July 7th, he gave his last avowal of faith, his last promise of righteous 
glory for standing firm on liberal principles, and his last warning on the danger of failure. 
You only possess the true facts, and see clearly; I would not be writing if I lacked the 
conviction that you are preparing to do an extraordinary thing. The task before you is 
hard and thankless, but the future will repay you with the honor reserved only for those 
who dare to stand alone. I believe that America’s heroic opportunity has come. For there 
can be no compromise on this issue without ultimate defeat. I believe sincerely that 
anything short of full and outright action in co-operation with the Soviets will drench 
Russia in blood from end to end, and throw her body and soul into the arms of 
Germany… The tragic fact which, from a future social plane, history will record if this 
summer goes wrong, is that Russia all the while in her present phase has actually been 
struggling towards the same new world for which the people everywhere are fighting.100 
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Colcord did not realize it at the time, but no matter how he pled his case for non-
intervention, whether with a stronger emphasis on military expedience or more chiding the 
president about his liberal promises, the real tragedy is that it was already too late. On July 6th, 
Wilson made his decision; the United States would join the Allied invasions of Russia’s far east 
and far north for the ostensible reason of deterring German advances on Russia’s resources. 
Later in the month he announced his decision to the Allies in a private note, and by August, 
American ships, guns, and soldiers were on their way to Siberia and the Arctic Circle.101 
Even in the face of this disaster, Colcord’s idealism did not evaporate overnight. He 
joined the League of Free Nations Association in late autumn to serve as its publicity director, no 
doubt hoping to still play a public role in advocating for a moderate peace as the end of the war 
drew near.102 But that hope, too, would collapse completely as the terms of the real peace 
became apparent at the start of the following year. Ironically, though he twice pledged to Wilson 
that he was not a socialist – a sincere avowal both in name and substance103 – Colcord’s position 
on Wilson’s foreign policy had been drifting in the socialist direction since mid-1917. Elizabeth 
McKillen notes that socialists were as unconvinced by Wilson’s internationalist rhetoric during 
the war as they were before American entry. The war in their eyes had always been a defense of 
capitalism and imperialism, and by relentlessly criticizing the president on those grounds (even 
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in face of legal repression), they played a key role in “shift[ing] the debate over foreign policy to 
the left” as the conflict dragged on.104 Indeed, just as Colcord distinguished himself from the 
socialists, so too did socialists distinguish themselves from him. “The League we shall not get,” 
said Evans Clark, a New York City Socialist Party member, “is the League of the well-meaning 
liberal professional folk: the League of H.G. Wells and H.L. Brailsford, the League of Herbert 
Coly and Lincoln Colcord… The League we shall get… [is] a League of Businessman’s 
Republics. We know who will control it and in whose interests it will be directed.”105 
Clark was not wrong, and Colcord continued to drift into that more radical camp as the 
reality slowly took form. The end of the war thus brought him no solace. Russia was still a pariah 
state, and the United States was still contributing to the “demolition” its unprecedented social 
experiment, “the next step forward in the machinery of democratic government… To break the 
new Russian democracy means, in no uncertain terms, to lose the fight for the new world.”106 
This was always the hardest test of Wilson’s commitment to his principles, and it was this test 
which the president decisively failed. In Lincoln Colcord’s final judgement, the war for the new 
world would forever be the war that Woodrow Wilson lost. 
The Reversing Current, 1919-1924 
 The years which followed his expulsion from the Philadelphia Public Ledger, American 
intervention in the Russian Civil War, and the November armistice ending the First World War, 
were a period of extraordinary activity for Lincoln Colcord. Beginning all at once at the start of 
1919, he let loose a veritable flood of writing on national and international dilemmas, joined a 
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dizzying array of political organizations, and became a professional advocate for left-liberal 
causes stretching from industrial reorganization to civil liberties.107 But Colcord was just one of a 
legion of liberals and leftists who defected from the Wilson camp in the World War’s immediate 
wake. Long before the struggle in Paris and Washington over the peace, writes Thomas Knock, 
Wilson had made “crucial mistakes” that cost him the needed support for his final victory – first 
his acquiescence to the wave of wartime repression that Colcord himself spoke out against in 
April 1918, and then to the demands of the Allies for a harsh peace at Versailles. As truly as 
Wilson believed in his own “progressive internationalism,” responsibility for the erosion of his 
once broad base of domestic support in 1919 ultimately lies in his failure to live up to his own 
idealism at home and abroad.108  
Colcord was well-positioned to make known his political shift. In the spring of that year 
he was hired as an associate editor and Washington correspondent by one of the premier left-
liberal magazines in the country – The Nation – owned and edited by the hardline pacifist 
Oswald Garrison Villard whose other vehicle, the New York Evening Post, had been the only 
American newspaper to publish the full texts of the Allies’ secret treaties during the war.109 
Remaining on the staff into the following year, this gave him a high journalistic perch for 
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reigning down brutal criticism against the president and his administration. During the 
immediate postwar years, beliefs that had gradually developed during the war calcified into a set 
of absolute convictions about Wilson and his foreign policy failures. These were the grim 
memories that Colcord carried intact into the decades to come. He had warned the president 
about the judgement of history; now, he passed a merciless judgement of his own. 
 “We went into the war, on the argument of the President, to fight for ideals and for a 
democratic peace,” wrote Colcord in his first article for The Nation. “Neither ideals nor a 
democratic peace have been the resultant… secret treaties are what we have won.” There was no 
hint of this future in the public mind in 1917 or 1918. “Perhaps we were determined to idealize 
the war,” he wondered, speaking for both his nation and himself. After all, “[t]he cue for 
idealism had been given from Washington.” But the “net result our mal-education” was “the 
creation of an ignorance so vast and an emotionalism so overwhelming as well-neigh to defeat 
the original purpose and integrity of the enterprise.”110 
 No one bore more responsibility for the disaster than President Wilson. Although the title 
of Colcord’s piece read that Wilson was “Defeated at Paris,” in fact, Wilson was defeated “at the 
beginning of our participation in the war,” when the time was most ripe to “kick over the traces 
and demand a revision of the Allied imperialistic war aims.” But this he did not do. With the 
public in his pocket, he was free to “evade” the inconsistencies between his words and his 
policies. As a terrible consequence, “America was committed to support of, and actually was 
fighting for, the imperialistic aims.” That Wilson knew of the secret treaties even before they 
were publicly released – a fact which Colcord claimed to have learned in September 1917 “from 
                                                 
110 Lincoln Colcord, “Why Wilson was Defeated at Paris,” The Nation 108, No. 2811 (May 17, 1919), 782-83. 
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Colonel House himself” – was the ultimate betrayal. By a combination of irresolution and 
conciliation of the Allies, Wilson allowed his own ideals to be “perverted to ignoble and 
disastrous ends… and since men have died and empires have been lost and infinite wrong has 
been done in pursuit of the illusion, it is difficult to forgive him his rather peculiar and deliberate 
sin.”111 
 Colcord did not forgive him. Later in the year, after the signing by the European powers 
of the Treaty of Versailles, his already overwhelming sense of righteous indignation reached a 
high from which it never came down. The treaty was an act of “moral depravity,” an “evil pact” 
which would “consign the Europe of the future, as well as the America of the future, to oceans of 
blood and wars innumerable.” Colcord threw his support behind the leading members of the 
Republican opposition to Treaty and to American participation in the League of Nations – the 
“Irreconcilables” – as the only hope for staving off that terrible future. He praised Senators 
Hiram Johnson of California and William Borah of Idaho specifically as men whose “sincerity,” 
“honor,” and “patriotism,” as opposed to mere partisan interests, were beyond reproach.112 
Wilson, by contrast, dishonored himself and his country by promoting a corrupt peace. 
Colcord spared nothing in demonizing the president in the months before the Congressional vote 
to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Writing once more in The Nation, he also gave his first real 
mea culpa for his own wartime role in “help[ing] shore up the President’s power.” It was only 
too late that he and his cohort in Colonel House’s “journalistic group” finally “began to lose 
                                                 
111 Ibid., 783. Emphasis in the original. 
112 Lincoln Colcord, “The Results of the White House Conference,” The Nation 109, No. 2826 (August 30, 1919), 
282-83. In 1919, Colcord initiated a significant chain of correspondence with Johnson on their mutually opposition 
to the Treaty of Versailles, to the League of Nations, and to American intervention in Soviet Russia. He revived this 
connection in the mid-1930s when, as before, they were unified by another spirit of opposition to the foreign policy 
of Franklin Roosevelt. For the 1919 letters, see CFA Box 11 Folder 246. 
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faith. We were young and ardent men, but we were not fools.” Now the truth was clear. 
“America went into the war under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson for aims precisely the 
opposite of those incorporated in this settlement… She did not go to Europe to fight for the 
secret treaties, for any pact which sustains them, or for any League which guarantees such a 
pact.” Wilson, “through his bureaucratic engines of censorship and suppression… has prostituted 
the soul of a nation – the most sacred charge that can rest in the hands of a leader of men. It will 
take America years, and maybe generations to recover from the blight of his hypocrisy.”113 
For his part, Lincoln Colcord never recovered from that betrayal. He was vindicated in 
his hostility to the Versailles Treaty and the League when they were narrowly defeated in the 
Senate in November 1919. The unresolved crisis in Russia, on the other hand, nagged him into 
1920. American and Allied intervention in the Russian civil war stoked Colcord’s sympathy with 
the Soviet government to a white heat that lingered even after the withdrawal of the last 
American troops from Siberia in April 1920. Massive American support to the newly created 
Polish state in its ongoing war with Russia threw more fuel on the fire. In an argument strikingly 
similar to the one he would make against Lend-Lease twenty years later, Colcord alleged that the 
American government sold tens of millions of dollars in surplus war materiel to the Poles with 
“no restriction” upon its use, and issued tens of millions more in credit, as a means of attacking 
Russia through a proxy. These exchanges were effectively an “American policy towards Russia,” 
one which constituted “an act of war against the Soviet government.”114 
As before, “responsibility” for this and every other misstep to date laid with Wilson. 
From 1918 on, his vain attempts at suppressing the Bolsheviks while preaching “democratic 
                                                 
113 Lincoln Colcord, “Black is White,” The Nation 109, No. 2828 (September 13, 1919), 364. 
114 Lincoln Colcord, “America Aids the Polish Drive,” The New Republic 23, No. 290 (June 23, 1920), 117-18. 
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crusade” revealed “the grievous faults in [his] character.” Wilson constructed his own “hero-
myth,” and his assault on Russia was nothing more than an expression of his all-consuming 
vanity. He had pre-written the “scroll” of history, “visualized himself as the savior of 
civilization, as the great liberal leader of the world.” This, Colcord wrote, was “the Wilson 
illusion,” and it was only now, after the tragedy had run its course, that he could be understood 
for what he was; “not a demigod, but an extremely fallible human being.” Wilson had demanded 
“perfect faith,” but in the end, he gave the faithful nothing for their devotion.115 
Lincoln Colcord’s grand faith in Wilson, and his faith in the new world which Wilson 
promised, were now interred in the deepest recesses of his mind. In their wake went his once 
promising career in professional journalism. He resigned from The Nation abruptly in late 1920 
and returned to Searsport, Maine. The reasons were not political, but personal. Colcord hoped to 
resume his fiction writing after a long hiatus, producing a new book of short stories in 1922.116 
His wife Blanche, however, was also seriously ill with cancer, and the move was primarily to 
preserve her health. Her death in 1924 was a blow so crushing it compelled him to leave Maine 
entirely for the rest of the decade. Yet it was a fitting conclusion to an already dismal period of 
his life. One more tragedy piled on top of the rest, one more loss, one more reason to look in new 
directions for a new purpose. But with him always was the memory these years and these events. 
In the next decade, they would return to the forefront of his thought, a poisoned strand of history 
woven into new events and new crises that once more demanded his response. 
                                                 
115 Lincoln Colcord, “The Basis of Our Russian Policy,” The Freeman 3, No. 53 (March 16, 1921), 8-10. 
116 Lincoln Colcord, An Instrument of the Gods and Other Stories of the Sea (New York: Macmillan, 1922). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LINCOLN COLCORD: APOSTACY 
Forward 
Lincoln Colcord never escaped from the legacy of Woodrow Wilson and the First World 
War. The lessons of the 1917-20 were permanently fixed in his mind as the ultimate standard for 
measuring national and world events. Surprisingly, the early years of the 1930s found him a 
public supporter of Franklin Roosevelt. But in short order, he found such serious fault with the 
new administration’s domestic policies that he effectively switched from the Democratic to the 
Republican Party. Not long after, its foreign policy, too, became anathema to him. Colcord thus 
took up a new stance as an opponent of FDR on both those fronts, but it was foreign affairs that 
came to dominate his interests and fears during the later 1930s and into the 1940s. Through those 
years of crisis he was more deeply concerned than ever with the direction of American public 
opinion. Initially, he was confident that by their collective good sense they would turn back the 
dangers he saw drawing the nation into domestic and international disaster. But gradually, and 
with his vision constantly turning backward to the Wilson era, doubts seeped in as Roosevelt’s 
power and popularity became undeniable. “Why is it that people persist in thinking that we have 
a different world,” a bewildered Colcord asked in early 1937. “Haven’t they read history? Or 
don’t they believe that things which have happened once cannot happen again?”1 
Preventing recent history from being repeated was the basis of Lincoln Colcord’s 
isolationism. It also drove him completely away from the idealism that defined his early career in 
                                                 
1 LC to John Bassett Moore, February 28, 1937, CFA Box 12 Folder 299. He only speaking half rhetorically. “The 
fallacy of the last twenty years, springing directly from Wilson’s intellectual dishonesty, has been the notion that 
only bad men fight, that good men hold what they have by divine reason, and that the status quo can maintain itself 
through its intrinsic virtue… Well, we had a good time fighting the ‘war to end war,’ and we’ll have an even better 
time fighting the ‘war for legal neutrality [meaning, the “unneutral” Neutrality Act].’” 
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Washington and towards a realism so hard-boiled it was almost Darwinian. Yet he continued to 
call himself a liberal, and even within his adamantly anti-interventionist foreign policy he was 
not totally inflexible. Historian Christopher Nichols has written that out of the anti-war and anti-
Versailles movements of the Wilson-era came a “new isolationism” for the 1920s and 30s – a 
fusion of “fairly strict isolation in diplomacy” with “largely open and private engagement in 
commerce and cultural arenas,” coupled with a Western Hemisphere focus and a desire to 
“minimize war” where it was fought.2 This basic model fits Colcord’s case well. His isolationism 
did not entail absolute detachment from the rest of the world. On the score of economics, it was 
just the opposite. His position on neutrality was the United States had an obligation to open itself 
to trade without discrimination between belligerents in a given conflict or between nations at war 
and nations at peace. Such a policy, he argued, was both the only legitimate course of true 
neutrality and the only sure way keep the massive economic advantages that the United States 
possessed out of the hands of one side alone. But after this “free trade” position, Colcord drew 
the firmest of lines on the fundamental issue of U.S. non-involvement in foreign wars: 
Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, and finally, the Second World War. 
Yet step by step and war by war, America inched closer to just those faraway conflicts 
under the leadership of FDR and the lingering “curse” of Woodrow Wilson’s internationalist 
idealism.3 In a pessimistic peacetime mood, Colcord brooded that “you can’t expect intelligence 
from a country whose mind had been demoralized by twenty years of dishonest intellectual 
                                                 
2 Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 329-31. Emily Rosenberg, by contrast, argues that the practice of limited 
diplomatic engagement with intense promotion of private enterprise abroad was not an expression of “isolationism,” 
but rather, a tool of “liberal expansionism.” It was only in the context of the Great Depression and the rise of the 
Axis states that the practice was gradually abandoned for another strategy to extend American power around the 
world, “the international regulatory state.” Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic 
and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 114-15, 169. 
3 LC to Edwin Borchard, April 8, 1936, CFA Box 7 Folder 96. 
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leadership, and who now has in the saddle a demagogue who could steal Wilson’s shirt any day 
in a poker game of intellectual dishonesty… Roosevelt is repeating the same shocking 
intellectual dishonesty as Wilson’s. It keeps on raining – the deluge is yet to come.”4 
The tide of war surged closer to American shores from 1939 to 1941. But up to and 
beyond the bitter end at Pearl Harbor – the day that one erstwhile isolationist remarked “ended 
isolationism for any realist”5 – Colcord held fast to his conviction that the United States could 
and should remain uninvolved in Europe’s and Asia’s quarrels. In spite of a grim but astute 
understanding that the balance of the intervention debate was turning towards Roosevelt’s “aid 
short of war” policy from the very beginning, he continued to promote neutrality even without 
hard faith that it would carry the day. Colcord annunciated that final vision and that pessimism 
most clearly to a fellow isolationist and an old liberal of the Wilson era. “Our duty is to save 
America. We had nothing to do with the present war. Our policy towards it should have been 
from the first to watch it with pain and a considerable degree of cynicism, and to be prepared to 
go on living with the forces that eventually came out on top.”6 Such was the isolationist ideal, 
but it was one all too far removed from the real current of American life and politics. 
Old Ship, New Current, 1930-1934 
The death of his wife in 1924 was the capstone to Lincoln Colcord’s sad half-decade 
following the First World War. But a subsequent move to Minnesota reinvigorated his spirit and 
professional fortunes. In mid-1927, he returned to the east and settled himself and his daughter 
Inez in New York City. There he resumed his place in literature by becoming a regular (though 
                                                 
4 LC to Archie Binns, April 1, 1937, CFA Box 7 Folder 90. 
5 Arthur Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, edited by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 1. 
6 LC to Amos Pinchot, September 7, 1940, CFA Box 72 Folder 1222. Emphasis in the original. 
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free-lance) book reviewer for the New York Herald-Tribune, a generally conservative and 
business-oriented broadsheet.7 This paper would be his most consistent source of income for the 
remainder of his life. It was also his most frequent outlet for airing his politics both in his 
reviews and more sporadic opinion pieces. In 1929 he, Inez, and a new wife, Frances Brooks, 
returned to Maine and once more made Searsport his permanent home. For many years of the 
1930s, however, Colcord also wintered at his mother’s home in Mount Vernon, New York. This 
was partly for the sake of his health, but it also kept him close to the social circle he ran in during 
the Great War – he counted among his urbanite old friends Edward House, Bernard Baruch, 
owner and editor of The Nation Oswald Garrison Villard, and journalist Isaac Don Levine – and 
to the press and publishing industries which he still depended on for his livelihood. 
Amidst this flurry of activity, Colcord was strikingly quiet on political issues of any kind 
and remained so even after the beginning of the Great Depression.8 In particular, a full decade 
passed between his last exposition on foreign affairs in the early 1920s and his next one in 1932. 
The impetus for the burst of new commentary was itself significant. In September 1931, Japan 
invaded the northern Chinese province of Manchuria, a space long within its economic sphere of 
influence but now coveted as an outright colonial protectorate. In defiance of the League of 
Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact prohibiting non-defensive war, and the American interest in 
China as well, Japan thus took the first significant step toward breaking the international status 
                                                 
7 Graham J. White, FDR and the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 75, 111-12. 
8 One of the few exceptions to this was a 1928 editorial submitted (unsuccessfully) to the New York Times 
championing Senator Henrik Shipstead – newly reelected despite his risky shift from the Republican Party to the 
Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party – as “a Viking in strength and stature,” “an old-fashioned democrat,” and “perhaps 
the most constructive Progressive in American public life.” Colcord had befriended Shipstead during his time in 
Minnesota and kept up the relationship through the 1930s and 1940s on the grounds of that personal history and 
their mutual opposition to FDR’s domestic and foreign policies. LC to Henrik Shipstead, November 13, 1928, with 
attachment, “Henrik Shipstead: Lone Wolf of Minnesota,” MS, CFA Box 25 Folder 631. 
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quo that had largely held since the end of the First World War. With the benefit of hindsight, it 
was also the clear first step on the long road to the Second World War.9 
The invasion proceeded swiftly, but so did Colcord’s reaction. In December 1931, he sent 
a long article on the war to Collier’s magazine, but was rejected. He then rewrote the piece and 
sent it to Harper’s instead. The editor leapt at the opportunity, pushing Colcord to make final 
revisions immediately so that he might be credited as “a true prophet” for predicting the war’s 
end as an undisputed Japanese victory.10 Unfortunately, the war ended just after his submission 
deadline in late February. But nevertheless, “The Realism of Japanese Diplomacy” hit 
newsstands on March 20, 1932 as the lead article in Harper’s April issue. Despite the Far 
Eastern setting, this piece was a clear restatement of the positions Colcord had formed before, 
during, and after the First World War. Now, his initial isolationist impulse from the period prior 
to American intervention – as well as his instinct to deny moral differences between nations and 
instead see all countries as driven by self-interest – merged with the bitter historical lessons he 
absorbed in the Great War’s wake. Together, they became a geopolitical ethos whose essence 
was not idealism, but hard-boiled realism.11 
From this “realistic view,” as he called it, Colcord first and foremost laid the blame for 
facilitating the invasion on the League of Nations, which offered such untenable promises of 
collective security that it “undermined any adequate effort to prepare China to protect herself.” 
                                                 
9 For a sample of historians in agreement with this popular conclusion, consider John Wiltz and Justus Doenecke, 
From Isolation to War, 1931-1941 (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 2003), 19, Niall Ferguson, The War of the 
World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 312, and 
John Lukacs, The Legacy of the Second World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 16. 
10 Lee Hartman to LC, January 30, 1932, CFA Box 38 Folder 823.  
11 Hartman also took the liberty of sending the MS of the article to Walter Lippmann – like Colcord, a writer for the 
Herald-Tribune and a former member of the House circle, but now a much more prominent political commentator – 
for review. Lippmann supported publishing Colcord’s piece, calling it “a bit super-hard-boiled, but healthy for that 
reason.” Walter Lippmann to Lee Hartman, January 28, 1932, CFA Box 38 Folder 823. 
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He also derided the mainstream of American opinion for falling victim to “a sort of propaganda, 
based on a delusion of international cooperation,” and for placing “its faith in a fallacious and 
non-existent new world.” The “basic facts and plain realities” were the uniformity of nations in 
their pursuit of self-interest. The very question of “right or wrong” was a false premise. “No one 
is actually to blame for the way national forces operate, and no one actually wants to do wrong.” 
While acknowledging that such a view might be unpopular, he thought Japan had “done the 
world a distinct service in stripping post-war thought of its unhealthy illusions.” Alluding to 
American history, he credited Japan with reminding Western observers just how “a nation acts in 
pursuit of its manifest destiny… the way all nations in the ascendency have acted in history.”12 
 The article revealed much of Colcord’s complicated conception of nationalism. While the 
League’s feeble attempts to intimidate Japan with sanctions were simply “empty threats,” the 
invasion’s underlying cause could only be defined in nationalist terms. “So long as the spirit of 
nationalism persists,” he wrote, “nations will strive against one another for advantage.” But the 
impossible prerequisite for collective security to function, “the price of world peace through the 
League… comes down to the renunciation of the principle of nationalism,” an inexpungable 
element of human nature. Thus, in spite of the League, nation states alone still held the power to 
determine the fate of the world, as they always had. Colcord predicted that Japan would probably 
conquer China as part of its bigger scheme for “assuming hegemony in the Orient,” but also that 
it would “die of the victory.” Showing lingering traces of his youthful infatuation with China, 
Colcord was confident that its national “stability and permanence” gave it an immortal strength 
which the Japanese could never defeat. But in any event, the Manchurian affair was “already 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 516, 520-21. 
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settled,” and the onus of resolving the conflict permanently could only lie with China and Japan, 
“where it belongs in ultimate terms.”13  
Colcord’s article was recognized immediately. The Canadian journal Pacific Affairs, a 
leader in that field of study, called it “extremely significant and provocative” in a long and 
generally positive review.14 The article also made its way to the scene of its own action. The 
student newspaper of Beijing’s Yenching University quoted Colcord at length in an editorial 
seconding his analysis.15 More importantly, “The Realism of Japanese Diplomacy,” was cited by 
one of the most prominent commentators of the interwar era, Lothrop Stoddard, a fellow 
geopolitical realist with a similar concern about the misdirection of American public opinion 
away from “the world as it is” and towards “a phantom world-we-would-like-to-see.”16  
A recent historian has described Colcord’s article as a rare example of an American 
observer whose sympathies leaned towards the Japanese during the Manchurian Crisis.17 This, 
however, is not an accurate assessment of Colcord’s mindset, and a distinction ought to be made 
between sympathy and pragmatic understanding. Granted, he did pay Japan a conspicuously high 
compliment by calling their diplomacy “stark and unblushing, but practical and realistic.” And 
likewise, his snide comparison of Japan’s imperialism with American “manifest destiny” was 
later part of the argument the Japanese themselves made in response to the Hoover 
administration’s indignant reaction to the invasion.18 But in essence, Colcord was no more 
sympathetic to Japanese imperialism in 1932 than he had been in 1915 in Vision of War, or, for 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 514-15, 518, 523. 
14 “In the Periodicals,” Pacific Affairs 5, No. 6 (June 1932), 571-72. 
15 “Chinese Editor Lauds Mr. Colcord,” Bangor Daily News (July 20, 1932). 
16 Lothrop Stoddard, Lonely America (New York: Country Life Press, 1932), 338. For Stoddard’s long and 
approvingly prefaced transcriptions from Colcord’s article, see ibid., 255, 311-12. 
17 Jon Thares Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.–Japanese Relations, 1919–1941 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 139. 
18 Doenecke and Wilz, From Isolation to War, 40. 
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that matter, in 1918 regarding the invasion of Siberia. The value of the conflict in his eyes was 
simply in its putting the lie to the myth that a “new world” had been born out of either Versailles, 
the League, or the much-touted multilateral non-aggression pacts of the 1920s. In reality, the old 
world had never died at all, and its principles only – the balance of power, the build-up of 
armaments, and “the philosophy of force” – still defined “the life of nations.”19 
Strikingly, Colcord had little to say about the United States’ connection to the 
Manchurian conflict. America, he wrote, was “the only genuine friend of China” in the 
diplomatic world, but this was for no more noble a reason than it had more to lose economically 
from the closing of the Open Door than any of the other great powers. And even in making this 
claim, he made no mention at all of Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s January announcement 
of a new U.S. policy of non-recognition for Japan’s gains or any other international changes 
made by force. But ultimately, as Colcord himself made so clear, the struggle between Japan and 
China was one which they alone could truly settle. His position was that the United States should 
not attempt to meddle in their affairs on that core principle, for if it tried, it would bear the 
responsibility for setting East Asia and potentially the whole world “on fire.”20 This, in the end, 
was his basis for an American policy of strict non-involvement, and this was the policy which he 
would continue to promote with even greater ardor as new crises threatened to lure the United 
States into war. 
                                                 
19 Colcord, “The Realism of Japanese Diplomacy,” 521-22. A very recent history of post-World War I 
internationalism comes to precisely the opposite conclusion of Colcord’s in 1932. Hathaway and Shapiro argue that 
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The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World (New York: Simon and Shuster, 
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Yet in the interim, Colcord’s interest in world affairs waned as fast as it waxed. For the 
remainder of 1932 and up to the end of 1935, domestic politics preoccupied him. As a registered 
Democrat, he duly endorsed and voted for Franklin Roosevelt along with the Party’s candidates 
for the Maine governorship and his congressional district – Louis Brann and Edward Moran, 
respectively.21 All three candidates won their 1932 elections. But from almost the moment those 
victories were confirmed, Colcord expected his votes to pay a dividend. In January 1933, he put 
his name forward for a $6400 per year patronage position that could be awarded only by 
appointment from the president: Collector of Customs for Portland, Maine. But despite his 
intensive lobbying efforts, the better-connected state Democratic Chairman John Dooley was the 
natural victor in the struggle for the Collectorship.22 This was not the last time Colcord would 
seek patronage from the Democratic Party. Twice more he would vie for jobs within or affiliated 
with the Roosevelt administration – in June 1934 for the role of secretary to the Chairman of the 
new Securities and Exchange Commission, and in January 1935 for a position in the government 
of the U.S. Virgin Islands. Twice more he was rejected. It is no coincidence that Colcord’s 
antipathy towards the FDR grew after each of those later failed attempts. Yet foiled ambitions 
were only a marginal factor in his evolving position on Roosevelt.  
Colcord was never enthusiastic about the man politically. He remained so even after a 
long interview with the president on November 7, 1933 for a lead article in former Brain Trust-
member Raymond Moley’s news magazine, Today, where Colcord was employed as a staff 
                                                 
21 He confided his reasoning to his father-in-law on the day before the election: “The tariff is the only issue that 
interests me; that is really my only reason for being a Democrat. I believe if we don’t knock down our own and 
world tariffs we are heading for trouble. I have no doubt that Roosevelt will be overwhelmingly elected tomorrow, 
an opinion I haven’t changed for the past year.” LC to Morgan Brooks, November 7, 1932, Box 3 Folder 48. 
22 All the details of this scheme can be found in the folders of Colcord’s intense correspondence with Congressman 
Edward Moran and Governor Louis Brann, his principle backers within the Maine Democratic Party. For Moran, see 
CFA Box 26 Folder 644. For Brann, see CFA Box 8 Folder 106. 
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writer for the first few months of its existence.23 The article was the embodiment of a puff piece, 
praising Roosevelt to the rafters for his personal qualities of “seamanship” while scrupulously 
avoiding actual policy issues.24 This approach was no doubt necessary to conform with Today’s 
pro-FDR and pro-New Deal editorial line.25 Privately, however, Colcord was dogged by 
skepticism about the new leader and his policies. The talk at the meeting was “[m]ostly about 
sailing on the Maine coast,” he wrote to his father-in-law, “but incidentally we talked of foreign 
policy and all the rest of it – a fine and friendly conversation… I liked the President personally 
very much; but I guess I am too old to be carried away by a man’s ideas just because he is 
President.”26 
 This was a candid admission, and one all too true for the now fifty-year-old writer. It was 
also true that the long shadow of Woodrow Wilson blackened Colcord’s vision as he observed 
the new executive’s progress. “Look out for that fellow [FDR],” he wrote to a friend on the 
Consumer Advisory Board who was his inside man in pursuit of the SEC job, “don’t follow him 
too blindly. I’ve followed one trimmer over the dam, and I don’t propose to make the trip a 
second time.”27 Indeed, he did not, but it was another kind of trip that gave him the final push in 
the direction he was clearly drifting. The true opening wedge for Colcord’s break with Roosevelt 
was his passionate objection to the social and economic impact of the New Deal.  
                                                 
23 The White House logbook records that Colcord and Moley remained with Roosevelt in the Oval Office from 9 pm 
to ten before midnight, the President’s last and longest meeting of the day. “November 7, 1933,” FDR: Day by Day, 
accessed March 13, 2018, URL: http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/november-7th-1933/. Moley 
abruptly dismissed Colcord from the staff of Today in January 1934, citing budget tightening as the reason. Though 
he left the door open to submit pieces on a freelance basis, Colcord never took that offer up and resented him bitterly 
through the years that followed. Raymond Moley to LC, January 16, 1934, CFA Box 39 Folder 830. 
24 Lincoln Colcord, “Roosevelt: Seaman President,” Today 1, No. 7 (December 9, 1933), 3-5. 
25 Media less friendly to the administration easily ridiculed the claim in Today’s subtitle, “An Independent National 
Weekly,” as a misnomer. “Floating the New Deal,” The Saturday Review 10, No. 16 (November 4, 1933), 232. 
26 LC to Morgan Brooks, November 9, 1933, CFA Box 3 Folder 48. 
27 LC to Gardner Jackson, July 4, 1934, CFA Box 11 Folder 223. 
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He based his position on firsthand experience. In the fall of 1934, Colcord was contracted 
by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) to do a “field survey” of relief efforts 
in some of the industrial cities of Michigan and Ohio.28 From late October into early December, 
he travelled into those economically devastated states and spoke with executives in the auto 
industry, local social workers responsible for distributing relief, ordinary citizens, and less 
frequently, the unemployed themselves. Colcord’s final report to the FERA chief Harry Hopkins 
found that, based on his interviews and observations, federal “work relief” programs were 
undermining the recovery of private enterprise and were fostering the birth of new class of 
people who would be permanently dependent on government aid.29 Neither of these results 
boded well for American democracy or the American economic system in Colcord’s eyes. 
Before his survey even ended, he wrote Harper’s to test the ground for an article knocking the 
“Frankenstein’s monster” that was the federal relief program. He admitted frankly that “all my 
views tend in a conservative rather than a radical direction” but also that he struggled to 
understand which way the New Deal itself was trending; it “really is utterly haywire in its social 
and economic implications.”30 
 Colcord’s experience as an old liberal who quickly soured on FDR and his program 
conforms with the thesis of a dated but important study of exactly that subject, Otis L. Graham’s 
                                                 
28 Although the exact route by which Colcord got this temporary job is unclear, the likeliest cause lies with his older 
sister Joanna. A prominent social worker since the 1910s, by 1934 she was a leading employee of the massively-
endowed philanthropic organization, the Russell Sage Foundation, and a published author on the subject of cash 
relief. She was also an earnest supporter of the New Deal from the outset and, by her brother’s account, knew the 
FERA chief Harry Hopkins personally. LC to Gardner Jackson, June 4, 1934, CFA Box 11 Folder 223. 
29 Colcord’s weekly letters to Hopkins and his final report of December 3rd can be found in CFA Box 16 Folder 445. 
For an admirable summary of Colcord activities on his relief survey, and for a useful comparison with the work of 
other FERA field surveyors, see William R. Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal (New York: Cambridge 
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on December 10, 1934. Ibid., 263. 
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64 
 
An Encore for Reform. In his survey of 168 prominent Progressive Era reformers who lived 
through all six years of the New Deal (Colcord was not among them), Graham concluded that 
opposition to the New Deal was more common than support. The “old reformers” who survived 
into the 1930s were generally daunted by the pace and scope of the new spirit of reform; 
“Liberalism, as the New Dealers practiced it, required adventures in federal regulation and 
planning, in class politics and novel economics, that postdated progressivism and found most 
progressives reluctant to go along.”31 Moreover, Graham’s cliometric analysis of a smaller 
sample of his old reformers found that those with backgrounds in Progressive Era journalism 
(like Colcord) were markedly inclined to opposition at a rate of more than four to one.32  
 Graham’s admitted weakness to his survey was the deliberate omission of the old 
liberals’ reactions to Roosevelt’s foreign policy. He recognized that many of his subjects – 
including Senator Hiram Johnson and Amos Pinchot, both friends and correspondents of Colcord 
– fell in with “the isolationist tide” around 1938, when FDR became more assertive in pushing 
the United States onto the international scene. But Graham also reiterated that their 
“disillusionment with domestic liberalism,” the real focus of his study, “actually began much 
earlier than Roosevelt’s move towards involvement in the European situation.”33 This was 
certainly true in Lincoln Colcord’s case as well. Useful for filling that gap left by Graham, then, 
                                                 
31 Otis L. Graham, Jr., An Encore for Reform? The Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York: Oxford 
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33 Ibid., 33. 
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is a comparison of Colcord’s experience with that of John T. Flynn, another self-described liberal 
and prominent columnist with a background in investigative journalism during the late 
Progressive Era. According to his biographer John Moser, Flynn was initially a strong supporter 
of the New Deal and a federally planned economy in general. But after 1935, growing concerns 
about fiscal irresponsibility and the potential for totalitarianism posed by an over-powerful 
central government eroded his enthusiasm. It was gone by 1938, and this was precisely the year 
when Flynn also turned towards isolationist opposition to the President’s foreign policy as well.34 
Flynn’s story, like Colcord’s, shows the natural (though far from absolute) connection 
between early opposition to FDR’s domestic policies and later opposition to his foreign policy. 
But in contrast to Flynn, Colcord’s opposition to Roosevelt’s – and, indeed, to Congress’ – 
foreign policy was born much earlier than 1938. His began in 1935, from the moment when 
American involvement in a new foreign war arose once more as a real possibility.  
Changing Course, 1935-1939 
 In January 1935, President Roosevelt announced his proposal for a new, $5 billion relief 
bill. It was the first step towards his Second New Deal, and the final straw for Lincoln Colcord.35 
Although he remained a registered Democrat and a self-described liberal for the rest of his life, 
those terms could no longer be used without qualification. Now he was an “old-line Democrat,” 
a “true liberal,” and above all, an open opponent of the President and his program for America.36 
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Through the early months of 1935, Colcord made his change public with a string of speaking 
events across eastern Maine – from the Penobscot Bay to Bangor and from the University of 
Maine in Orono all the way to Houlton (a town 150 miles north of his Searsport home).37  
Where Colcord’s ferocious criticism of the Roosevelt administration lulled was on the 
score of foreign policy. There was a long hiatus between his last full-length exposition on foreign 
affairs in early 1932 and his next in late 1935. Just as before, it took another radical shock to the 
international order to catch his attention and incite him to respond. This was the Italian-Ethiopian 
War, a conflict which boiled for months before finally exploding on October 3rd. It was this 
war’s menacing prelude which stirred Congress as well, prompting the passage of the first 
Neutrality Act in August as measure to keep the United States out before it even started.38 The 
Act was in no small part a response to a public demand for national security in a time of growing 
world unrest. The exact extent of interwar Americans’ commitment to “isolationism” is an 
intensely debated point. But if (as Justus Doenecke and Manfred Jonas assert) that term is simply 
meant to mean opposition to involvement in foreign wars and to “collective security” schemes 
like the League of Nations, then by the mid-1930s its strength was real and recognizable.39 
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Colcord’s reaction to the outbreak of war filled three columns of the New York Herald-
Tribune’s opinion page – a letter to the editor of near-article length. But despite that ample space, 
the nation of Ethiopia did not factor into his thinking at all. Italy and its regional great power 
rival, Britain, were the only parties of concern. The tension between the two was a “struggle of 
imperial destinies” and nothing more. Colcord was emphatic that “the moral issue” had no place 
in the equation. Hence the “moral pressure” of milquetoast sanctions imposed by the League was 
yet another empty threat that could do nothing to halt Italy’s course of action or stave off its 
looming show-down with Britain; “any realist knows that they simply will not work.” Both 
countries “ought not to want to fight” one another, of course, but on the Italian side at least, 
forces beyond pragmatic pacifism were already at work. Compelled by a “manifest destiny” just 
as Britain had been in the century past, Italy would have to fight for its “place in the sun… That 
is the way every nation, including the United States, has reached its present boundaries.”40 
This cold-blooded analysis of the East African crisis had the same intended function as 
his take on the Manchurian conflict. Colcord was showing his American readers how they 
needed to look at foreign wars if they really wanted to keep out of them. The “realist” point of 
view was the “neutral” point of view precisely because “it faces reality on both sides” and takes 
neither of them as its own. Colcord personally hoped that Mussolini would tread carefully with 
Britain and that there would be no great power war. “But if war must come,” he warned, “we 
would help nothing and ruin much, as we did in the World War, by allowing ourselves to be 
drawn in.” He offered the American public this sobering advice: 
American opinion should strive first to put itself in the mind of an Englishman, thinking 
of the protection of his far-flung empire, and second into the mind of an Italian, thinking 
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of his ancient imperial heritage and chafing under what feels to be an unfair national 
limitation. Then, in an honestly neutral frame of mind, aware that it had nothing to do 
with making the trouble, convinced that the self-interest of the United States is nowhere 
involved, it should withhold its hand and wait for the outcome. By doing so it would 
render the best service to humanity in the long run.41 
In an outstanding study of the ideology of interwar American isolationism, historian Ross 
Kennedy notes that many isolationists had a “realist” appraisal of international affairs as being 
defined by “power politics,” cited the First World War as the prime example of the futility of 
American involvement in Europe’s perpetual squabbling, and ultimately based their foreign 
policy goals on the self-interest of their own country.42 Each of these characteristics is visible in 
full force in the writing of Lincoln Colcord. But what is unique in his case is his conception of 
neutrality and his additional justification for American non-involvement. Neutrality as Colcord 
defined it was less a policy than a state of mind. As such, it was not just the responsibility of the 
State (or more specifically, the State Department, rather than Congress) to diplomatically ensure 
it. Neutrality was a fundamental duty for the American people themselves to uphold as they 
observed events abroad. But as a country with undeniable power on the world stage, the United 
States as a state also had a duty in Colcord’s eyes. Worse than just futile, its role in the Great 
War was disastrous all around. It exacerbated the conflict where it was actually fought, and its 
diplomatic fumbling had helped erect an unjust and unsustainable postwar peace settlement. 
Neither America nor the world could afford to repeat that colossal national mistake. 
 The Anglo-Italian war over East Africa never materialized, but Colcord remained uneasy 
about America’s prospects for staying out of other potential wars. In late 1935 and early 1936, he 
began following the activities of Congress on U.S. foreign relations more closely, particularly the 
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tail-end of the Senate’s “Nye Committee” investigating the entry of the United States into the 
First World War. Colcord showed little interest in the Committee’s most famous finding – that 
American bankers and munitions makers played an outsized role in drawing the country into the 
Great War. Instead, he was most struck by the sheer hollowness of the Wilson administration’s 
claims to neutrality from the war’s outset. In mid-January, he merged his old indignation at that 
historical failure with a new rage against FDR’s personal proposal to expand presidential 
embargo power from all belligerents flatly, as the 1935 Neutrality Act prescribed, to specific 
ones whom he designated as “aggressors.”43 In January 1936, in another broadside for the 
Herald-Tribune, he let loose his thoughts on American neutrality’s past and future.   
 Colcord admitted frankly that “since the dawn of modern history neutrality has been a 
matter of give-and-take and dog-eat-dog.” No nation, not even America, had ever upheld the 
principle “consistently” in the face of appeals and pressure by belligerents. So it had been 
nineteen years prior. Yet the fact of the matter was that the United States in 1917 “possessed 
complete economic power over the situation” in Europe and could have successfully asserted a 
“strict neutrality” had it the will and the leadership. But both were lacking, and “bowing to 
Allied policy” it lurched into the conflict against its own “self-interest.” The same error was 
being repeated “in even more drastic form” today. Neither the Neutrality Act nor the President’s 
selective embargo principle were a defense of American neutrality, but rather, its abrogation. 
True neutrals could not take sides between nations at war and at peace any more than they could 
take sides between the opposing belligerents themselves. “We should say that we will not be 
drawn into any European war,” Colcord wrote, “but that the one thing we will fight for will be 
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our neutrality.” Such a course “cannot stop war itself,” he conceded, but by neither joining the 
fray nor taking sides “we could stop war from descending to the standards of the jungle.”44 
This stirring article drew Colcord into the center of a distinct subgroup of American 
isolationists, variously described as “traditionalists” who wanted to “preserve conventional 
neutral rights” (per Wayne Cole) and “belligerent” isolationists who favored the strictest kind of 
unilateralism in foreign affairs (per Manfred Jonas).45 In Washington, the leaders of this group 
were Senators William Borah of Idaho and Hiram Johnson of California – both Republicans, old 
progressives, and “Irreconcilables” who had led the opposition to U.S. ratification of the Treaty 
of Versailles. Colcord knew both these men from his own Washington years and had supported 
their anti-Versailles insurgency in 1919 from the pages of The Nation. Now he revived the 
connection in the service of a new fight for American non-entanglement in an unstable world. 
Colcord wrote both men to praise their actions in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(SFRC) criticizing the proposed second Neutrality Act. He also prompted them to read his recent 
piece in the Herald-Tribune on that subject of mutual concern.46 Johnson (whom Colcord had 
developed a closer connection to in 1919 than Borah) responded very favorably, even promising 
that he would insert the article into the Congressional Record as he had done with pieces by 
other commentators who shared his point of view.47 
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The January Herald-Tribune piece also made Colcord two new contacts in the field of 
international law. The public intellectual counterparts to Borah and Johnson were John Bassett 
Moore, Assistant Secretary of State under William McKinley and the first American judge to 
serve on the World Court, and Edwin Borchard, a professor at Yale University Law School. Both 
men had recently appeared before the SFRC to give testimony at the behest of their isolationist 
allies in the Senate, and Colcord was deeply impressed with their arguments and conviction.48 
Borchard and Moore’s biographer notes that the two men shared a “realist” philosophy for 
international relations that was in perfect accord with Colcord’s. They were staunch advocates of 
traditional neutrality and opponents of intervention in foreign wars that ran counter to the United 
States’ self-interest. They were highly critical of the Treaty of Versailles and dismissed the 
possibility of a world without war as a fantasy. And they resented Woodrow Wilson for 
poisoning American public opinion with vacuous idealism that blinded them to the unchanging 
realities of world affairs.49 In that last respect, Colcord found much needed outlets for venting his 
own bitter feelings. “I attribute the disintegration of American thought chiefly to Woodrow 
Wilson,” Colcord wrote Moore. “Wilson was intellectually dishonest, and he succeeded in some 
curious cosmic way of imposing his intellectual dishonesty on the thought and even the policy of 
the country ever since. Until we emancipate ourselves from the Wilson conception of liberalism, 
we will not be able to think straight again.”50 
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 This was Colcord’s ultimate goal, and in the process of fighting for it, he further 
enmeshed himself into this neutralist-isolationist cohort. Prompted to write once more by a 
Walter Lippmann column defending the Locarno Treaty,51 his focus for his next Herald-Tribune 
op-ed shifted to the actual effects of Locarno, Kellogg-Briand (the other illustrious non-
aggression pact of the 1920s), and the Versailles Treaty. As the title of the piece – “Treaties That 
Are Foredoomed to Failure” – suggests, he considered all three of them illegitimate from their 
inception. The reigning discord in world affairs was not an “evil” anomaly, but the logical 
reaction of “strong national forces” in revolt against an untenable status quo. Once again, 
Colcord insisted that “relations between nations are not and cannot be arranged on a purely 
moral basis.” Instead, they could only be based on “mutual self-interest and the competitive spirit 
of nationalism.” Any treaties which were not premised on this reality, as were Versailles and its 
“stopgap” successors Locarno and Kellogg-Briand, were “bound to be violated and should be 
violated, for they are wrong treaties arranged by wrong leaders for wrong purposes.”52 
 Eugene Davidson, editor of the Yale University Press, read this letter to the Herald-
Tribune. Impressed by the piece and with recommendations from his colleague Borchard and 
from Storer Lunt (an executive at the W.W. Norton publishing house and one of Colcord’s New 
York City friends), Davidson freely inquired if there was “any chance of getting a book from 
you” on the current issue of neutrality.53 As it so happened, Colcord had mused on and off for 
several years about putting together a book of his own experiences during the World War, one he 
planned to serve partly a personal history and also an analysis of the relationship between 
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Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House.54 Tragically, though, he never got farther than rough notes 
for this extremely promising endeavor.55 And despite his recognition of the growing war danger 
that America faced, he made no attempt at all to produce a monograph about neutrality. While he 
loathed what he saw as the capitulation of American intellectuals to FDR’s “amorphous 
liberalism,” and resented the failure of the press to hit the President with harder criticism, he 
explained his deliberate inaction to Davidson as a matter of blasé confidence. 
I have a strong faith in the potentialities of American opinion. To my mind, the 
outstanding historical fact of World War diplomacy was that America refused to ratify 
the Treaty [of Versailles]. That meant that American public opinion, pushed to the wall, 
had a better mass sense of the diplomatic realities than did Woodrow Wilson and all the 
statesmen of Europe. I believe American opinion today could easily be brought to support 
the point of view that you and Professor Borchard and I have in common, though only a 
handful of people hold that point of view today. I believe this is the native American 
opinion, the one that satisfies American common-sense… [but] as it is, it seemed best for 
me to stay here, try to get my views into the Herald-Tribune, and keep up a friendly 
correspondence with Senators Borah and Johnson, John Bassett Moore, and others who 
are on the firing line… [In any event,] Spring is coming and I’ve got to plant the garden 
besides. The world isn’t worth trying to save at the expense of letting your garden go – 
because you can’t save it anyway. I got over that idea quite a long time ago.56 
Colcord had more than his garden in mind, of course; he was increasingly busy as 1936 
wore on. He was at the beginning stages of organizing the Penobscot Marine Museum in his 
hometown of Searsport, a grand monument to the maritime history of Maine that would become 
his greatest pride and joy.57 He was also occupied with a series in the Portland Sunday Telegram 
promoting the life and work of living Maine authors, including Robert Tristram Coffin, Kenneth 
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Roberts, and Colcord’s own sister Joanna.58 But even after all that, there is no reason to doubt his 
sincerity. As much as the prospect of American involvement in another war filled him with 
dread, he could still muster up confidence that the American people would stem the danger as 
they had in 1919. It was only after FDR’s landslide reelection in November 1936 that Colcord’s 
angst about the United States’ course prompted him to take new action as commentator.59 
His fear for America was a response to trends in both domestic and foreign affairs, and in 
early 1937, Colcord saw dangers on those fronts rising in tandem. In his correspondence through 
1935 and 1936, he had casually derided FDR as a “demagogue” in the vein of Father Coughlin 
and Huey Long, but also forecast his inevitable political demise. Reality proved the opposite of 
that over-confident prediction. In February 1937, the newly reelected Roosevelt brazenly moved 
to expand his authority with a radical new bill that would have empowered him to add a new 
Justice to the Supreme Court for every sitting one over the age of 70. Opinion in the press, in 
Congress, and among much of the public ran strongly against this “Court packing plan” from the 
outset; “dictatorship” was a common refrain. The strongest single source of opposition came 
from New York newspaper magnate Frank Gannett’s “National Committee to Uphold 
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Constitutional Government,” a pressure group coordinating sympathetic citizens to flood 
Congressional offices with letters and telegrams urging the bill be stopped in its tracks.60 
Colcord was directly and enthusiastically affiliated with the Gannett Committee.61 
Following its lead, he wrote Senators Borah and Johnson, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Senator 
Henrik Shipstead, and Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandies railing against the bill and 
encouraging them to stand firm in opposition to it. He made the ultimate danger plain in another 
long op-ed for the Herald-Tribune in February. The President’s plan was indeed a step towards 
legalizing “dictatorship,” but its essence was an entirely familiar one. FDR’s attempt to alter the 
shape of American government was “exactly parallel in psychological terms” to Wilson’s push 
for the ratification of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. In both instances a man who could not take 
“adverse criticism,” who was riven with “delusions of grandeur” and a “messianic complex,” 
who believed that “the fate of humanity hangs on [his] word,” was again asking to be given 
“unlimited authority” on the grounds of his own supreme wisdom and the exigencies of the 
moment. Fusing his external-oriented isolationism with his internal-oriented conservatism, 
Colcord made a hopeful prediction. “The American people will not subscribe to the destruction 
of their democracy, just as, in the case of the Treaty of Versailles, they would not subscribe to 
participation in European dangers beyond their control.”62 
Through the critical months of March through May – the period when both the Court bill 
and a third, permanent Neutrality Act were under intense debate – Colcord enjoyed a burst of 
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good fortune when he was given a bi-weekly column in the Portland Sunday Telegram. With 
free rein to write on subjects of his choosing, he thus had a regular (if highly local) platform 
from which to press home the imminent dangers facing the American nation. Though the threat 
of “dictatorship” posed by the Court bill began to ebb by May, the simultaneous passage of that 
new Neutrality Act drew heavy fire from Colcord’s column. He was particularly incensed by its 
“cash-and-carry” provision which allowed to the sale of non-military goods to belligerents in 
conflicts of the President’s choosing as long as they were bought with cash and carried on a 
belligerent’s own ships.63 This was not just another evasion of “the basic principle of neutrality” 
– not taking sides – in the abstract. It was “a definite alignment” of the United States with Great 
Britain and France, the nations which had the cash and controlled the seas. War clouds were on 
the horizon in Europe, and the passage of this Act had predetermined America’s course. Colcord 
was emphatic, “we are involved in the next European war before it has even broken out.”64  
We are just involved in it. Whenever and wherever it breaks out, we are on the side of the 
nations which control the seas. And you cannot take sides without eventually becoming a 
belligerent. One step leads to another; the nations controlling the seas would begin 
shipping supplies from America; the other nations, their enemies, would make what 
reprisals they could, against both them and America; very soon we would be forced to 
declare war. 
 Colcord was describing the actual process of America’s creeping intervention in the First 
World War. But at the same time, he was also anticipating the path of American involvement in 
the World War to come. The tragedy he saw there was worse than just the fading alternative, that 
America still could maintain a “strict neutrality” and save both herself and potentially Europe 
from war without limit (as it could have during the Great War). The tragedy was that ordinary 
Americans were forgetting the lesson of their own recent history. Once more they were allowing 
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themselves to succumb to the “sad illusion” that by yet another “unneutral policy” they might 
have the peace that only true neutrality could give.65 
Remarkably, after the spring of 1937, Colcord went publicly silent on neutrality, FDR’s 
foreign policy, and world affairs in general. His final shots in those quarters were concentrated 
on defending a recent book by his friend Edwin Borchard, Neutrality for the United States, 
which was, in many respects, the monograph he had never been able to produce himself.66 And 
yet, even a fall sailing cruise in the Caribbean with his friend Samuel Eliot Morrison could not 
distract Colcord entirely from foreign affairs.67 “I fear most of all the projection of the United 
States into the international scene,” he wrote to Marion Martin, the Maine-born assistant chair-
woman of the Republican National Committee. “If we were to become involved in war, all bets 
would be off. That is why the President’s Chicago speech [a speech calling for the “quarantine” 
of “aggressor” nations] gives me such a disquiet; I have been through all that during the World 
War as a journalist in Washington, and it is the same thing over again. Our pseudo-liberals who 
make political capital out of peace will be the first ones to lead us into war.”68 
This was Colcord’s deepest fear of all – that the very same tragedy which he lived 
through and abetted during the Great War was looking ever more likely to be repeated verbatim. 
But despite more prompting, it would be over a year before he confronted that fear with a full-
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length article.69 Foreign events did not escape his attention, though, through that long period of 
inactivity in his political writing. In February 1938 while he was wintering in New York City 
and Washington, D.C., the ongoing Spanish Civil War filled him with such righteous indignation 
that he allowed a signed statement denouncing “Franco and Fascism” and declaring his 
sympathies with “Republican Spain” to be included in a book titled simply, Writers Take Sides: 
Letters about the War in Spain from 418 American Authors.70 
There is an obvious irony to Lincoln Colcord unambiguously “taking sides” after 
spending several years denouncing that “unneutral” activity. He had not shown any such moral 
scruples when he followed the war in Manchuria or the hypothetical Anglo-Italian war over 
Ethiopia. On the contrary, he denied the presence of moral advantage on either side of those 
conflicts. But even in this truly unique case where sympathy got the better of him, Colcord never 
favored American involvement of any kind in the Spanish Civil War.71 He shifted smoothly back 
into his hardline “realist” mode to respond to the other great crises of 1938. He accepted the 
German annexation of Austria and even the prospective annexation of Czechoslovakia as fait 
accompli before the latter deed was even done.72 Hence when a real territorial dispute over the 
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Sudetenland in September brought Europe to the brink of another war, he held to a realistic 
expectation of the outcome; “England and France will give Hitler what he wants and there will 
be no general war. The Czechs may fight but I doubt it. It’s been an exciting time, however, I 
hope Roosevelt doesn’t make a fool of himself and horn in.”73 
Colcord would soon have far more to fear than Roosevelt simply embarrassing himself. 
He could confide to his daughter a sense of morbid satisfaction at the outcome of the Munich 
Crisis; “if one thing is [now] plain to everyone in the world, it is that recent events have blasted 
the theory itself of collective security sky high. There is no collectiveness among nations any 
longer, and no security.”74 But the President’s post-crisis reaction – calling for a $500 million 
boost to federal defense spending – filled him once more with extreme concern. The new 
proposal also reminded Colcord of the real danger at hand: FDR’s existing discretionary power 
to apply wartime trade embargoes. This “isn’t neutrality at all,” he wrote, and “has nothing to do 
with it. To stop selling munitions and goods to one country and shoot them through to another is 
a war measure… Neutrality, of course, is something entirely different. It means the right to trade 
freely with both belligerents in a conflict, and insisting on this right as far as possible. That is, 
neutrality really means not taking sides. The present plan of the Administration obviously means 
taking sides, and taking sides is an act of war.”75 
 American participation in another European war remained Colcord’s paramount fear, and 
the post-Munich spike in FDR’s internationalist ambitions finally prompted him to put his total 
perspective to paper. Through January 1939 he labored on a new article dedicated to FDR’s 
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foreign policy to date and to come. On the 27th he sent the piece, bluntly titled “American 
Foreign Policy,” to the Saturday Evening Post. In addition to being the highest circulation 
periodical in the country, historian Michael Zalampas notes that the Post was also among “the 
most staunchly isolationist” American magazines of the 1930s, upholding its anti-interventionist 
editorial line all the way up to Pearl Harbor.76 “I feel very deeply about it,” Colcord confessed of 
his article to the Post’s editor, Wesley Strout, “and believe it to be a consistent outline of a point 
of view that isn’t being fully brought out.”77 Nor was it to be brought out in the Saturday 
Evening Post; the article was declined. Although the work was thus left in Colcord’s hands 
alone, it nevertheless represents the fullest image of his isolationist worldview in peacetime. 
Colcord alleged that Roosevelt and his allies were presenting a false image of American 
insecurity to breed “hysteria” among the public. The reasons were twofold. It was a means of 
restoring the administration’s political hold on the country as the New Deal stalled and FDR’s 
popularity wobbled. It was also a “trump card” for justifying his insatiable desire to concentrate 
more power in the hands of the Executive. While “Munich and the terrible suppression of the 
Jews,” a reference to Kristallnacht, had indeed “raised a moral issue of startling proportions,” the 
President was abandoning his duty as a statesman to look at foreign issues “coolly with an eye to 
national self-interest.” Instead, he stood only “on grounds of emotionalism,” and as a 
consequence, the country was “heading directly for war.” Such a course flew in the face of the 
realities of America’s position. “Nothing in the known world threatens the United States today.” 
Rather, “in sober truth, the chief threat against the institutions of the United States today is the 
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present Administration in Washington… the real totalitarian dangers which threaten our 
democracy [come] from within.”78 
 Regardless of the increasingly loud insinuations from Roosevelt and parts of the press 
that America was threatened from without, the “complete hollowness of the war scare” was 
easily deflated. The proposition that Germany could or desired to “conquer the United States” 
was “an idea unworthy of adult mentality.” Technological limitations alone made the act 
impossible, as did geographic security. “The bare idea that Germany could set out across three-
thousand miles of ocean to conquer the United States under these circumstances, or under any 
circumstances for that matter, is worthy only of a story in a pulp magazine.”79 Colcord found 
Germany as unlikely to conquer South America as it was to conquer the North, and condemned 
Roosevelt’s “tactless” and “insulting” assumption that Latin countries were so totally helpless 
before a foreign power as just a contrived excuse for meddling in those nations’ affairs.80 
 Speaking for himself, Colcord asserted that his country had no responsibility whatsoever 
to check German or Japanese expansion in Europe and Asia. He conceded that while either could 
be “deplored to the utmost,” neither of were “within the sphere of American self-interest; it is not 
our function to correct the evils of the world.” The effective goal of current American foreign 
policy, then, if it was not to serve the national interest, was only to “fight the battles of Great 
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Britain once more, as we did in the World War.” The moral assertion that it was the United 
States’ duty “to stand with the democracies against the totalitarian nations,” ignored the 
disgraceful realities of British and French actions in Spain and Czechoslovakia, that “the 
democracies in Europe have stood neither for themselves nor democracy.” Concluding, Colcord 
asked his perennial isolationist question: 
Nations save themselves; they are not to be saved by other nations… [Britain] has to 
straighten itself out along the lines of its own self-interest and on the basis of its own 
power. We might affect the issue for a moment, only at the expense of rolling up world 
disaster later on. The World War proved this beyond any question. By our entrance into 
the World War we saved nothing, and only succeeded in be-deviling every international 
relation. Must we plunge in again, knowing in advance that it is a vain enterprise, and be-
devil the world once more?81 
There are two distinguishing features of this article that set it apart from Colcord’s earlier 
pieces. The first is his concentration on President Roosevelt as the main determinant of U.S. 
foreign policy, rather than the Neutrality Act or the even American public opinion. The former 
was not mentioned at all, and the latter comes across almost as putty in FDR’s hands. The second 
is Colcord’s explicit the denial that there was any direct threat to the United States (or the 
Americas generally) from abroad, and specifically from Germany and Japan. This element stands 
in especially stark contrast with his writing from the previous seven years. In 1932 and in 1935-
37, he never once felt the need to state outright that the United States was not threatened by other 
nations and was totally secure by virtue of its geography besides. The only danger he saw then 
had been America allowing itself to be dragged into to other nations’ wars half-blinded by 
“unneutral” legislation. The idea that his country or its leadership would actively choose war as a 
response to perceived threats abroad was never on his horizon. 
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These new components of Colcord’s isolationist platform had interconnected roots in the 
evolving political scene. No less a public figure than President Roosevelt himself saw dire 
military threats to the United States from “aggressor” nations and had made that fact known as 
early as his “quarantine” speech of October 1937.82 The revelation in late January 1939 of plans 
orchestrated by U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullitt to supply that country with American 
military aircraft only illustrated the obvious favor of the administration towards the old Allied 
nations.83 Cries about German economic influence in Latin America was also a rising concern by 
the start of 1939. Indeed, economic historian Patrick Hearden argues that it was this very real and 
growing trade competition that was seen as the primary foreign threat by key members of the 
State Department and by American business opinion.84 
Colcord’s isolationist thought was thus shifting in appropriate directions. The questions 
of national security threats from abroad and the President’s power to guide U.S. foreign policy 
towards war were rapidly moving to the center of the interwar American foreign policy debate. 
Soon to come, they would be two of the dominant issues of that debate’s second stage – the 
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opening years of the Second World War.85 Yet even before that terrible but inevitable crisis 
arrived, Colcord was deeply skeptical about his country’s place in the looming war.  
I would give anything in the world to feel that it were possible for America to be wisely 
and bravely led in the times that are coming; led, I mean, by a leadership that is realistic, 
intellectually honest, and clearly informed. But I see no signs of it today. In order to 
accomplish a real neutrality if Europe does go to war, we would need to begin now to 
correct our present madness and clear up the ground of a sane public conviction. Lacking 
that, we will drift forward with our public emotionalism daily increasing, until when the 
war breaks out we will be one of the first to dash into the field.86 
 Colcord never quite left this dismal valley of pessimism, largely because he saw so little 
light in the situation to bolster his hope for “a real neutrality.” Through the years of war to come 
he, like so many other isolationists, struggled personally to help forestall that conclusion. But all 
the while, the ultimate futility of their efforts was no less obvious than the existential dangers 
they were trying to prevent. The winds of war were filling FDR’s political sails, and in spite of 
the disaster that Colcord and his ilk warned of with such passion, the current of American 
opinion was already shifting away from isolation and towards the wider, chaotic world. 
The Whirlpool, 1939-1941 
 The debate over America’s role in the Second World War began immediately on its 
outbreak. It raged on for over two years, and as Doenecke and Wilz note, for both sides the 
fundamental issues were understood as matters of national “life-or-death.”87 In his monumental 
and definitive study of that titanic debate, Doenecke further shows that despite the “incredible 
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diversity” of the anti-interventionist movement and the highly variable politics of its factions, the 
broad group shared some common positions besides their basic opposition to American 
involvement in the ongoing wars of Europe and Asia. They saw in war existential dangers to 
democracy at home, they denied that the Axis powers posed direct military threats to the United 
States, they favored a “negotiated peace” over absolute victory for either side, and they often 
questioned the moral superiority of the democracies over their fascist counterparts.88 
 Colcord’s initial response reflects these themes well. On October 6th in a long letter to 
Raymond Gram Swing – one of his closest journalistic colleagues from the Great War and now a 
news announcer for NBC – he unloaded his understanding of the war in Europe and his worst 
fears for the future. The extension of the war to the total defeat of either side promised no 
outcome but “the destruction of western Europe.” The time to stop the war was now, “while both 
sides have their bargaining power” and the ruin was still at a minimum. The mistakes of the past 
were as plain to him in 1939 as they had been in 1919. “Instead of bringing peace” as an 
unbiased mediating neutral, “America entered the [First World] war, financed it beyond sane 
economic limits, and helped the Allies to crush Germany. On the pages of history America was 
the devil of that piece, when the great Author really had cast her to be the angel.” 
 Such was Colcord’s perspective at its most optimistic. Otherwise, the circumstances of 
the war’s outbreak had not changed his basic realpolitik outlook in the slightest. Germany was 
only out for its own “self-interest,” just as with England and France. Looking at the conflict 
“from both sides,” he saw no moral advantage to either of them. And “as for [Germany’s] threat 
to the western hemisphere and the world, this is merely a bugaboo, of course, built up by 
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propaganda for political purposes.” But Colcord was not writing all this just for his own sake. 
The purpose of his letter was to chide his friend for talking the opposite position, an especially 
grievous fault in light of their shared experience during the last war. 
And it seems to me, Raymond, as I listened to you just now [on the radio], that you were 
in danger of allowing your emotions to warp your judgement, and that you had 
temporarily forgotten the lesson we learned and suffered in the World War. By ‘we’ I 
mean you and I, not America. You seemed to me to be allowing yourself to think of this 
war as another crusade of justice and truth; [and] allowing yourself to attribute right to 
one side and wrong to the other… As I see it, this war is merely a repetition of the World 
War, or rather, its second phase… We have had all this once before – a power war in the 
name of a moral crusade. Speaking for myself, I shall never be deluded again.89 
 Colcord felt obligated to make this special appeal to an old friend, but from the start of 
the war and until February 1941, he published nothing at all about the conflict or the United 
States’ wavering neutrality. Part of the reason Colcord showed so little interest in airing his 
opinions to the public was that he had no hopes of altering the views of non-isolationists; “It’s no 
more use to try to change the mind of one of these collectivists than it is to flap your arms and 
expect to fly.”90 Another reason might have been the open and overwhelming preference the 
American public had for Britain and France against Germany. Rigidly “neutral” thinking (and in 
Colcord’s case, very deliberately denying ethical considerations all together) was a difficult feat 
amidst a war so easy to frame in both moral and national security terms.91 
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But even without publications, he was far from idle as a commentator on the flood of 
events through that year and a half. In his prolific correspondence, he dedicated himself lock, 
stock and barrel to channeling his views to a breadth of people. To a Danish friend who had 
stayed at Colcord’s Searsport home the previous summer, Colcord wrote to dissuade him of a 
belief that Americans must be “more civilized” to avoid the regular conflicts that so mired 
Europe. “Our blessings depend almost wholly on geography, and your ills depend on much the 
same factor – geography plus history. Certainly the peace and security of the United States, or of 
the Western Hemisphere, don’t come from higher wisdom or greater virtue.”92 He did not expect 
virtue out of Congress either. During the debate over FDR’s proposed revision of the Neutrality 
Act to allow the sale of war materiel to belligerents if it was bought under the “cash-and-carry” 
formula, he encouraged leading isolationist Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan to ratchet 
up the Republican resistance. “Things are too gentlemanly,” an irate Colcord wrote, “the 
opposition doesn’t really attack. The fight isn’t personally and fiery enough. Instead of saying 
the administration’s cash-and-carry plan will lead us into war, why not rip out and attack the 
President’s foreign policy, showing that he has been committing acts of war for the past year or 
more, and accusing him of already placing us in the war?”93  
Just once in 1940 did Colcord speak publicly in Maine about the war, FDR’s foreign 
policy, and his strong preference for a policy strict non-intervention. He felt pressed to comment 
after the string of sweeping German victories through Denmark and Norway, the Low Countries, 
and finally France. “There is a lot of unnecessary hysteria in this country,” Colcord said at the 
Bangor Kiwanis Club in late June, “and the President seems to be encouraging it.” He spoke 
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favorably of the perspective of Charles Lindbergh, the famous aviator and a leading civilian 
voice for non-intervention in the European war. “[T]he Atlantic is as broad as ever it has been,” 
and even if Germany were to defeat Britain and take total power in Europe, it would have neither 
the reason nor the means to attack the United States. “We should concern ourselves with keeping 
America a democracy,” he said in a thinly veiled jab at FDR, “not permitting it to drift into a 
totalitarian form of government.”94 
But there was a reason Colcord was speaking before the public at all. The fear remained 
fixed in his mind that “in spite of the enormous lesson of the futility of our participation in the 
[First] World War, American opinion will again be swayed by influences extraneous to our own 
self-interest and the wisdom of history.”95 Defense money was playing no small part in that shift. 
As historian Francis Rexford Cooley notes, even the rock-ribbed Republican state of Maine was 
enjoying the economic benefits of the spending spree by the summer of 1940 (a trend which 
continued and accelerated into 1941).96 Colcord, too, was affected. Although his Bangor speech 
denied that America was threatened from abroad, he carefully assured his audience “I believe in 
it [“preparedness”] thoroughly.” His only critique was that current defense spending was packed 
with “waste” and geared towards offensive rather than defensive materiel, like tanks.97 
FDR remained the clear leader of the charge towards American involvement in the war, 
and Colcord was continually furious through the late summer of 1940 that his Republican 
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opponent for president, Wendell Willkie, was doing so little to challenge him on “the dominant 
issue” of the coming election. “Willkie has got to do something to differentiate his policies 
fundamentally from those of Roosevelt… [for] if Roosevelt is re-elected in November the page 
will be closed on the America of ten generations of my forefathers, on the America I have loved 
faithfully and shall continue to believe in until my dying day.”98 Colcord was not exaggerating. 
Chaffing badly after the orchestration of the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal in September, he made a 
direct appeal to candidate Willkie in the month before the election. “You cannot continue to say 
you are opposed to our entering the war but are in favor of all aid to Britain short of war, after 
Roosevelt has put us into the war on precisely that basis.”99 Willkie did change his strategy in 
October as his electoral prospects began to dim, but it was far too late to affect the outcome. 
FDR won his unprecedented third term with a comfortable majority of the popular vote.100  
The results were devastating for Colcord, and silenced him even more than he already 
was until the start of the following year.101 Ironically, he was roused to new action only in part 
by the next “war measure” from FDR – another revision to the Neutrality Act to allow convoys 
of American merchant ships to travel into warzones. Rather, it was the unsatisfying response 
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from the most powerful anti-interventionist group in the country – the recently formed America 
First Committee (AFC) – that grabbed his attention anew. Colcord was already informally 
connected to the AFC by his friendship with one of its National Committee members, Amos 
Pinchot, and on January 2, 1941, his signature was requested for its official “Message to 
Congress” asking that they make “unmistakably clear by all your actions that the United States, 
in aiding the British, will never take the step [the Neutrality Act revision] that leads to war 
abroad.”102 
Colcord responded with blunt criticism. “I cannot sign you Message to Congress because 
in my opinion it does not go far enough or state the case clearly or consistently. It tries to carry 
water on both shoulders, by taking sides yet wanting to avoid war.” The reality, he said, was that 
“there is no such thing” as a “‘measure short of war.’” It was on the basis of just that “national 
delusion amounting to hypocrisy” that President Roosevelt had already placed America 
“definitely and actively at war with Germany.” Colcord only cautioned that the Committee alter 
its course and promote “the pure and basic principle of neutrality” as the only way to save 
America’s “national integrity” in the eyes of history.103 “This grieves me very much,” Colcord 
wrote Pinchot, “because I realize that this is the crowd, above all others, that should be 
representing the true opposition to the way we are going.” But instead, by “placating popular 
opinion” which leaned so blindly toward “aid short of war,” the group was only abetting FDR’s 
long-term plan to sink America ever deeper into the European war.104 
 Colcord recovered from his indignation at the AFC quickly, though, for that same month, 
Roosevelt’s newest and most radical “aid short of war” proposal yet was put before Congress – 
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H.R. 1776, the “Lend-Lease” bill. The bill proposed to empower the president to transfer federal 
property (including arms and military equipment of all kinds) to any nation whose security he 
deemed “vital” to the defense of the United States. The move was received with extreme shock 
by anti-interventionists across the board. The cries of “dictatorship” showed echoes of the Court 
packing fight of 1937, as did the AFC-organized flood of letters to Congressional offices 
denouncing the plan.105 Replying late to Colcord’s letter, the AFC National Director wrote 
personally to assure him that the group was concentrating all its efforts on the bill’s “outright and 
complete defeat” in hopes of showing “a strong and unmistakable expression of disapproval for 
the administration’s whole foreign policy.”106 This was just what Colcord had been hoping for, 
but even before hearing from the AFC about its resolute stand, he was making moves of his own. 
Beginning in mid-January he wrote his support to his main isolationist contacts in the Senate – 
Hiram Johnson, Arthur Vandenberg, Henrik Shipstead, and Robert Lafollette, Jr. – and to 
Maine’s entire Congressional delegation – Senators Ralph Owen Brewster and Wallace White, 
and Representatives Frank Fellows, James Oliver, and Margaret Chase Smith.107 
 More useful than those letters for understanding Colcord’s isolationism at this late point 
is his last foreign policy op-ed of the New York Herald-Tribune of February 22. The letter was 
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ostensibly a blast against the Lend-Lease bill. Its only functions were to “legalize by act of 
Congress a war condition which the President has already incurred,” to “have America finance 
the war in Europe beyond its natural economic limits” (as it had in the Great War), and to 
continue the eight-year process of consolidating more power in FDR’s hands. But more than this, 
Colcord’s letter also chided the American people for following a dishonest leader. The “hue and 
cry of the threat of totalitarianism” abroad was distracting them from the obvious erection of 
totalitarianism at home. And while the hysteria let loose among the people had not yet broken 
their “national will” to keep the country out of war, it had blinded them to their own recent past. 
In “the World War of 1914-18,” America had slid into a conflict that was not its own, achieved 
none of its high-minded aims, and in fact, had ensured that “the war closed with an almost 
complete lack of justice, reason and economic sense, so that another world war was inevitable… 
What is history for, if we derive no lessons from it?”108 
 No matter the course of events overseas, Colcord would not change his old positions. But 
America, on the other hand, was changing fast. The final Lend-Lease bill passed both Houses of 
Congress in March, and despite staunch resistance from the AFC and other anti-interventionists, 
support for the bill resoundingly outweighed the opposition. The exact opposite of what the 
AFC’s National Director had written to Colcord thus came to pass, and in more than just a sense, 
this was a referendum on American isolationism itself. Wayne Cole notes that by the start of 
1941, isolationists in and out of Congress were “fighting a losing battle.” Though “millions of 
Americans continued to believe that [they] were right,” the glaring challenge posed by the Axis 
and Roosevelt’s shrewd leadership combined to “shatter” their image in the public mind. FDR 
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and his interventionist allies were working hard to discredit the isolationist worldview and those 
who supported it. Over the course of the year following his reelection, isolationists became 
“widely viewed as narrow, self-serving, partisan, conservative, antidemocratic, anti-Semitic, pro-
Nazi, fifth columnist, and even treasonous.”109 
 Cole was careful to call these accusations “guilt-by-association” tactics used by the 
president to discredit his harshest critics.110 But the association was real nevertheless. Indeed, so 
pressing was the dilemma of open fascists within the AFC’s ranks that it nearly caused a split 
between its National Committee and its largest single chapter, the New York City branch under 
John Flynn.111 But in Colcord’s case, the worst of the labels Cole cites are clearly invalid. It is 
true that Colcord’s “realism” could be extraordinarily brutal.112 But in spite of his dogmatic 
belief in the uniformity of national intentions, he did not have any special sympathy for Nazi 
Germany, a fact which he made clear in 1939 and would again later in 1941. Nor was Colcord 
anti-democratic. On the contrary, his most frequently vented fear was that if America went to 
war abroad it would inevitably cripple democracy at home. And Colcord could never be called a 
traitor to his country. Its interests and welfare were his highest concern in the world, and 
isolationism was what he saw as the best policy for defending them. But narrowness and 
partisanship were undeniably vices he indulged in. His instinct to opposition was almost 
reflexive by 1941; just as he had read everything good into Woodrow Wilson in 1917, now he 
read everything evil into FDR. And while even some isolationist senators could see at least a 
                                                 
109 Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 410-11. 
110 Ibid., 322 
111 Moser, Right Turn, 125-30. 
112 “I have never been a pacifist, Amos; I recognize that the world’s affairs have always been dominated by force, 
and I reckon they always will be… History is nothing but a record of man’s absurd barbarisms and brutalities in 
search of gain. Our own record isn’t particularly different from any other.” LC to Amos Pinchot, March 14, 1941, 
CFA Box 72 Folder 1222. 
94 
 
glimmer of national interest in making a concerted effort to support Britain against Nazi 
Germany, Colcord’s insistence that any step which brought the country closer to war was a step 
towards unmitigated disaster certainly limited his strategic vision. 
 After the Lend-Lease bill’s passage, Colcord understood the grimness of the situation all 
too clearly. Yet his current perspective was still in line with his incorrigible pessimism of the last 
two years. “There is no substance left to the opposition in the public mind,” he wrote to Amos 
Pinchot, and “[a]s for keeping out of the war, I don’t believe it can be done; in fact, we are in the 
war already… now that the die is cast, I believe it would be better for us to go into it all over, in 
honest fashion… I can’t bear this insincere and hypocritical position in which we now find 
ourselves… it almost seems like a hideous joke to me; and in this state of mind I can honestly sit 
back and watch the show as if I were reading history.”113 
 In the fall of 1941, it was Colcord’s tragic reward for his isolationist advocacy to date to 
have the privilege of entering his thoughts on that “hideous joke” into the eternal record of the 
great intervention debate. On October 18th, he received an invitation from Senators Johnson, 
Lafollette, and Robert Taft to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against the 
latest “war measure” from the White House – a revision to the Neutrality Act that would allow 
the arming of American merchant ships now crossing the Atlantic with aid for Britain on a near-
daily basis.114 Colcord could never have passed up such an opportunity. He accepted the offer 
and rushed south to Washington, where he was graciously hosted by SFRC-member Wallace 
White of Maine despite their earlier difference of opinion about Lend-Lease. On October 24th, 
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Colcord settled into his chair before a panel of over twenty U.S. Senators and said his piece 
alongside a host of other isolationist intellectuals, including Charles Beard, John T. Flynn, 
George Peek, and his old friend and colleague from The Nation, Oswald Garrison Villard.  
In his opening statement, Colcord stood on his oldest ground. “I have never felt neutrality 
to be a fit subject for legislation,” he said, or that it could be “controlled by legislative acts. The 
only way to be neutral is simply to be neutral; that is, to feel that way.” Nevertheless, he also did 
the job he was called to the Capitol for. The arming of merchant ships was no different from all 
the other foreign policy steps FDR had pushed through thus far. “It is purely and simply a 
question of whether or not we shall commit another act of undeclared war in the European 
conflict. To consider it in any other light is intellectual dishonesty.” By this point, though, 
Colcord was almost less disturbed by actual American involvement in war than the “dishonest” 
pseudo-neutrality that was leading to the same end. “I think it is a terrible thing for the country to 
be carried forward in this way from act to act, in a state of delusion as to what these acts really 
embody.” Britain, at least, “had the honor to declare war against Germany” legally. America, by 
contrast, was an “ostensible neutral” while in reality being anything but. Thus, as it had been 
since 1939, the real question of “peace or war” with Germany was still being evaded.115 
Such was Colcord’s prepared statement, but then came the period of open questioning. 
The lion’s share of this time was occupied by questions from Democratic Senator Theodore 
Green of Rhode Island. The senator’s grilling concentrated on breaking down Colcord’s ideas of 
neutrality in theory versus in practice. If he did not support the Neutrality Act from the start, 
Green inquired, then why should he oppose its revision at all? Colcord replied that his argument 
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was based on a “chain of logic, that if we do this thing [arm ships] it will inevitably bring about 
war” by forcing the other side – Germany – to go into “unlimited submarine warfare” just as it 
had in the Great War. Senator Green also asked just how “neutral” Colcord really was, whether 
he had “no preference as to which side should win this war – England or Germany?” Colcord 
was honest in his answer. He did consider himself neutral, but this did not mean he was without 
personal feelings about the two sides. As “an American citizen,” he said, “I believe that our 
country should have remained legally neutral. As a human being all of my sympathies are with 
Great Britain.” But nevertheless, his core reasoning for American neutrality remained unaffected 
by any such sympathies as an individual. Neither the Germany of the moment nor a future 
Germany that had defeated Britain (which he saw as unlikely) posed a threat to the United States. 
War for America was still as much a matter of choice as neutrality.116 
Only on one point was Colcord forced to make a real concession. Towards the end of the 
questioning, he made a single statement that Committee Chairman Tom Connally of Texas could 
not let stand. Justifying his conviction that America ought to live with the status quo Europe sets 
for itself, he said that “[t]he national life is not endangered in my opinion by anything that 
happens in the world outside the United States.” Senator Connally pounced. “Would you favor 
submitting to the conquest of Canada by some European power,” he asked? Caught in a blind, 
Colcord had no choice but to retreat. “Well, we would do something about that; yes.”117 
Other than this embarrassing snag, Colcord left Washington with his head held high, and 
the inevitable (although slimmer than with Lend-Lease) passage of the ship arming bill early the 
next month did not dampen his personal pride in that final commentary on American neutrality 
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and the Second World War. Nor was he disappointed that by the time he returned from the 
Capitol on October 28th, he had another invitation – now eight days old – from the New York 
chapter of the America First Committee asking if he could be a guest on the platform of their 
next mass meeting at Madison Square Garden on the 30th. Naturally, Colcord was unable to 
make another long trip on such short notice, but having warmed to the group considerably since 
January, he gave them full permission to use his name on behalf of their shared cause.118 
With American involvement in either of the wars in Europe and Asia lurching closer by 
the day, Colcord made his last stand on his isolationist principles closer to home. In a step 
reflecting the hollowness of his Democratic label, he attended the annual meeting of Maine’s 
Young Republicans on November 15th in the state capital. There he participated in a “Round 
Table Discussion on Foreign Policy” with a professor of history from Colby College and a 
retired army captain from Waldoboro. The discussion, however, was reported by one paper as 
closer to a “debate” in which some of the points “were like the flashing of sharp swords.”119 
Surprisingly, though, very little of that discussion was recorded by the Maine papers. Colcord 
took what was described as “the isolationist stand” by saying that Germany did not pose the 
threat that his opponents claimed and that “‘we should have been neutral from the start.’”120  
But Colcord was standing against forces beyond just two “interventionists.” The entire 
course of the meeting was an unambiguous display of support for the president’s defense 
program and his foreign policy against Germany. The “young Republicans” themselves debated 
and voted overwhelmingly against “the policy of isolationism” as “not in accord with the best 
interests of the United States.” Rather, they favored a foreign policy of “united and alert 
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nationalism taking its place in world affairs” with a central goal to “destroy and defeat 
totalitarianism.” This, of course, was President Roosevelt’s foreign policy, and the adults of the 
meeting – including Governor Sumner Sewall and Congresswoman Smith – followed the youths 
in throwing their support behind national defense and aid to Britain. Senator Wallace White was 
particularly strident. “This is not a European war to establish another balance of power… It’s 
more than that because of Hitler’s purpose to enforce his policies upon the world… And yet 
there are some who say this war is no concern of the United States!”121 
Colcord had good reason to suspect that White’s words were aimed at one isolationist in 
the audience specifically. Besides the fact that the Senator was attacking his talking points, by 
Colcord’s account, “about half the time he swung around and talked straight at me – we glared at 
each other through about half the speech. People were amused at it.”122 He had additional 
indications that even Maine, his home state whose resistance to the lure of the New Deal he took 
so much pride in during the 1930s, was trending fast into the President’s camp on the issues of 
foreign war and national “defense.”123 Just days before the Young Republicans meeting, the one 
America First chapter in Maine – founded in September in Portland – was outright denied access 
to Bangor’s City Hall for a mass meeting. In an open letter of protest, the local AFC chairman 
decried the action as “partisan censorship,” since the pro-intervention Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies had used the facility just recently.124 Justus Doenecke notes that 
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such informal censorship was rapidly becoming the norm for anti-interventionists by mid-1941. 
In cities across the country, America First meetings were refused access to local venues and the 
organization itself was subject to extreme rhetorical “abuse” through much of the American 
press. Indeed, the rhetoric of President Roosevelt himself played a key role in encouraging that 
hostility towards both the AFC specifically and its isolationist principles generally.125 
In the end, Colcord’s pessimism was justified. As a consequence, he could take the event 
which finally brought America officially into a foreign war in stride. In the days leading up to 
Pearl Harbor, he was already seeing the disaster clearly on the horizon. “[I]t’s plain that the 
Administration is almost in the position of forcing war on Japan. There is a belief in Washington 
that Japan is bluffing, and that war with her would merely be a push-over. I think that they are 
not considering the realities.”126 Indeed, they were not, and when the inevitable happened, he 
kept up his pessimism at full tilt. “Japan has called our bluff, not we theirs,” Colcord wrote not 
long after Pearl Harbor. “I think we are going to lose the Philippines, and I think Britain is going 
to lose Singapore. The West is in the process of being thrown out of the Orient. It’s an historic 
occasion. And an entirely justifiable one, when you look back on the history of how the West got 
there in the first place.” America, of course, was still at no risk of being “conquered” by either 
Japan or Germany, but a conquest of another kind had already taken place to bring the country to 
where it was. “Well,” he brooded, “the League of Nations boys have at last got their way. We’re 
out for collective security, picking the bad nations, America mothering the earth, and all the 
rest… We can say good-bye, Elling, to the world we have known.”127 
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But as that awesome wave of reality surged over him and as America continued to 
change beneath his feet, Lincoln Colcord stayed just the same as he ever was. Don’t forget, he 
told his daughter in February 1942, that “our war is a foreign war, and what we are defending are 
other peoples’ countries… Makes me furious to have all the isolationists quitting on the job, and 
everyone saying that events have proved them so wrong. Just the opposite is the case; as far as 
I’m concerned events have proved me right in every particular.” Lest anyone else write the 
political epitaph for this man or his worldview, here is Colcord’s own: “I am one isolationist who 
doesn’t take back a damned word he said.”128
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CHAPTER THREE 
ARTHUR LOWER: APOSTACY 
Introduction  
In his survey of twentieth century English Canadian history writing, Carl Berger boldly 
labeled Arthur Lower “the most nationalistic of English Canadian historians,” a man constantly 
preoccupied with national identity, one whose writing was dominated by a quixotic “search for a 
nationalist creed” to distinguish a unique and meaningful Canadian nationhood.1 Indeed, at the 
molten core of Lower’s vision of his country, Canada was a perennial nation in the making; at 
once an entity with an undeniably solid historical existence, yet also an ephemeral and grandiose 
idea forever struggling to be born (with nationalists like Lower as its loyal midwives). Arthur 
Lower lived his life with the story of his nation firmly in mind, a saga which he also had the 
tremendous privilege of writing for public consumption. He evolved with Canada, sharing with it 
his own youth and maturity, and projecting those phases of human development onto that greater 
version of himself.2 It was his all too bitter misfortune that so much of the reality of Canadian 
life in the 1930s refused to align with his personal ideals.  
Coming to the ideology in early 1933 and leaving it with equal abruptness in September 
1939, Lower placed the principles and policies of isolationism at the center of his national vision 
for Canada during that decade. As an outgrowth of his preexisting nationalism, Lower’s stripe of 
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isolationism was primarily dedicated to isolating Canada from Britain – politically, militarily, 
and culturally. This was also the pattern of his likeminded compatriots. In his monumental series 
Canada and the Age of Conflict, C.P. Stacey describes “a new generation of acerbic nationalist” 
English Canadians, “based chiefly in the universities,” as the drivers of interwar Canadian 
isolationist thought. Political scientist F.R. Scott and historian Frank Underhill are mentioned 
here by name, as is the magazine Canadian Forum, “an ably conducted Toronto-monthly of 
leftist views and small circulation.”3 Lower fits into this left-leaning university demographic 
perfectly. He was a professor of history at a small but notable Canadian college, a self-described 
liberal (though not a socialist like Underhill and Scott), and an outspoken advocate for civil 
liberties through the course of his mature life. He also published several of his isolationist 
articles in Canadian Forum during the late-1930s and was a subscriber to the magazine from as 
early as 1931. But most of his isolationist pieces appeared in a broad variety of outlets ranging 
from popular magazines like Maclean’s to elite institutional journals like Queen’s Quarterly.4 
Lower asserted his belief in nationalist isolationism with conviction and indignation. 
Through the 1930s – the decade he would describe in hindsight as the “crown” of his historical 
career – his burning hostility against Britain’s still powerful influence over Canadian foreign 
policy, against the glaring mistakes of British leadership, and against the inability of English 
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school,” a movement “of the left,” took the lead in promoting “the thesis that Canada’s own vital interests must be 
the determining factor in her foreign policy” rather than antiquated “colonial” sentiment. A.R.M. Lower, “The 
Foreign Policy of Canada,” New Commonwealth Quarterly 7 (April 1942), 277. 
4 Heick and Graham’s bibliography for Lower counts 62 total publications – books, articles, transcribed speeches, 
and some poetry – between 1930 and 1939. Of those, no less than 20 were explicitly dedicated to foreign affairs, 
with additional overlap into pieces on other subjects. That bibliography, however, excludes most of Lower’s 
sporadic but highly revealing “letters to the editor” in the Winnipeg Free Press and other publications. His Own 
Man: Essays in Honour of Arthur Reginald Marsden Lower, edited by W.H. Heick and Roger Graham, (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1974), 165-69. 
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Canadians to detach themselves emotionally from their traditional mother country, all carried 
over into his published writing and public speaking. Isolationism as a national policy and as a 
mentality for Canadians to understand the world was an elemental part of his nationalist cure for 
all those deep-seated and distinctly British ills. 
Ironically, Lower’s resentment of Britain and its overbearing place in Canadian life was 
never expressed more clearly than in October of 1940, a full year after his leap away from 
isolationism and over to support for a war-beleaguered Britain. Writing to a close confidant, a 
fellow isolationist of the 1930s, Lower revealed the ultimate basis of this dramatic pivot: 
I have no objection to working alliances with other powers in our own national interests (and 
I accept this war as now, thanks to the unparalleled mess that has been made in Europe, in 
our national interests – that is, it is Hitler’s hide or ours) but the religion of ‘Britishism’ must 
go. As long as that false and dark idol worship obtains among us, we Canadians can never be 
independent, for we are slaves to ourselves.5 
The cardinal elements of Lower’s nationalist and isolationist worldviews are on naked 
display in this simple paragraph. Independence was his goal for Canada, and the ability of the 
country to act on its own terms and in its own interests was the practical measure of true 
sovereignty. But important, too, was independence of the mind. Despite all their political gains, 
Canadians still could not be a people without a self-consciously Canadian identity, the psychic 
key to culturally distinguishing their own nation from its colonial parent state. Even as he finally 
validated Canada’s alignment with Britain in its existential struggle against Nazi Germany, the 
“religion of Britishism” was still the faith which Lower had decisively broken with, and that 
which he had painstakingly replaced with another, essentially Canadian one.  
                                                 
5 Arthur Lower (hereafter AL) to T.S. Ewart, October 8, 1940, Arthur Lower Fonds (hereafter AFL) Box 1 File 15. 
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The Undercurrent, 1889-1929 
Like all people, Arthur Lower’s adult life was profoundly shaped by the circumstances of 
his youth. A child of the late-Victorian era, he was born in the small but prosperous central 
Ontario town of Barrie to first-generation immigrants from England. His father, a merchant, was 
successful enough in business to support seven children in a large house near the shore of the 
local lake. His mother was a convert to Methodism who took the rest of her family with her from 
Anglicanism into the fervent but popular sect. Shy as a boy and mildly alienated from his peers 
by his intellectual bent, Lower set out early on the path towards professional history as a 
livelihood and source of identity. Supporting himself financially with work as a forest fire ranger 
during the summers, he was the first in his family to receive a college education, attending the 
University of Toronto for his undergraduate degree from 1909 to 1914. He subsequently worked 
as a primary school teacher in Toronto until 1916, when he left Canada for the British Navy and 
service in the First World War. The long span of Lower’s early years was not only decisive in his 
path towards the writing and teaching of Canadian history. Personal events of this period also 
played a determining role in his ideological evolution as a Canadian nationalist.  
The many details of Lower’s first three decades, so candidly revealed in his 1967 
memoir, have been the fodder for Canadian scholars dissecting the private influences in Lower’s 
work as an historian. Carl Berger speculates that dysfunction within Lower’s family had a 
marked influence on his later writing. Some of Lower’s most important historical motifs – 
characterizing the nation as a “familial community,” his stress on the importance of unity 
through social homogeneity – were logical extensions of their author’s imbalanced domestic 
life.6 C.P. Champion, too, notes the influence of personal struggle in shaping the historian’s 
                                                 
6 Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 112.  
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worldview, linking Lower’s youthful rejection of Methodism with his mature dedication to 
inspiring a nationalist “faith” for Canada, a possible “quasi-spiritual substitute for religion.”7  
These frank assessments reveal important and long-held elements of Lower’s worldview. 
But to understand his nationalism in full, and to trace the deepest roots of his later but 
interconnected isolationism, his early feelings for Britain and its place in Canadian society must 
be illustrated. The memoir remains essential for this task. Writing in his old age and at the height 
of his fame, Lower showed remarkably little compunction at airing some of the most intimate 
details of his life for the Canadian reading public. But nowhere was the author’s self-assessment 
sharper or more sullen than in describing his relationship with his father, Fred Lower, whom he 
bluntly labeled “a negative influence in my formative years, contributing little in the way of 
guidance though spending himself in unending toil to keep his family going.”8 Indeed, so cold 
was the father toward the son that nothing short of the latter’s return from the war in Europe in 
1919 was enough to break the ice.9 So intense was young Lower’s resentment in kind, that even 
though it was his mother who first brought the family into the Methodist camp he nevertheless 
channeled his bitterness about their “‘desertion’” of the traditional church toward his father, who 
“[f]or some years” afterward became “a stranger and almost an alien to me” as a result.10 
Beyond all this, the sharpest wedge separating Fred and Arthur Lower was not another 
personality flaw, nor the father’s strong Conservative affiliation, but a cultural trait endemic to 
                                                 
7 C.P. Champion, The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-68 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) 97. 
8 Arthur R.M. Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), 4. 
9 Lower recalled walking home with his father through Barrie, still clad in his naval officer’s uniform, as “the one 
and only time in my life that I caught him exhibiting paternal pride.” Ibid., 119. 
10 Ibid., 9. 
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Canadians of British descent at the turn of the twentieth century. Fred Lower was a Canadian in 
name only. In reality, he was “an English exile to the day of his death.” Lower continued: 
[A]s he got older his thoughts and words turned more and more towards ‘home.’ So constant 
were the allusions, so disparaging the comparisons, so peculiar the friends that this nostalgia 
entailed, that it became distinctly unpopular with other members of the family and shoved us 
farther into the direction of nativism than many a Canadian without this close English 
association has felt any need to go.11  
Fred Lower was not an unusual case. Barrie itself was “almost as much a transcript of a 
little town in the British Isles as it was a Canadian community.” The social environment of 
Arthur Lower’s youth was one in which there was absolutely “no dissent” from the reigning 
dogma of “Britishism.” A mentality stretching far beyond the confines of little Barrie, Britishism 
was laden with multiple meanings for English Canadians of Lower’s generation and prior. It 
meant that the country nearest and dearest to their hearts was to be found not at home, in Canada, 
but abroad in the “shining figure of Britannia” across the sea. Internally, the meaning of 
Britishism was equally simple, “Canada was British, and that was that… the general concept of 
Britishness overrode everything else.” Although young Lower, despite his background, felt 
brewing within himself “a certain hostility to all things English,” this was far from apparent in 
his actions through the first three decades of his life.12 
 Even as the foundation of his later nationalism was laid, Arthur Lower hewed close to his 
British roots in the years surrounding the First World War. This was not merely a consequence 
of social pressure in Barrie. The college atmosphere at the University of Toronto was one of 
independence and rebellion, where students would “invariably find themselves in revolution 
against their past.” Lower was not immune from this trend. While at university he “destroyed 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 4. 
12 Ibid., 17, 20-22. 
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nearly the entire religious structure handed down to me,” leaving the gulf between himself and 
his family “vastly widened.” Yet he was not prepared to become an iconoclast in the religious 
sense; “heritage and tradition were far too strong for me to be tempted to set myself up in 
opposition to orthodoxy. I might be free of dogma, but I was bound nevertheless.”13  
In that same vein, he was also unprepared to be an iconoclast in a secular, social capacity. 
After 1914 as before, Lower remained a public adherent to the cultural orthodoxy of Britishism. 
This was well in line with the rest of his ethnic cohort. Although Canada, as a British Dominion 
with no right to an independent foreign policy of its own, joined the First World War 
immediately when Britain did, this was not at all to the chagrin of Canada’s British-descended 
(and for a large part, British-born) population. On the contrary, they replied to the call to arms 
with an explosion of patriotic feeling and a flood of volunteers, though the numbers were not so 
great as to avoid the institution of Conscription in 1917.14 
While he did not join the war as swiftly as Canada itself did, Lower’s own pro-British 
sentiment was as sincere an expression of racial and patriotic feeling as those of other Canadians 
of his kind. Emblematic of this was Lower’s first serious published article, a May 1915 piece for 
a Toronto University student publication. Written while he was unable to enlist for service 
because of a dispute with his older brother on who would go abroad and who would stay behind, 
“Nationalism and Peace” was Lower’s personal “justification for my own [later] participation [in 
the war].” It was also a significant intellectual milestone for its author. Here was Lower’s first 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 57-59. 
14 Mark David Sheftall, Altered Memories of the Great War: Divergent Narratives of Britain, Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 92-95. At least one Canadian historian has taken a more 
skeptical view of the image of English Canadian “mass enthusiasm.” See Bryan Douglas Tennyson, Canada's Great 
War, 1914-1918: How Canada Helped Save the British Empire and Became a North American Nation (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 9-10. 
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public enunciation of nationalist ideas. Within its four brief pages lay part of the foundational 
vocabulary for his writing on Canadian nationalism from the 1920s onwards: nation, “‘a race 
which possesses its own government, language, customs and culture and enough self-
consciousness to preserve them,’” and nationality, “a race which possesses all of these except its 
own government… its constant aim will always be to become a nation.”15 
Yet here, too, was an explicit moral endorsement of the British Empire and Canada’s 
place within it. Lower’s article condemned Germany for holding Poles, Danes, and French “in 
subjugation,” and Austria-Hungary, where “the tyranny of race over race is not so galling even in 
the Turkish Empire.” As a contrast, he presented the British system as the antithesis of that 
tyranny, as a model for the successful application of “the national principle,” and as a healthy 
“confederation” of “small states” coexisting in a “happy condition” that war-torn Europe ought 
to emulate. The British Empire, Lower wrote, “has shown how well sister nations may live in 
union to the advantage of all; England and Scotland, Cape Colony and Transvaal, Ontario and 
Quebec, are shining examples of different nations living their own free life together on equal 
terms, and developing in their own way without let or hindrance.”16 
Readers versed in Lower’s articles of the 1930s might suspect this passage was written 
tongue-in-cheek. All six of those “sister nations” are equally useful as examples of the bitterest 
national conflict, and Britain’s global empire was flush with nationalities held “in subjugation.” 
Later in life Lower made statements similar in content but with an unambiguously sarcastic tone. 
                                                 
15 A.R.M. Lower, “Nationalism and Peace,” The School 3, No. 9 (May 1915), 613. Lower’s quoted definition of 
nation and unquoted definition of nationality were drawn from a curious (but uncited) source. Both were adapted 
from the purported reply of a Serbian representative in the Austrian Empire to a question – “what is a nation?” – 
from Lajos Kossuth, the Hungarian revolutionary of 1848. The original quote can be found in R.W. Seton-Watson, 
The Southern Slav Question (London: Constable, 1911), 46. In his memoir, Lower names only official British and 
Allied publications as his sources for the essay. The other readings which contributed to the piece went undisclosed. 
Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 90. 
16 Ibid., 614-16. 
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In his memoir, however, he asserts the sincerity of his sympathy for Britain at the time, and of 
his rationale as an “innocent young man” for joining the war a year after writing the article: 
As I look back on my own enlistment, it seems to me that to explain it fully I would have to 
explain a whole way of life, that of the English-Canadian people and that of my family and of 
myself. One point sticks out; I was just in the current and had no doubts about the rightness – 
and righteousness – of the war. It never occurred to me that there might be something to be 
said as [a] counter-account.17 
As an “innocent young man” lacking that all important “counter-account,” and mired as 
he was in an all-pervasive British sentiment which even the rebelliousness of youth could not 
dull, Lower followed “the current” to its logical conclusion. In the spring of 1916, he duly 
enlisted in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve at the age of twenty-six. Although by the end of 
the war he had attained the rank of lieutenant and participated in one major military action off 
the Belgian coast, Lower summarized his service on submarine depot ships as mundane. On the 
water, his time was defined by the tedium of naval routine; and on shore, by his disappointing 
home port, “Dismal Dover.”18  
The most valuable element of Lower’s war experience was not the thrill of conflict or 
even pride of service, but his interaction with England and its people.19 While the living history 
of the country was an endless source of fascination, Lower, as with other “Canadian boys,” knew 
that he was “[a] stranger in England” despite his British uniform. Between himself and his 
national hosts stood the same cultural “gulf that separates English and Canadians” as peoples. A 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 90. 
18 Ibid., 103. 
19 The most important English connection of all was Lower’s future wife, Evelyn Smith, of the coastal town 
Folkstone (just south of Dover along the Channel coast). The two met in the spring of 1917 when Lower was already 
engaged to a Toronto woman. Lower and Smith became engaged in May of 1919 while he was still in England and 
they married in October of 1920 after a year together in Canada. These details can be found in a note written by 
Arthur Lower not long after Evelyn’s death. “Kingston, July 3, 1976,” ALF Box 10, File 3. 
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wall of social “ice,” variable in thickness, continually isolated the young Canadian from the 
English men and women who surrounded him through the course of his time abroad.20 
Lower was not totally alone in feeling this way. In an insightful comparative article, R. 
Douglas Francis draws a useful parallel between Lower’s experience in England during the Great 
War and that of a contemporary Canadian historian-turned-soldier (and later, historian-turned-
isolationist), Frank Underhill. Although both men were born in 1889, Underhill’s historical 
career progressed much faster than Lower’s, having graduated from Oxford University in 1914 
and moving immediately into college-level teaching at the University of Saskatchewan. 
Underhill also beat Lower into the service. He joined the Canadian army in 1915, then quickly 
transferred to British infantry forces in France where he was wounded at the Battle of the 
Somme. Francis notes that Underhill, like Lower, suffered his own alienation from his British 
hosts, but more specifically towards the “upper class English elite,” the same cohort he resented 
while at Oxford.21 While Lower lacked that pre-war opportunity for building up the wall between 
himself and the English, his wartime experience more than served to suffice. 
One friend of Lower’s, Bob Beattie, a conscription-exempt young man in Toronto, 
recognized Lower’s subtle shift in mentality away from Britain and towards Canada. Pleased to 
hear that Lower had “not relinquished, but rather intensified, the robust Canadianism of your 
outlook since being ‘over,’” Beattie foresaw a cultural division among the Canadian soldiers who 
would someday return from Europe. Many would continue to live with England first in their 
                                                 
20 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 94, 108. A letter from a fellow Canadian soldier serving in British-occupied 
Mesopotamia sympathized with Lower’s circumstances: “I don’t blame you for getting fed up with the Englishmen 
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21 R. Douglas Francis, “Historical Perspectives on Britain: The Ideas of Canadian Historians Frank Underhill and 
Arthur R.M. Lower,” in Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity, edited by Philip Bruckner 
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hearts even in peacetime. But for other men, the meaning of their lives would be redirected 
towards solving “the problems of their own country,” and doing so with a distinct “independence 
of thought.” This latter group, Beattie anticipated, would be the “decisive” factor in Canada’s 
post-war future. “If there are enough [of them] they will have the chance of their lives in creating 
National responsibility [sic].”22  
 Many years would pass before he began, but eventually Lower would strive to bring this 
grandiose prophecy to fruition. For the time being, though, his budding alienation from Britain – 
a profoundly negative feeling which reached a critical mass in the 1930s – did little to spoil his 
British patriotism during or immediately after the war. Two cheerful articles describing his 
service for The Sailor, a Toronto-based publication for Canadian naval men, attest to Lower’s 
initial satisfaction with his personal role in the war.23 Likewise, he saw no reason to critique the 
justness of the British cause or the war itself too soon after its conclusion. This was the most 
persistent and powerful element of Lower’s First World War-era mentality. Only with his turn 
towards the ideology of isolationism, “fifteen years after the end of the war,” did he finally break 
with the most sacred myth of that or any other war, that it was still justified in hindsight.24   
 Before he reached that moment of catharsis, Lower continued to develop his Canadian 
nationalism and to erase his own inner British sentiments. Although he “came back from the war 
much more of a Canadian than I went into it,” this was a slow process spanning the entire decade 
of the 1920s, the same period in which he also started to break into the world of higher 
                                                 
22 Bob Beattie to AL, July 13, 1918, ALF Box 1 File 1. 
23 A.R.M. Lower, “Extracts from the Log of –,” The Sailor 2, No. 4 (November 1919), 12-13, 24-25. A.R.M. Lower, 
“Two Christmas Nights Afloat,” The Sailor 2, No. 5 (December 1919), 22-23, 28-29. 
24 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 92. Lower’s dating thus puts the inception of his isolationism around 1933. 
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education.25 As part of earning his Master’s degree at the University of Toronto, Lower began a 
career at the Canadian Public Archives in Ottawa, where he lingered after his graduation in 1923. 
The work was bitterly unsatisfying. Despite serving under the prominent economic historian 
Adam Shortt, he knew his archival drudgery was not the work of a genuine historian but of a 
“civil servant,” which meant “really to be nothing.” Lower had a clear image of what he wanted 
to become. To fulfill his “secret ambition” of university teaching, and to make himself a 
recognized “authority on Canadian history,” he needed a doctorate.26 
 That mark of true professionalism, however, was to be found at only three Canadian 
universities at that time: Toronto, McGill, and Queen’s. While the option was open for Lower to 
seek his Ph.D. in England like many of his Canadian contemporaries, he chose to remain in 
North America instead.27 In 1925 he went south to the United States, enrolling at Harvard 
University for the fall term. There he remained for the next four years. This time at Harvard as 
both a student – studying under the likes of Samuel Elliot Morrison, Edward Channing, and as 
his mentor, the Cromwell specialist Wilbur Cortez Abbott –  and as an instructor in his own right 
at Radcliff College, accelerated his journey towards the full mastery of his subject. It was also a 
time for confronting his personal identity as a Canadian.  
 Opportunities for this self-assessment came immediately on arrival at Cambridge. In his 
first week at Harvard, Lower attended a reception for foreign students, only to be assured that, 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 139. In the same passage, Lower notes that this was also the period when he turned sharply towards the 
Liberal Party and made liberalism his political philosophy of choice. Lower also cited his later experience at the 
1932 Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa – observing the Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett profess 
“filial affection towards Great Britain” as he pushed hard for Canadian trade advantages – as having finally “cured 
me of any lingering ancestral attachment I had still felt for Canadian Toryism.” Ibid., 187. 
26 Ibid., 132-33. 
27 For details on Lower’s choice of a Ph.D. program and the experience of other Canadian historians of his 
generation, see Chapter 3, “’The post-1918 generation’: professionalization continued,” in Donald Wright, The 
Professionalization of History in English Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 52-81. 
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from the American perspective, “Canadians are not foreigners” at all. While Lower recalled that, 
indeed, “[n]o one every treated me as one,” he was recognizably foreign in another way; not as a 
Canadian, but as a “British subject.” This was Lower’s national stamp in the eyes of some of his 
professors and close friends alike, and despite the university’s general atmosphere of 
Anglophilia, it opened him up to “amicable” teasing along American nationalist lines.28 
 Amidst these scholarly travels, academic challenges, and professional toil, Lower’s 
nationalism matured. It was an evolution clearly demarcated by two seminal articles. The first, 
published in a small nationalist magazine from Montreal, The Listening Post, was Lower’s first 
public act of dissent towards Britain and the place of British patriotism within Canada. That 
criticism, however, was coupled with an even harsher critique of the United States. The article 
was ostensibly a counter-point against a piece in the magazine’s previous issue, an inflammatory 
polemic advocating for the annexation of Canada by its neighbor.29 Much of Lower’s article was 
thus a justification of Canada’s independence from the United States. Americanization was not 
merely a looming social threat, but an ongoing process by which English Canada in particular 
was “fast being swamped by modern American culture.” To repel this existential danger, Lower 
called on Canadians to dedicated themselves to a high spiritual task: finding a national “soul” to 
distinguish their country from its southern counterpart. The cost of failure was plain. “We must 
either have a national soul, as have all great nations… or disappear.”30 
 But before this “national soul-searching” could begin, Canadians needed to engage in 
national self-reflection. What was Canada as a country, what was the basis of its existence to 
                                                 
28Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 154-55. 
29 Bostonian, “Sand Against the Wind: Canada under the Stars and Stripes?” The Listening Post 3, No. 3 (March 
1925). 
30 A.R.M. Lower, “Calling Our Souls Our Own: What is Our Future?” The Listening Post 3, No. 5 (May 1925), 24. 
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date, and what kept it united despite its myriad of internal divisions? Each of these Lower 
answered for his readers. In the process, he added critical new elements to his own understanding 
of Canadian history and Canadian national identity. Canada’s cultural core was a fusion of “the 
Puritan tradition of New England” and “British political institutions,” a foundation to which 
emerging customs of “indigenous” creation were slowly being added. Reiterating the same 
definitions of “nation” and “nationality” he had discovered in 1915, Lower saw the tense 
coexistence of Canada’s two component nationalities – English and French – as no bar to its 
nationhood. In fact, Canada’s “mere existence” in spite of this and other divides showed that “the 
forces of union must be stronger than the forces of disruption.”31 
 Those unifying forces, however, were deeply troubling for Lower. By his account, only 
two bonds held Canada together: “sentiment for the British flag combined with a strong dash of 
hostility towards anything savoring of American domination.”32 Neither of these “exterior 
things” were a legitimate basis for a Canadian nation or a Canadian soul, but the first of the pair 
was especially “unstable.” That new word in Lower’s nationalist vocabulary, sentiment, would 
from this time forward become a literal hallmark of his writing. Virtually every successive article 
on the subject of Britain and its place in Canadian society would utilize this potent and versatile 
term, one which was meant to summon up a laundry list of negative connotations.  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 9-10. 
32 Lower’s assessment bears a resemblance to a more current historian’s description of the two constant themes in 
Canadian national identity before the First World War and into the interwar decades: “… the United States remain-
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new versions of ‘Canadian-ness.’” John Herd Thompson, “Canada and the ‘Third British Empire’, 1901-1939,” in 
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Canada’s “mysterious sentiment” for Britain, Lower mused, was “sufficient to have 
preserved it” against the prosperity promised by American annexation. It was indeed “the British 
flag, the British connection which appears to keep the country together.” But, he continued: 
… this unity is blind. One part of Canada [i.e. Quebec] feels no loyalty to what has been 
referred to above as a curious symbol – the flag (not the Canadian ensign, which is a very 
obscure symbol indeed, but the Union Jack) – curious because, though meaningless in 
itself, it, an inanimate thing, possesses so much power over us… it sums up all the queer 
odds and ends of racial sense, self-sacrifice, medieval devotion to a throne, imaginative 
glimpses of a great world-wide unity, that lie in untidy heaps in the dusty, unfrequented 
corners of all our hearts and minds…33 
The language of this description – mystery, blindness, a whole people living under the 
power of a symbol – suggests something more than mere irrationality; it borders on describing 
British sentiment as a kind of cult. This was undoubtedly a very deliberate choice on the author’s 
part. Lower would retain this religious framing for his nationalist argument through the decades 
to come. As he labeled his unifying nationalist creed a Canadian “national faith,” so too did he 
deride British sentiment as a hollow faith that did little to serve Canada as the country it was. 
Lower received a modicum of praise for his Listening Post article. Two of his former 
professors from the University of Toronto, the historians George Wrong and W.P.M. Kennedy, 
personally wrote to congratulate him on taking such a bold stand, and an English newspaper even 
gave the piece a considerate review.34 But the young historian did not rest on those laurels. While 
at Harvard, Lower continued to question and criticize his country’s relationship to Great Britain 
and its empire. In 1927, he gave voice to his still burgeoning nationalism through another article, 
this time in a British academic journal. The still evolving ties between Britain, the imperial 
metropole, and its distant Dominions were already becoming a major focus of Lower’s historical 
                                                 
33 Lower, “Calling Our Souls Our Own,” 24. 
34 The letters from Wrong and Kennedy and the undated clipping from the Tunbridge Argus, “Canada and the 
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work, but the main thesis of this piece also found its way into the very core of his isolationist 
position during the 1930s.  
Written half-a-decade before the Statute of Westminster opened the way for Canada to 
exercise its own foreign policy, the article did not propose that the Dominion break with 
Britain’s imperial leadership outright.35 Yet Lower’s assessment of the titular “sentimental idea 
of empire” – the cultural and familial affection which made imperial unity possible – pointed 
towards just such a future. That bond of “pure emotion,” based on an idealized conception of 
Britain as the perfect center of the empire, was not a product of that center imposed onto its 
colonial periphery. Rather, “it was in the colonies, not in the motherland, that there originated 
and developed… the sentimental view of empire.”36  
This thesis, one which Lower would reassert through the decade to come, had a double 
meaning. Above all, it meant that English Canadians as a people, and Canada as a young nation, 
were still choosing to wear the mental chains of colonialism even as they assumed greater 
political independence. The second meaning was a message sent abroad, a caution to British 
policymakers. They ought to be mindful as they dictated the overall direction of the 
Commonwealth, for “[f]irst among forces of centrifugal nature stands the developing nationalism 
in the Dominions.”37 For Lower, this was no idle prophecy. Although it implied inevitability, it 
was a volatile historical process that he consciously worked to influence. His work as a 
                                                 
35 The relevant section of the Statute reads: “3. It is hereby declared that the Parliament of a Dominion has full 
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professional historian was augmented by this other responsibility, the shaping of Canadian 
national identity and the Canadian national path. 
The Tide Comes In, 1930-1933 
Arthur Lower began the 1930s on a new footing. Having graduated from Harvard in 
1929, he accepted a position at Wesley College in Winnipeg, Manitoba as a professor of history 
and as the chair of its History Department. Assuming his post in the fall of 1929, there he would 
remain through the decade to come and into the 1940s, years in which he would produce much of 
his best known academic writing on Canadian economic, environmental, and national history.38  
Fortunate as he was to have a steady job at the onset of the Great Depression, and to have 
achieved his professional dream so completely, Lower found much to dislike in the taxing 
workload of authentic professorship (a burden compounded by a recurring struggle with cataracts 
that nearly left him blind on several occasions). His new environment was another source of 
discomfort. The Canadian Prairieland was a far cry from his birthplace in small town Ontario, 
and from the cultural meccas of his early professional life, Toronto and Ottawa. Even more 
difficult to adapt to was Lower’s new home city. The Winnipeg area teemed with continental 
European immigrants, a multiethnic reality which ran starkly counter to Lower’s own ideal of a 
bi-cultural Canada defined by English and French alone.39 
                                                 
38 Lower’s three outstanding monographs of this period are Select Documents in Canadian Economic History, 1783-
1885, with Harold Innis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1933), The North American Assault on the Canadian 
Forrest: A History of the Lumber Trade between Canada and the United States (Toronto: Ryerson Press, and New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), and Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green, 
1946).  
39 Even before his move to the west, immigration and its effects on Canada had become one of Lower’s main areas 
of interest as a social scientist. He was an outspoken opponent of mass immigration at its height in the late-1920s 
and remained so even after it was effectively cut off in 1931, privately remarking that, as an English Canadian, the 
after-effects of the great influx made him “pessimistic about the future of our race. A Winnipeg angle makes one 
so.” AL to J.A. Stevenson, December 1, 1934, ALF Box 1 File 6. 
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Yet Winnipeg and the Canadian west were also a place of revelation for Lower. It was 
there that he completed his transformation into a dedicated promoter of Canadian nationalism, an 
unabashed critic of “British sentiment,” and an advocate of isolationism as the political 
fulfilment of the former and a cultural check against the latter. In the years following his move to 
Winnipeg, Lower’s process of personal detachment from Britain intensified, but again, it was not 
until 1933 that he felt able to make an explicit and aggressive call for a break with Britain on 
foreign policy grounds. Before that year, his primary nationalist interests centered exclusively 
around Canada’s internal development – relations between the provinces and the federal 
government, the appropriate division of power between the two, and the immigration question – 
rather than its external relationship with Britain.40 
Still, as Lower’s national focus turned inward in the opening years of the 1930s, the 
dilemmas posed by Canada’s British connection remained in his mind, allowing fractional 
elements of his later isolationist position to percolate in the background. This was apparent even 
before the Statute of Westminster was signed in December of 1931. Nine months prior, at a 
lecture ostensibly devoted to impressing the need for a strong central government as a guarantee 
of Canadian unity, Lower abruptly ventured into the sphere of Canada’s relationship with Britain 
and its empire. While only a brief aside within a thirty-plus page speech, the substance of the 
passage was an assertion of Canada’s natural right to determine its own foreign policy. The 
“Imperial tie” linking Canada and Britain was acceptable, Lower declared, but only on the 
condition of its reform as a “free bond between self-respecting equals.” Personifying Canada in 
                                                 
40 An apt example of this tendency is an enormous article Lower wrote for his preferred city newspaper, “A Five-
Year Plan for Canada,” Winnipeg Free Press, December 11, 1932. In contrast to his nationalist writing from 1933 to 
1939, the piece is almost entirely focused on his recommendations for domestic policy, the only exception being his 
demand for the abolition of the system of appealing Canadian legal decisions to the British Privy Council as the 
“highest court” of Canada. This was a point which Lower hammered on frequently until the practice was repealed 
after the Second World War. 
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the form of a young “Jack Canuck” and taking on that role for himself, Lower slyly aired his 
individual grievances as those of his entire nation: 
… I do not feel that I am in a position consistent with self-respect if I have to call on 
somebody else, even a close friend, to manage my affairs for me. I shall feel very much 
better disposed to my kindred if they run their business and I run mine… The man (or the 
country) who cannot mind his own business is popular nowhere… They [the British] assume 
that I, Jack Canuck, am grown up, and I think I ought to assume it too, I ought to stand 
squarely on my own feet. Then if another great emergency comes, as it did in 1914, I shall be 
free to aid my kindred with every means at my disposal. But my aid will be freely given. 
That is the effect, the very salutary effect, which the complete and unfettered control of our 
own affairs will have on our relations with the mother land.41 
 This statement is can easily be recognized as an imitation of Mackenzie King’s famous 
fly-by-night policy for explaining Canada’s path in the event of future British war; “Parliament 
will decide.”42 But Lower’s argument – reasonable enough on the surface as a kind of 
compromise between Canadian national pride and British colonial loyalty – was, in fact, 
premised on a contradiction. His demand for independent rights was qualified with a self-
negating concession; an assurance that a Canada empowered with external sovereignty would, at 
the moment of decision, and without any apparent regard for its own national interests, make no 
different a choice than if it was still a colony under de jure British control. 
Later in the 1930s, a shadow of this argument would reappear in Lower’s foreign affairs 
worldview. But in the short term, a guarantee of military support if the “choice” was Canada’s 
was a promise he could not keep. Within two years it was completely abandoned. “Self-respect” 
would remain a keynote of his nationalist appeals, and the simple maxim of “minding one’s own 
                                                 
41 “Strengthening Confederation, Address to Canadian Clubs,” MS, February 1931, ALF Box 20 File 188, 28-29. 
42 Compare Lower’s accommodating statement with, for instance, this one from 1923 by then-Prime Minister King 
at the London Imperial Conference; “Our attitude [Canada’s] is not one of unconditional isolation, nor is it one of 
unconditional intervention,” but “if a great call of duty comes, Canada will respond.” Quoted in John Herd 
Thompson, “Canada and the ‘Third British Empire’,” 104. 
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business” was a core tenet of his isolationist platform. But by 1933, the prospect of Canada’s 
participation in another war for Britain was unacceptable for Lower under any conditions.  
Asserting that provocative point, however, required another one to support it. In 1931, 
Lower could still honestly refer to 1914 as a “great emergency,” implying that both Britain’s war 
and Canada’s aid were necessary and legitimate. But to justify Canadian neutrality in the event 
of another Great War, he first had to challenge the powerful dogma surrounding the original 
conflict. In sum, he needed to write his own “counter-account” of the First World War. 
This was a painful position for Lower to arrive at, both as an English Canadian and as a 
former soldier with a four-year personal investment in the war. For a decade-and-a-half after its 
end, there was not even a shade of skepticism about the World War in Lower’s published 
writing. “For me,” Lower recalled in his memoir, “(as for tens of thousands more) the First 
World War had been a crusade; we were fighting FOR THE RIGHT [sic].” While other nations 
had the pride and self-consciousness to fight for self-serving reasons, for their own “national 
interest,” merely “introducing such an explanation into our motivation, prior to about 1945, 
[would] have been considered just wicked!”43 
Wicked, indeed. A critical view of the World War was an exceptionally difficult one to 
take publicly during the postwar decades. Jonathan Vance, in his intensive history of the First 
World War’s legacy in Canada, asserts that a reverent memory of the war – and of the myths that 
so tightly intertwined with the plainer facts – was an almost universally accepted position in 
interwar English Canada. The popular memory the Great War as a “just war” against an evil 
enemy, as a defense of high moral ideals, and as a necessary sacrifice for the construction of a 
                                                 
43 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 184. Emphasis in the original. 
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lasting international peace, spanned the full breadth of anglophone Canadian society.44 As Vance 
poignantly notes, for every conspicuous and articulate revisionist to be found in the halls of 
Canadian academia, “there were countless Canadians who aired conflicting views just as 
passionately in the rather lest august fora of the small-town newspaper, the smoky Canadian 
Legion hall, and the IODE [Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire] meeting.”45  
These, however, were precisely the minds that Lower aimed to influence with all the 
means at his disposal. After the Great War, he recalled, he gradually “passed from being a 
British subject to being a Canadian; my centre of vision had changed, as had my centre of 
allegiance.”46 It was his goal to take the rest of the English Canadian people with him through 
that transition. By 1933, he was convinced; “if Canada were not to go through the whole bloody 
mess of 1914-18 over again, she would have to reduce imperial ties to the minimum and make 
herself in spirit what she was in the letter, an independent nation. And given the English 
Canadian people, there was absolutely no prospect of her doing any such thing.”47 
The history of interwar Canadian revisionists is easily overshadowed by their more 
famous counterparts to the south. Beginning in the 1920s and continuing their work in earnest 
thought the following decade, a legion of American scholars and journalists like Charles Beard, 
C. Hartley Grattan, and Oswald Garrison Villard made a cottage industry of demystifying the 
Great War through a steady stream of critical books and articles. The voices of likeminded 
Canadians, meanwhile, while significantly fewer in number, grew increasingly loud at the start 
                                                 
44 Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1997). 
45 Ibid., 6-7. In that same passage, Vance specifically names O.D. Skelton, Escott Reid, Frank Underhill, and Arthur 
Lower as examples of some of the most prominent Great War revisionists in interwar Canada. 
46 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 229. As this occurred, Lower also found that his “critical propensities had 
widened” simultaneously, an almost comically understated personal truth. 
47 Ibid., 189. 
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of the 1930s. While Arthur Lower was not the earliest proponent of Canadian First World War 
revisionism, he was certainly part of its initial wave. The premier outlet for this perspective was 
the left-liberal magazine Canadian Forum, to which Lower was a satisfied subscriber by 1931.48 
From there he had access to the cutting edge of Great War skepticism, British Empire criticism, 
and Canadian nationalism, a triad well illustrated by the work of Frank Underhill, an associate 
editor of the magazine and one of its regular contributors.49  
In addition, by 1933 Lower had deeply integrated himself into local and nation-wide 
networks of Canadians interested in international issues, in Canada’s place in the world, and 
more than incidentally, in Canadian nationalism. Within weeks of his arrival in Winnipeg in 
1929, Lower was introduced to E.J. Tarr, a prominent lawyer and President of the Association of 
Canadian Clubs (the same group Lower spoke before in 1931), and to J.W. Dafoe, editor of 
Winnipeg’s largest newspaper – the Free Press – and one of the most influential liberals in 
Canadian media.50 Tarr and Dafoe were also key members of the Winnipeg branch of the 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA). A small but highly coordinated organization 
of individual “study groups” scattered across the larger Canadian cities, the Institute served as a 
private gathering place for intellectuals, business elites, and (some) policymakers to discuss 
                                                 
48 Lower recommended the magazine to his sister Jessie, writing of it: “… while rather highbrow, [it] has some 
pretty good things in it and is the only magazine in Canada that dares to speak its mind these days and call a spade a 
spade. I think it ought to be patronized…” AL to Jessie Lower, December 11, 1931, ALF Box 1 File 4. 
49 Underhill’s biographer notes, however, that it was his socialism more than his nationalism that first prompted his 
extremely strong anti-imperialism, as well as his conviction that Canada fought in the First World War to defend 
Britain’s imperial interests rather than democracy. R. Douglas Francis, Frank H. Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur 
(Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1986), 93-94. 
50 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 176-179. Lower also notes that through his Winnipeg connections he 
became casually acquainted with Canada’s leading social democrat, J.S. Woodsworth, head of the Canadian 
Commonwealth Federation and, by a wide margin, the single highest profile Canadian anti-interventionist of the 
1930s. For an overview of Woodsworth’s neutralism, see Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of 
J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 281-312. For details on J.W. Dafoe’s influential 
stances on liberalism, internationalism, and support for the League of Nations, see Ramsey Cook, The Politics of 
John W. Dafoe and the Free Press (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963). 
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world events and the precise nature Canada’s external interests. Tyler Turek notes that while the 
group was officially non-partisan, in practice it promoted a continentalist strain of nationalism 
that defined Canada as an essentially “North American” state. From this basis, its leadership 
generally “viewed imperial sentiments negatively” and invested much of its public education 
efforts to securing Canada’s “right to neutrality” before another European conflict broke out.51 
Although it is unclear when exactly he joined the organization, by the early months of 
1933 Lower had become the chairman of the Winnipeg branch, thus giving him an additional 
connection to the Institute’s national director in Toronto, Escott Reid.52 In his memoir, Lower 
cited his intense participation in the Institute, together with a torrent of writing and public 
speaking on his own initiative, as the primary forces for change in his intellectual life. Through 
these efforts, he gradually formed his own “considered philosophy” for understanding Canada’s 
position in the world. The Winnipeg branch for him was a place of “never-ceasing debate,” one 
where the “old comfortable assumptions – the King’s in his heaven and all’s right with the 
British world – were badly disturbed.” So badly, in fact, that Lower himself became, in his own 
words, “one of the chief of those who came to be talking ‘treason’” about Canada’s British 
relationship.53  
                                                 
51 Tyler Turek, “Mobilizing Imperial Sentiment: Identities, Institutions, and Information in British Canada’s Road to 
War, 1937-1940,” Canadian Studies, No. 75 (2013), 24-25. Turek gives a stark illustration of just how small the 
CIIA was by contrast to its more imperially sentimental counterparts. In 1939, the CIIA had a membership of 1,190 
with branches in just seventeen major Canadian cities. The Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire, 
meanwhile, had a membership of 25,000 women in 600 local branches, while the servicemen’s fraternity, the 
Canadian Legion, had over 170,000 members in 1,500 branches across the North American continent. Ibid., 17-21. 
52 Although Lower and the mercurial Reid disagreed on many points – as a socialist, Reid was significantly more 
committed to international organization – they firmly concurred with one another on the importance of distancing 
Canada from Britain and ensuring it stayed out any potential foreign wars. Wrote Lower: “I do not really think there 
is any essential difference between our points of view as I take it that what we are both trying to do is to think about 
the situation of this country in as realistic terms as possible and without allowing ourselves to be influenced by 
sentimental considerations.” AL to Escott Reid, April 11, 1933, ALF Box 52 File 21. 
53 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 179-80. 
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“Treason,” here, was not merely hindsight hyperbole. From the outset of his career as an 
isolationist, Lower would learn well that there were real dangers for English Canadians who 
openly stood against Britain, British sentiment, and the memory of the Great War.  
In the spring of 1933, ominous rumblings of war across the Atlantic offered Lower a 
convenient opportunity for airing his newest and most radical views. A grim moment in an 
already grim decade with the ascent of Hitler to power (as well as the withdrawal of Japan from 
the League of Nations), the course of world events merged with influences in Arthur Lower’s 
personal life into a storm of iconoclastic feeling. In a letter to the editor of the Free Press written 
from his office in Wesley’s History Department on March 15th, he let that storm break loose for 
the first time, his rhetoric overflowing with resentment and bitterness so intense it reads as if it 
had festered for years. The truth, however, is that it was only the beginning.54  
And Lower began at the beginning. He looked backwards in time to 1914, when Canada, 
“not then in control of its own destinies,” followed Britain dutifully into a war not at all its own, 
and one whose true nature was totally misunderstood. In 1914, “there was hardly a dissentient 
voice as to the duty of this country… Everyone believed the shibboleths that were then so 
common.” But with nineteen years of hindsight, “many of us are not nearly as sure that all the 
right was on the one side as we were then.” Lower put the reality bluntly. The war was fought 
neither for Belgium, nor democracy, nor any other high ideal, but for “saving France,” the same 
country whose invidious post-war foreign policy was responsible for the mounting European 
tension between itself and a “spirit in the shape of a resurgent Germany.” Yet again, the prospect 
of Britain having to “pull the chestnuts [of France] out of the fire” looked increasingly likely, 
                                                 
54 The MS of Lower’s letter makes its importance to his public life in the 1930s unambiguously clear. Handwritten 
in pen at the top of the sheet are two words, without further comment: “Opening Gun.” “Letter to the Editor, 
Winnipeg Free Press,” MS, March 15, 1933, ALF Box 12 File 8. 
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and once more the danger of Canadian involvement in a faraway struggle mounted in turn. 
Describing circumstances painfully similar to those of his own enlistment, Lower thrust towards 
the core Canada’s unique dilemma, the burden and the danger of British sentiment: “…the 
average person [in 1914] believed in the British cause not because he was intellectually 
convinced through a knowledge of the facts, but because he could not resist the wave of emotion 
that by one means or another was set going.”  
If this was the path that led to Canada’s participation in the war, and thus the path never 
to be repeated, an alternative had to be found. The peoples of Europe, Lower wrote, “must work 
out their own salvation.” Nothing Canada could do would ever allay their unresolvable feuds. 
More than this, though, another, stronger line had to be drawn between the Canadian nation and 
Britain. “Whatever course Great Britain elects to pursue… our course here in Canada is clear.”  
On no excuse whatever must this country plunge into a war which does not concern it. 
The blood and treasure spent from 1914 to 1918 will not have been sent in vain if we 
have learned our lesson, which is, roughly, to mind our own business, but if we once 
more plunge blindly and emotionally into a war which none of us understand, then we 
shall deserve the fate that will certainly descend upon us… a much more complete 
disorganization of our national life than exists even at present. 
I go so far as to say that regardless of Great Britain’s action, whether she be involved in a 
war or not, we in Canada must keep the peace. There must be no war in which our own 
vital interests are not immediately at stake and I defy anyone to prove that Canadian 
safety can in any real degree be menaced by a war in Europe.55 
 Although some important elements are missing (the League of Nations and the United 
States are conspicuously absent), the main points of this letter set the original pattern on which 
Lower’s more mature isolationism would be modeled. The primary message was to emphasize 
that Canada’s natural, geographic security required additional, political detachment from Europe 
generally and Britain specifically. To avoid the dangers of ties to those fallen idols – and 
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particularly a danger only briefly hinted at, the destruction of Canadian society by the tensions of 
war – only a policy of “mind our own business” would be the country’s saving grace.  
All this Lower grounded in his understanding of the World War, an interpretation defined 
by pessimism and regret. Canada had fought not for itself, but was dragged in by a combination 
of colonial obligation and the Canadian colonial mentality. Regarding the latter, it was the 
responsibility of Canadians themselves to break with it, a feat which required saying no to 
Britain when it demanded service on grounds of loyalty. Here also was an especially critical 
point for Lower, a simple but crucial dialectic that separated his own position of nationalism, 
national interests, and realism from the British sentiment, British interests, and blind 
emotionalism which he saw predominating among the English Canadian public. 
Lower’s letter created a minor controversy in the offices of Wesley College. The 
principle of the college, Dr. J.H. Riddell, was placed in the awkward position of defending the 
speech of one of his professors from some irate readers of the Free Press.56 Although he 
received no complimentary correspondence from any of his academic colleagues as he had for 
his article of 1925 and would again for future pieces, Lower did take in a handful of fan mail 
from Winnipeg locals impressed with his candor. One man, “a private in the late war,” was 
particularly pleased, complimenting Lower on his evasion of censorship by the “‘powers that 
be’” and optimistically assuring him that their mutually held views were shared by “90 percent 
of our Canadian people, according to my daily experience.”57 Another reader similarly echoed 
                                                 
56 Lower proudly recalled the scene in a letter to his wife; “Dr. Riddell told me some fellow called up and 
complained about his allowing his professors to say such things. ‘The fellow is a regular German’ (that’s me!) the 
gentleman himself having the very English name of Dojack. The chief said he didn’t superintend the thinking of his 
staff. The whole thing arose out of the study group of the Institute of which I have been chairman and which has 
inevitably had a good deal to say about the present situation in Europe. My view was that a war in Europe was none 
of this country’s business.” AL to Evelyn Lower, March 19, 1933, ALF Box 66 File 1. 
57 Neil P. Reid to AL, March 19, 1933, ALF Box 12 File 8. 
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Lower’s perspective, boldly adding that the surest “road towards peace” was a foreign policy in 
the vein of George Washington’s Farewell Address, “friendly diplomacy towards all and secret 
alliances with none.”58 If Lower had not already begun taken these views deeply to heart, these 
letters from sympathetic Canadians would have been a compelling cue to do so.  
As it so happened, it was not long at all before Lower expanded the position he 
tentatively outlined in March for the Free Press. Before the end of the month, he submitted the 
manuscript of a long article to The Nineteenth Century and After, a prominent British literary 
magazine.59 The piece, which sacrificed some of its precursor’s biting tone, was largely an 
elaboration of the points in the Free Press letter with the infusion of new arguments for support. 
In 1927, when he published his article on the “sentimental view of empire” in another British 
journal, Lower did not have the luxury of open advocacy for a distinctly Canadian foreign 
policy, much less an openly isolationist one. In 1933, he was fully empowered to do just that. 
Hostility to “sentiment” now moved to the forefront of Lower’s writing, an integral element of 
the historian’s struggle to sway the public mind about Canada’s still fluid international course.  
 Two years after the Statute of Westminster, Great Britain, its Empire, and Canada were at 
the beginning of a new era. A British push to reassert its leadership of the Commonwealth, a 
“centralized or united foreign policy,” was no longer possible. The political ties between the 
Dominions and the imperial center were effectively severed, and Britain’s navy embarrassingly 
forced to share oceanic power with the United States and Japan. Canada had no national interest 
in the defense of the British Empire, and Lower backhandedly criticized Britain’s assertions of 
                                                 
58 D.W. Buchanan to AL, March 18, 1933, ALF Box 12 File 8. 
59 The article did not come out until the journal’s September issue, but in the opening days of April Lower requested 
the aid of his wife (then in Folkstone, England visiting her parents) in mailing the original MS back to him from 
London, probably for revisions. AL to Evelyn Lower, April 2, 1933, ALF Box 66 File 1. 
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other nations’ “immorality” by questioning its own tarnished history of “accumulating territory” 
by conquest. The “one element of unity holding together the white nations of the Empire” was 
the “intangible but none the less real bond of sentiment.” But emotion and dependency were no 
basis for a “dignified” Canadian foreign policy.60 For that, Canadians themselves would have to 
account for the realities of their international position and chart a course on their own terms. 
As an export-dependent nation, a “rigorously isolationist” policy was precluded on 
economic grounds; Canada’s “chief interests” were peace and free trade. Finally introducing the 
United States into his argument, Lower insisted that the “cornerstone” of any Canadian foreign 
policy had to be the maintenance of warm relations with its great neighbor. Canada had “little to 
fear from the extra-American world,” and no “full-dress invasion” of the country from without 
was possible. In truth, Canada’s only “potential enemy,” the one country which could genuinely 
“threaten [its] national existence,” was the United States. Dark as that possibility was, it was 
even less likely that an attack by a non-North American power. Crucially, Lower did see Canada 
as having an interest in “international control” through the League of Nations. But, he qualified, 
this was only acceptable with a “limited assumption of responsibility” commensurate with the 
realities of Canada’s geopolitical size, power, and national interests.61  
Again offering unsolicited advice to British policymakers, Lower took a more 
authoritative and belligerent tone than he had in 1927. Speculating that any future British war 
would “certainly see the Dominions at once declare themselves neutral,” the preservation of the 
empire meant that Britain, too, “must at all costs be kept out of European quarrels,” a policy 
which Lower admitted came “unpleasantly close to peace at any price.” The article’s remarkable 
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final line makes plain Lower’s inspiration for an ideal foreign policy; “George Washington’s 
advice to his countrymen a century and a quarter ago is still good advice to Canadians [today]: 
friendship towards all, but entangling alliances with none.”62 
With these two pieces, both born in the spring of 1933, Lower had laid almost the entire 
foundation for the isolationism he would promote through the six years to follow. He advocated 
a simple policy of “mind our own business”-style neutrality. He was confident that Canada’s 
geographic position and closeness the United States made it invulnerable to attack, and that no 
threats from overseas existed in any event. He was certain that greatest threat to Canadian 
security was its British connection, and that Canadians’ sentimental loyalty to that tainted great 
power did not promote their own country’s national interests but rather endangered them.  
Where the second piece clearly breaks with Lower’s isolationism from the rest of the 
1930s, however, is in the wild over-confidence of its conclusion. Canadian readers of the time 
might have wondered why Lower bothered to write at all, based on his self-assured prediction 
that Canada would “certainly” be neutral if Britain ever went to war again.63 This confidence 
quickly evaporated. Never again would Lower be so sure that Canada would follow his desired 
course of action. Just the opposite, in fact. The defining tenor of his later articles and speeches 
was one of bitter, desperate struggle against the real paramount factor deciding Canada’s foreign 
affairs – persistent sentiment for Britain and the Empire. 
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circumstances.” R.A. MacKay to AL, December 22, 1933, ALF Box 1 File 5. 
130 
 
Through these same months of early 1933 that Lower was writing his first public 
statements of isolationism, he was also planning an extended tour of Europe for the coming 
summer. The trip’s ostensible purpose was researching the Baltic and Northern European timber 
trades, a subject well in line with his main area of Canadian historical research. Although the 
travel itself was officially funded through a generous $700 grant from the U.S.-based Social 
Science Research Council, privately, Lower saw the trip as a much needed “holiday.”64  
Travelling first through England and from there to the continent, Lower’s trip took him to 
Denmark, Germany, Poland, and the lower Baltic states before reaching Russia. There he 
rendezvoused with Jack Pickersgill, a close friend and colleague in Wesley’s history department, 
for a side trip to Moscow. After parting ways, Lower went via Leningrad to Finland, and then on 
to Sweden where he was joined by his wife Evelyn and his sister Jessie. They then travelled 
together back to Britain for an extended stay until their return to Canada in the late summer.65 
In his memoir, Lower described the European journey as one of the highlights of his life, 
going into considerable detail on his experiences in all the countries he visited. All, that is, 
except for Germany. Here Lower’s writing becomes evasive, stating only that, at the time, 
“Germany under Hitler was just getting under way, and the true nature of the regime was still to 
come out.”66 Naturally, the truth of his German experience is more complicated than this opaque 
and abbreviated summary. Indeed, the omission is made even more conspicuous by the fact that 
Lower was a fluent German speaker, making Germany the only country besides Britain where he 
could have communicated in the native language. 
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Arthur Lower visited only one part of Germany during his 1933 trip, the exclave province 
of East Prussia, and within that only two cities, first Danzig (at the time an independent city-
state), and then the provincial capital of Königsberg. The latter made an extremely strong 
impression on him, one plainly visible in his words and actions immediately afterwards and in 
the year to come. In an address at the University of Manitoba in early 1934, a speech which he 
quickly converted into article form for one of the school’s student journals, 67 Lower described 
his moment in Königsberg briefly but in fawning terms: 
I was in this pleasant East Prussian city myself this summer. I had just been in Warsaw, 
where I saw more soldiers and more militarism (and more inefficiency) than I saw 
altogether in Germany. Our Ko[n]igsburg friends did not appear to be worrying 
overmuch about war: [in the] evening, they all seemed to be in the dozen attractive beer 
gardens along the river, lingering for hours in family parties, extracting simple enjoyment 
from watching the play of coloured lights within the fountains.68 
 The intended function of this literally glowing memory was not simply to flaunt Lower’s 
personal experience in Germany, but to further one of the main goals of the talk itself; assuring 
his audience of young Canadian college students that the “present pet horror” of ever-imminent 
war was totally unfounded.69 The “hysteria” surrounding Germany and Hitler rang especially 
hollow to him. “In my opinion,” he said, “G[ermany] and H[itler] are both definitely less 
aggressive than is usually assumed and H[itler]’s pre-office utterances [i.e. Mein Kampf] are not 
                                                 
67 A.R.M. Lower, “Europe, War and Canada,” Manitoba Arts Quarterly 1, No. 3 (March 1934), 16-17, 24. 
68 “Europe, War and Canada: Address to students of the University of Manitoba, Winter, 1934,” MS, page 9, AFL 
Box 20, File 195. The MS of this lecture lacks the specific date it was given, but references to articles published no 
later than early February put the date of delivery sometime during that month, rather than in December of 1934 as 
the “Winter” heading might otherwise suggest. 
69 Besides his own experience, Lower also cited “an excellent article” by another expatriate history professor in 
Königsberg at the very same time, a man whose “impressions perfectly coincide with mine, i.e., the German people 
are not out for war.” Ibid., page 7. The author of that article – “Impressions of Germany,” The Nineteenth Century 
and After 115 (January 1934), 72-82 – was an Englishman named Philip Conwell-Evans, later one of the cofounders 
of the Anglo-German Fellowship, a far-right political action group with direct connections to Nazi leaders that 
promoted a friendlier relationship between Britain and Germany. Robert Griffiths, Fellow Travelers of the Right: 
British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (London: Constable, 1980), 146-49, 184-85. 
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to be taken at their full face value.”70 Thus, like his “friends” in Königsberg, Lower, too, was at 
ease. Even more so, in fact, as he counted himself downright “optimistic amidst a pessimistic 
world.” He was confident that war between Germany and any combination of European powers 
was “a good deal farther off than most people suppose” and “may be obviated altogether” before 
it even had the chance to start.71 
It was one of the few points he did not mention in his very detailed address, but Lower 
already had a specific technique in mind for “obviating” that potential European war. Before he 
left England for the continent, Lower met in London with Lord Lothian, a prominent Liberal 
politician and an early advocate for a policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany.72 Although 
the direct impact of his conversation with Lothian is unclear, the Canadian historian’s views 
rapidly came into line with those of the British lord.73 In Leningrad in July, Lower made close 
contact with the British Consul, Reader Bullard, regarding the theft of some of his luggage and 
the refusal of Soviet authorities to give him any kind of compensation.74 Besides this personal 
problem, their conversations also drifted deep into European affairs. Writing long after Lower 
had left Russia, Bullard hoped that they might “continue the discussion which began with your 
                                                 
70 There is more direct evidence beyond this statement that Lower was familiar with Mein Kampf. In 1937, after a 
former Wesley student of his travelled to Berlin to study philosophy, Lower wrote the young man with a peculiar 
request, inquiring “if you could purchase and send me a couple copies of the book of books, Mein Kampf. I should 
have a German edition.” AL to Mervin Sprung, January 18, 1937, ALF Box 1 File 9.  Lower received the German 
volumes that spring, duly remitting the student for his costs but still saying nothing about the destination of the 
copies other than the one he claimed for himself. AL to Mervin Sprung, April 3, 1937, ALF Box 1 File 9. 
71 “Europe, War and Canada” MS, page 1, ALF, Box 20 File 195. 
72 For a study of Lothian’s views on appeasement and foreign affairs more generally, and with references to his 
close political relationship with Philip Conwell-Evans (who personally arranged a meeting between Lothian and 
Hitler in January 1935), see David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest for World Order (Westport, 
CN: Praeger Security International, 2006). 
73 In his memoir, Lower states only that Lothian made “two points” to him: “first, ‘Europe at the moment [1933] is a 
madhouse’, and second, ‘Winston Churchill prays every night, “Thank God for the French Army”’ [sic].” Lower, 
My First Seventy-Five Years, 188. 
74 Although some of his lost papers were eventually returned, this incident left a bitter taste in Lower’s mouth that 
lingered for months afterward. In January of the following year, he even wrote the Latvian correspondent for The 
Times of London asking, “I wonder if it would be worth my while making myself nasty and writing to the Times 
describing the experience.” AL to R.O. Urch, January 15, 1934, AFL Box 1 File 5. 
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suggestion that the Germans should be given some territory outside their home frontiers, to 
administer and develop.”75  
Bewildering as it might seem in hindsight, the redistribution of territory was not a radical 
proposition during the 1930s. Indeed, isolationists and internationalists alike proposed it as a 
peaceful solution for the material struggle between “have” and “have-not” powers.76 For his part, 
though, Lower held to the idea for the whole of the decade, sporadically reasserting even during 
the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the German conquest of Czechoslovakia. 
Lower’s reassuring picture of Germany was based on more than his single, pleasant 
experience in Königsberg, and indeed, on more than his dedication to promoting a policy of 
isolation for Canada (a task which required denying that participation wars overseas was either 
necessary or morally justified).77 Beyond all this, Lower saw something in the new Germany that 
he could fundamentally relate to, a disturbing fact made clear in the language he used to describe 
it. In the article that his University of Manitoba address was converted into, Lower wrote that the 
“chief concern” of German people was not war, but “the rehabilitation of their own nation; their 
                                                 
75 R.W. Bullard to AL, August 24, 1933, ALF Box 1 File 5. 
76 For two of the more notable works of the decade promoting variations of the “have” versus “have-not” dichotomy, 
see John Foster Dulles, War, Peace and Change (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), there “static” and 
“dynamic” nations, and E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939), there 
“privileged” and “under-privileged” powers. 
77 Another influence for Lower’s friendly perspective on Germany lay closer to home. In November of 1933, several 
months after returning to Winnipeg, Lower extended an invitation to Henrich Seelheim, the German Consul in the 
city, to visit his house on the evening of the 22nd. The Consul graciously replied that he “would be glad to attend 
your next meeting.” Dr. H. Seelheim to AL, November 21, 1933, AFL Box 1 File 5. The archival record of this 
peculiar event starts and ends abruptly there, but the phrase “next meeting,” suggests that the invitation was for one 
of the private supper-discussion groups Lower participated in. The most likely candidates are either the “History 
Club” or the “National Club,” both of which J.W. Pickersgill notes were held in their members’ houses and featured 
regular speakers. J.W. Pickersgill, Seeing Canada Whole: A Memoir (Markham, ON: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1994), 
116-17. Seelheim himself was an enthusiastic promotor of Nazi ideology among the large German-born population 
in Winnipeg, and was known to also speak before anglophone Canadian groups as mainstream as the Lions Club. 
Jonathan Wagner, Brothers Beyond the Sea: National Socialism in Canada (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press, 1982), 37-41. Perhaps as a useful contrast to Seelheim, only a few months later Lower extended another 
personal invitation to speak before the National Club to Jacob Penner, the first Communist Party-member elected to 
the Winnipeg City Council. AL to Jacob Penner, [undated, but written in January 1934], AFL Box 1 File 6. 
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thoughts are turned inward.” The Germans he met spoke not of reconquering Lorraine or the 
Polish Corridor, but simply of “having their self-respect restored and that is what they esteem 
Hitler to have done for them.”78 In the portion of the speech on which those lines were based, 
Lower made the point even clearer. The German people “are not imperialistic but are intensely 
intent on restoring their self-respect and on creating of themselves a real nation, not a congeries 
of states, as even before the war, they in some respects were.”79 This rhetoric of nation building 
and national self-respect should ring very familiar to readers of Lower’s work. These were terms 
drawn from the same nationalist vocabulary that he used to describe his vision for Canada. 
 This is not to say that Arthur Lower was either a Nazi or a fascist politically. Lower’s 
dedication to civil libertarianism was as sincere as his nationalism itself. Indeed, much like his 
isolationism (but lasting much longer as an element of his thought), the principles of free speech 
and freedom of the press were inseparable from his ideal for a self-respecting Canadian society.80 
Blunt totalitarianism – whether foreign or Canadian – was anathema to Lower, and hostility to it 
grew within him as the decade dragged on.81 Additionally, that he used the same nationalist 
language to describe Germany as he did for Canada could easily be attributed to necessity; after 
all, only by a wild stretch of the imagination could National Socialism not be defined in 
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79 Lower, “Europe, War and Canada,” MS, page 7, AFL Box 20 File 195. 
80 This impulse was so strong it could come through simultaneously as he was defending the reputation of Nazi 
Germany. In April of 1934, Lower came to the defense of a fellow anti-interventionist – T.W. MacDermot, national 
secretary of the League of Nations Society in Canada – who was denounced by the Canadian Radio Commission 
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national menace.” AL to Hector Charlesworth, April 4, 1934, ALF Box 1 File 6. 
81 Although Lower once confided that he felt a “sneaking admiration” for the “frankly fascist” young writers of La 
Nation, a “well and fearlessly written” Quebec nationalist newspaper with a racialist and anti-Semitic bent, this was 
an outlier in his overall negative reaction to the fascist and separatist movements of French Canada. After the 
passage of Quebec’s “Padlock Law” for suppressing the speech of communists in 1937, Lower began to take a 
strong public stand against the danger of home grown totalitarianism in Canada. AL to William Arthur Deacon, 
April 29, 1936, ALF Box 20 File 196. 
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“nationalist” terms.82 And in the end, Lower appropriately admitted that the Germany of 1933 
was not the Germany of 1938, 1939, or 1940, the country which he would look upon with the 
deepest, most existential fear of his entire life. 
 The point remains, however, that Arthur Lower had a largely positive (and even 
sympathetic) mental image of Germany during the same critical period when he first developed 
his isolationist ideology. The meaning of this is of paramount importance; what drove Lower to 
isolationism was not a fear of war being brought to Canada by “aggressor” states, but the danger 
of war through Canada’s connections to Britain and (to a lesser extent) the League of Nations.83  
That Lower omitted some of these embarrassing facts from his own record of events is 
certainly understandable. But to grasp his ideological development in full – how he came to 
isolationism and how he eventually left it – all the elements which contributed to shaping his 
worldview must be explored. Likewise, for the fullest understanding of how Lower chose to 
express that worldview, the personal events which preceded it must be part of a conscientious 
reader’s perspective. As this was true for Lower’s writing and speaking at the start of 1934, the 
same principle applies to Lower’s accelerated advocacy for isolationism at the year’s end. 
                                                 
82 Lower was certainly not alone in seeing Hitler as interested more in German national development than war. Even 
later in the decade, none other than Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, summarizing his personal meeting 
with the Führer in June of 1937, wrote that “Hitler impressed me as a man of deep sincerity and a genuine patriot.” 
King recalled with total credulity how Hitler, speaking “with great calmness, moderation, and logically and in a 
convincing manner,” claimed that German rearmament was not preparation for aggressive war, but simply “to 
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held June 29, 1937,” in The In-Between Time: Canadian External Policy in the 1930s, Robert Bothwell and Norman 
Hillmer, ed.s, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1975), 159, 161. 
83 Indeed, as Lower assured Canadians of the resurgent Germany’s benign nature, he simultaneously continued his 
promotion of “a policy very close to isolation” from both Britain and the “leaky tub” that was the League. Lower, 
“Europe, War and Canada,” Manitoba Arts Quarterly, 17. 
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A Wave Forms, 1934 
 During the summer of 1934 – just over one year before Mackenzie King famously 
declared after his return to the Prime Ministry that Canada would follow the metaphorical 
“American road” – Lower took to that road in reality. Together with his wife Evelyn and his 
Wesley colleague Jack Pickersgill, the trio set off on a road trip of over 4000 miles through the 
Midwestern, Southern, Mid-Atlantic, and Great Lakes regions of the United States. It was 
Lower’s most extended time in the U.S. since his Harvard years, one that gave him a grand 
panorama of contemporary American life amidst the Great Depression and the New Deal. As 
part of their return trip, the group also stopped in Montreal for the first national meeting of the 
CIIA, an event that opened the way to another American connection for Lower. At the 
conference, Columbia University Professor James Shotwell announced the inauguration of a 
monumental new book series on Canadian-American relations funded by the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.84 Lower would be one of the fortunate Canadian scholars to 
receive a contract for one of the books in the series, a study of the cross-border timber trade.85 
The summer of 1934 was also the first instance when Lower’s isolationism was seriously 
challenged in public. His Nineteenth Century article of the previous September belatedly sparked 
an international scholars’ quarrel between himself, the empire-skeptic and Dominion-nationalist, 
and British historian Alfred E. Zimmern, a pro-empire internationalist. Zimmern inveighed at 
length against the main points of Lower’s article as “fallacies,” being especially critical of the 
Canadian’s call for “peace at any price.”86 Lower’s reply conceded that a “peace at any price” 
empire “would not be worth preserving,” but was in the main a reiteration of his original 
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principles. He contrasted Zimmern’s evasiveness with his own confrontation of the realities, “the 
differences in nature and the divergences of interest” that separated Britain from its Dominions. 
While admitting that his piece was “written more for Canadian than for English readers,” he 
hoped the latter would duly note the “unsatisfactory nature of colonialism as a basis for Empire.” 
To his “fellow countrymen,” he again implored them to recognize that their own interests were 
no longer synonymous with Britain’s. If the empire was to retain Canada as a willing member, it 
would have to adapt to the reality of Canadian independence. Nothing less than an “alliance 
between self-respecting States [sic]” would be acceptable.87 
The events illustrated thus far – from the March 1933 Free Press letter to the sparring 
match with Zimmern – were only the prelude for something much bigger to come at the end of 
1934; Lower’s most brazen assertion of isolationism and nationalism yet. The events of that 
November were the decisive moment that sealed his reputation as a firebrand promoter of both 
ideologies for the rest of the decade, dramatically raising his profile and increasing his influence 
as a political commentator. Combined with his continued participation in the CIIA, the events of 
November also served to instantly expand Lower’s network of likeminded Canadians – fellow 
nationalists and isolationists whom he read and would be read by in kind.  
On November 6th, just days before the seventeenth anniversary of Armistice Day, Lower 
gave the opening talk in Wesley College’s annual faculty lecture series, choosing as his topic 
“Canadian Foreign Policy.” By this point, his political predilections were known quantities for 
those who saw them in print or attended his previous talks on what was becoming his favorite 
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non-historical subject. With his habit of speaking his mind frankly, this lecture could never have 
been anything less than a controversy, and indeed, Lower enthusiastically spoke to stun. 
“Canadians,” he began, ought to look out in comfort “from the security of their North 
American island” onto the “madhouse” that was the outside world. Together with its only 
neighbor, Canada and the United States occupied “a private world of our own. We are not part of 
Europe, and European turmoil need not reach us unless we reach out and embrace it.”88 Despite 
this enviable geographic position, Canadian external affairs were complicated by membership in 
two vast and unwieldy world organizations, the League of Nations and the British Empire.  
Lower sympathized with the League in principle, casually admitting, “everyone knows 
that another world war would be just about the end… if it is to be averted, the people most 
concerned in averting it must get together an act together.” Yet those “people,” meaning the two 
greatest powers of Europe, Britain and France, could hardly be trusted to serve the interests of 
the world when all their exhortations to support the League were so plainly self-serving. Lower 
suggested there was “an uncomfortable element of truth” to the “legend of Anglo-Saxon 
hypocrisy,” that it was conspicuous for a nation like Britain to cry out for world peace when it 
was it was the party that had gained the most of all from war (and thus, had the most to lose from 
it). In the end, there was only one question that Canadians need ask regarding the League, that 
“hotbed of intrigue carried on by the wickedest men on earth… ‘What is there in it for us?’”89 
Lower begged the same question regarding Canada’s relationship with the British Empire 
and even with Great Britain itself, “the one partner in the empire above all others which is likely 
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to get into trouble.” The appealing promise of “protection” from aggression which Britain 
afforded to the rest of its empire was an “illusory” one for Canada. Only one nation – the United 
States – could ever threaten Canada militarily, and if it did (an unlikely possibility but one Lower 
raised for his bigger point), “Great Britain could not help us and probably would not do so.” In 
terms of trade and defense alike, British imperial policy was always tailored “to serve British 
interests and not Canadian,” a truth to which English Canadians especially were blinded by the 
stagnant haze of “sentiment, a smoke screen which has hitherto blurred our sense of reality to 
these things.” Lower cut through the fog with a hard question; were Canadians prepared to “pay 
the price of empire,” a cost which meant, at the very cheapest, the debt and death of “the last 
war,” and at the dearest, to “split this country from end to end, perhaps in civil war.”90 
Lower answered that question himself. To the “large political entity known as the British 
Empire” he “could be prepared to be loyal,” but loyalty to England itself was a different matter. 
That was a “loyalty of one people to another,” something not “consistent with [national] self-
respect.” Though “I should always have a due regard for England, the motherland, I am not 
prepared in any sense to be loyal to England, and I should not think very highly of myself if I 
were. My loyalty is to Canada.”91 
This line was the crescendo of Lower’s speech, the moment at which his audience reacted 
with “a pindrop silence.”92  That silence, however, was soon broken. The fallout from the speech 
reverberated first through the pages of Winnipeg’s local newspapers. Lower could count on firm 
support from liberal Free Press, owned and edited by fellow CIIA-member J.W. Dafoe.93 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 23, 25, 28. 
91 Ibid., 26. 
92 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 193. 
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Additional letters of sympathy and praise came not only from a smattering of Winnipeg locals, 
but also from leading isolationists farther afield, including Ottawa lawyer T.S. Ewart (son of the 
pioneering Canadian nationalist John S. Ewart, whom Lower referenced by name in the lecture), 
Canada’s foremost literary critic William Arthur Deacon, and the virtuoso of academic 
controversy Frank H. Underhill, already facing his own threats of dismissal from his history 
professorship at the University of Toronto for remarks as inflammatory as Lower’s.94 
But the counter-point, too, came almost immediately; a roaring tide of criticism that 
erupted out of the conservative and pro-Empire Tribune and continued through the rest of 
November. The initial editorial condemnation was biting. Ironically, the paper accused the 
historian of the same spiritual faults that Lower himself decried as rampant in English Canadian 
society.95 Lower’s foreign policy for Canada was nothing more than “simple materialism,” a 
“selfish” philosophy born out of the “cheap cynicism of the jazz era.” The British Empire may 
not be perfect, but at least it offered “a worthy part” for Canada to play in the world.96 
The letters to the editor were even less merciful. One doubted Lower’s nerve; “If Japan 
were to be at war with Canada, Professor A. Lower would be the first to say, the Mother Country 
is compelled to protect us.”97 Another dismissed his reasoning; “How long would our security 
last and our oceans protect us, if it were not for inclusion in the British Commonwealth of 
Nations. These very oceans would be our undoing [without the British Navy].”98 Others bitterly 
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attacked him in the most personal ways; “[There have always been] traitors to honor, to decency, 
to manhood, so naturally their line of action is falsehood, and slander… If Canada were attacked 
tomorrow they would dig up some other excuse to hang an objection on for not fighting for 
Canada; they would retire; not into their beds, but under them.”99 
More critical letters and phone calls flowed into the offices of Wesley College, some 
demanding that Lower be censored or dismissed from his post. These dangers were only 
canceled by a strongly worded public letter of support from Wesley’s Principle, J.H. Riddell. Dr. 
Riddell echoed his argument in defense of Lower’s Free Press letter from the previous year. The 
function of education was to grapple with the “problems of life,” a sacred task that could only be 
fulfilled in an environment of “frank and candid thinking.” The “suppression of frank, fair 
thought” not only detracted from that noble purpose, its only end was “mental slavery.” No 
“thoughtful citizen” would even consider denying Lower “the right to express his views” on such 
“matters of vital importance to the welfare of our beloved country.”100 
Thus passed the worst of the storm, but Lower still would not let the controversy die. In 
late November, he returned to the battlefield for a preplanned radio address to be broadcast with 
two others by colleagues from the CIIA Winnipeg branch: the pro-Britain imperialist Marcus 
Hyman, and Lower’s personal friend E.J. Tarr, a pro-League internationalist.101 Still chafing 
from the Tribune assault, he ensured that his broadcast was a strident reassertion of the points of 
his first speech.102 For a supplementary “rebuttal” broadcast the following month, Lower once 
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more reiterated his Wesley arguments while firing new volleys at Tarr and Hyman. He sneered at 
the “righteousness” of the League. The only “ethical” end for a Canadian foreign policy was to 
set an ethical example at home; “let us get on with our own job, and mind our own business.” 
Europe may be in a “perpetual state of catching fire,” but Canada was no fireman.103 As for 
Britain, Lower went even farther than he had at Wesley. If that connection meant fighting battles 
that were not Canada’s own, then “Canada’s foreign policy must be independent and have no 
connection with British foreign policy.” Again, he posed his provocative question – “Are they 
[Canadians with imperial sympathies] loyal to England and her Empire or are they loyal to 
Canada?” – and his even more provocative answer, “I have a proper filial affection for its 
[England’s] institutions and culture… But my loyalty lies to my own country, not to England.”104  
Because even this was not enough, Lower ensured that all his public remarks gained 
additional notoriety by merging them together into an article for the monthly broadsheet of the 
“The Native Sons of Canada,” a nationalist group he spoke before earlier in the year and would 
keep a close connection with through the 1930s.105 In a comparatively moderate tone – he 
prefaced the piece with a blatantly contradictory disclaimer, “I am not very fond of the word 
‘isolation’” – Lower once more reiterated his isolationist talking points. But as well, he gave a 
clearer statement than ever before of his mentality at the deepest level. 
Hitherto, Canadians have taken the Empire as they have taken their religious faith, as 
something to be believed in, not thought about. But that attitude will not get us very far 
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and I see no reason for regarding Canada’s relations with the Empire as a sort of ark of 
the covenant, to touch which is death. 
My suggestions may appear somewhat hard, not sufficiently effused with generous 
sentiments and so on, but I can assure you that the only reason for which I make them, 
the sentiment which most genuinely does inspire them, is a profound consideration for 
the welfare of my own country. I do not know whether my fellow Canadians will 
consider that that motive is sinful. Some of them apparently do. I myself do not. I myself 
believe in that good doctrine which the poet proclaims:  
‘To thine own self be true, Thou cannot then be false to any man.’106 
 Arthur Lower could feign that he was not really a social “sinner,” and even that he was 
not technically an “isolationist” at all, but his general attitude through this incident, what came 
before, and what was still to come, show that he relished just those roles. He was a willful 
iconoclast, a deliberate and defiant apostate from the reigning orthodoxy of his people and his 
country. In hindsight, at least, he admitted as much:  
[T]o many people my own views were ‘seditious’… I also sinned against the light in 
writing down ancestral ties… I committed that sin consciously and purposely, for my 
object was to educate the Canadian public, in so far as that colossal (and ludicrous?) feat 
was possible, although I knew, and I suppose it was foolish of me, that I was offering 
myself as a sacrifice in the process.107 
So Lower sinned on into the uncertain decade. After this, the most precarious moment of 
his professional career, he wrote, “I uttered my blasphemies with nothing more than threatening 
growls from dark corners.”108 But this was not to last forever. Grave events were fast 
approaching that would do more to challenge his isolationism than any malicious letters ever 
could. And after them would come the day of reckoning, the time when he would be forced to 
choose between his isolationist vision for Canada, or the reality. 
                                                 
106 A.R.M. Lower, “Says Canada’s Foreign Policy Should Keep Her Free of Entanglements,” The Native Son 4, no. 
1 (December 1934), 1, 9. 
107 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 199-200. 
108 Ibid., 194. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ARTHUR LOWER: REDEMPTION 
Foreword 
Despite some awkward misgivings about the label (preferring instead to define himself in 
realist or nationalist terms), by 1935, Arthur Lower had inextricably associated himself with the 
Canadian isolationist school of thought.1 In turn, isolationism as a foreign policy and as an 
outlook on world affairs now moved to the very center of his national vision for Canada.  
In a January letter to CIIA-director Escott Reid commenting on the latest Institute report 
circulated amongst its branches, Lower took an immediate interest in the section on “the 
isolationist point of view” for Canadian external affairs. After claiming initially that the section 
“put some of our positions fairly,” he quickly moved to criticize its overall “defeatist attitude.” 
The notions that without British preferential trade Canada risked being “absorbed” by the United 
States and that another European war would harm Canada whether it was a belligerent or not 
were particularly hollow. He dismissed both ideas out of hand; they were contradictory to the 
premise of his entire worldview as an isolationist, and for that matter, as a nationalist: 
My position in respect to Canadian foreign policy predicates a self-reliant people. If we have 
not got that we have got nothing, and I personally would cease to be interested in political 
questions and would not care very much as to what our eventual fate was… I admit that the 
British connection is valuable and will be valuable for some time… but the day must come 
sooner or later when we must stand on our own feet, and I suppose it will come when we 
become homogeneous enough to do so.2 
                                                 
1 Lower summarized his perspective at the start of the year with a dense but characteristic metaphor. “I rather object 
to people labeling me as an isolationist, though I suppose my views invite the description. But my real point is in 
respect to attitude… My plea is that we shall become ‘hard-boiled’… I don’t mean that we should become 
Machiavellian, of course: we should be honest business men, but still business men, and remember that we are 
dealing with very hard-headed business men, who most definitely are not a new type of evangelist.” AL to T.W.L. 
MacDermot, January 6, 1935, ALF Box 12 File 15. 
2 AL to Escott Reid, January 23, 1935, ALF Box 1 File 7. This letter was meaningful enough to Lower that he 
paraphrased its main points for his memoir, omitting, though, that his criticism of the document lay mostly in its 
146 
 
As he made this impassioned statement, Lower must have suspected that his countrymen 
might not reply to his satisfaction. Yet he wrote it nevertheless. The significance of the outburst 
is not that it was yet another dire notice to Canada. There was no prediction that blindly 
following the British would lead to the country’s destruction, a point he made often in his later 
public statements. Rather, these lines were a threat Lower made to himself. If Canadians could 
not hold their own in the world, if they could not place their own nation’s interests before 
Britain’s and insisted on maintaining an antiquated and undignified colonial obligation, if they 
failed to stand for themselves as a people – in sum, if they failed him – then their nationhood 
would be unfulfilled, and Canada would no longer be a worthy object of Arthur Lower’s faith. 
The irony of this grim attitude becomes palpable in the letter’s second-to-last paragraph. 
Lower glibly derided one of the report’s alternatives to an isolationist foreign policy – that 
Canada should respectfully follow Britain’s leadership in foreign affairs, but also attempt to 
influence British policy in directions beneficial to Canada – as “merely imperialism.” Those 
foolish enough to preach it, he warned, should realize the inescapable consequences of such a 
Britain first policy; “If you back their note you reasonably expect to have to pay up.”3 
A potent argument, to be sure, and one he had used just three months prior during his 
bombshell November lecture at Wesley College. But this was a principle that cut both ways. 
Lower had a note of his own outstanding – his isolationism – and eventually he, too, would have 
to “pay up.” At the moment of decision in 1939, the choice would be his: to abandon his faith in 
Canada, or to renounce his isolationist dogma for another national path. 
                                                 
section for isolationism, as well as his threat to drop Canada as nation if it failed to follow his ideal path. Arthur 
Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years (Toronto:  Macmillan of Canada, 1967), 195-96. 
3 AL to Escott Reid, January 23, 1935, ALF Box 1 File 7. 
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The Wave Crests, 1935-1937 
The middle years of the 1930s were the high-water mark of Arthur Lower’s isolationism. 
He promoted his worldview with a steady, aggressive beat, firing off one polemical article after 
another and supplementing his writing with lectures, talks at conferences, radio addresses, and 
fierce debates that pitted him against both his pro-Empire and pro-League counterparts at once. 
The mid-1930s were also the maturing period for Lower’s network of isolationist-nationalist 
Canadians. Together with his articles and speaking events, Lower also carried on an intensive 
correspondence, one in which he often revealed more of his worldview than he let on in public. 
Just as his profile began to rise, Lower very deliberately reached out to one Canadian 
isolationist specifically: Henri Bourassa, Quebec’s elder statesman and the doyen of French 
Canadian nationalism since the turn of the twentieth century. A stalwart opponent of Canadian 
involvement in foreign conflicts since the Boer War and one of the loudest voices against 
Conscription during the First World War, Bourassa took an adamantly anti-interventionist stand 
during the 1930s that Lower identified with. The connection Lower briefly made with this 
likeminded man in 1935 well illustrates the parallel between one English Canadian’s personal 
strain of the ideology and the far more widespread isolationism of interwar French Canada.4 
Complimenting the Independent MP on a recent speech in Parliament, Lower took the 
initiative to send Bourassa a copy of his Native Sons article from the previous December and 
politely ask for his comments. Bourassa complied, agreeing with Lower’s views and remarking, 
“your arguments are similar to those I have propounded, in the last thirty-five years, against all 
                                                 
4 Lower was one of a handful of English Canadians – particularly concentrated among members of the Department 
of External Affairs, like O.D. Skelton – whose individual isolationisms were noticeably similar to the French 
Canadian variety. See P.B. Waite, “French Canadian Isolationism and English Canada: An Elliptical Foreign Policy, 
1935-1939,” Journal of Canadian Studies 18, No. 2 (Summer 1983), 111-43. 
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attempts (but too successful) to drag Canada into Imperial ventures.” It was, he wrote, “the 
solace of my old age” to see those ideas repeated once more “by a new generation. Let us hope 
that the reaction will be strong and lasting enough to save us from further war adventures – and 
final ruin or suicide.”5 
Less illustrious than Bourassa (but a far more frequent correspondent) was William 
Arthur Deacon, literary editor of the Toronto Mail and Empire and another member of that “new 
generation” of Canadian anti-interventionists. Along with T.S. Ewart, Deacon became one of 
Lower’s closest intellectual confidents in the aftermath of the furor at Wesley, earning the 
historian’s trust with a strong showing of sympathy and support.6 As fellow isolationists and 
enthusiastic Canadian nationalists, Lower relied on these two men as valuable sounding boards 
for shoring up his ideas on those conjoined ideological fronts.7 Deacon leant him an especially 
understanding ear, and copious comments in his letters of reply. He was thus privy to some of 
Lower’s more ambitious ideas of the mid-1930s. 
Lower confided to the critic that the response to his Wesley speech bolstered rather than 
discouraged him; he shared Deacon’s confidence that “the nationalist movement is growing in 
Canada.” He was “equally certain,” though, “that the old Imperialist school in England is playing 
its game again and would like to have us all nicely tied up in advance.” This danger demanded a 
vigorous response, one potentially in the offing already. N.T. Carey, President of the Winnipeg 
                                                 
5 AL to Henri Bourassa, February 4, 1935, ALF Box 12 File 15. Henri Bourassa to AL, February 19, 1935, ALF 
Box 7 File 6. 
6 Deacon personally wrote Wesley Principal J.H. Riddell to congratulate him on backing Lower and defending the 
principle of free speech. William Arthur Deacon to J.H. Riddell, December 3, 1934, ALF Box 20 File 193. 
7 Ewart, ever the lawyer, was adamant that the Statute of Westminster afforded Canada the legal right of neutrality 
whenever it so chose, and vented his irritation with Canadians who falsely asserted “our liability for Britain, for the 
British Commonwealth of Nations and the Empire generally.” T.S. Ewart to AL, November 21, 1934, ALF Box 20 
File 193. Deacon was more emphatic. “Canada is not going to support Britain in the coming war. Feeling in some 
sections will be almost as bitter as in civil war…” William Arthur Deacon to AL, December 3, 1934, ALF Box 20 
File 193. Emphasis in the original. 
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branch of the Native Sons of Canada, recently mentioned to him a loose plan “to start some sort 
of nationalist group here, for study and propaganda.” Lower was clearly struck by this 
opportunity to organize a genuine force around his most important ideals, but bemoaned the fact 
that neither he nor Carey had anything close to enough “converts of a sufficient calibre to make 
it worth while.” The dismal reality, Lower concluded, was that Canada was still “a colonial 
society,” and indeed, that “we are all colonials, more or less… I for one feel the heavy weight of 
the culture of other and older lands upon me and would like to have a life of my own, not an 
imitation of life, as in so many respects it is the fate of a Canadian to have.”8  
Deacon’s reply was both reassuring and realistic. Boasting to Lower of just how much he 
was “getting away with here in Tory Toronto… the Holy of Holies… and as a staff member of a 
Tory, capitalist and imperialist newspaper,” he discouraged any thought of formal organization. 
That would only create “a target for opposition… Furthermore organization would mean setting 
a program and definitions; and it is premature. No single mind is fit to plan the new Canada.” 
Canadian nationalists like Lower and himself were and had to remain “free agents. In a way 
more effective divided than united.” Deacon reminded Lower that they were already part of a 
real “movement” with a strong and growing public presence; “just being there and known as 
holding those general views causes others to think, which is the chief thing of all.”9  
Lower would eventually return to the dream of an elite nationalist group, but for the 
moment, he took up Deacon’s strategy of outspoken, individual activism with gusto. Not long 
after this exchange, he publicly vented the same bitter feelings he confided to Deacon before a 
large audience organized by the Native Sons. His own copy of the speech does not survive, but 
                                                 
8 AL to William Arthur Deacon, January 29, 1935, ALF Box 12 File 15. 
9 William Arthur Deacon to AL, February 18, 1935, ALF Box 12 File 15. 
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impre-ssions from sympathetic and hostile observers alike attest to its substance. Lower threw 
down the nationalist gauntlet. The Statute of Westminster had given Canada a legal equality with 
Britain, but it had not made Canada a true nation, nor Canadians a true people. The Winnipeg 
Tribune, the same paper that condemned him the year before, reported these words as his: 
A country does not become a nation by getting something for nothing. A country does not 
exalt itself by achieving objectives that are unresisted. A nation can only make itself by the 
sweat of its brow – by embracing noble ideals and suffering the sacrifice necessary to realize 
them… With our own hands we can make Canada a nation to be proud of, but it cannot be 
done by other hands. It cannot be done by paper and ink and seals and ribbons at 
Westminster. It can only be done by the effort we put forth at home.10 
Lower did not contest this transcript, nor did T.S. Ewart and N.T. Carey in their letters of 
support in the Free Press.11 They could not. The spirit of the excerpt was unmistakably Lower’s; 
that people make nations, that nations are born, that nations must possess a defining vision of 
themselves which they assert regardless of the cost. Whether Lower’s speech included an explicit 
appeal for isolationism is not clear, but the following month, he showed Canadians their very 
limited options for a national path and the only one worth struggling for. 
Writing for Dalhousie Review, Lower observed with satisfaction that Canada, still in its 
national “youth,” was finally moving “beyond the stage of colonialism” and recognizing “its own 
essential nature” as a North American nation. This logical conclusion, however, was not 
uncontested. The old “imperial” mentality remained a powerful force in Canadian public 
opinion, while others saw the League of Nations as a noble experiment worth Canada’s fullest 
dedication.12  
                                                 
10 “The Making of a Nation,” Winnipeg Tribune (March 30, 1935). 
11 N.T. Carey, “The Relation of Canada to Great Britain,” Winnipeg Free Press (April 27, 1935). T.S. Ewart, “The 
Relation of Canada to Great Britain,” Winnipeg Free Press [Clipping without date. Letter dated June 12, 1935.] 
12 A.R.M. Lower, “Foreign Policy and Canadian Nationalism,” Dalhousie Review 15 (April 1935), reprinted in 
History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism. Edited by Welf H. Heick (University of 
British Columbia Press, 1975), 304. 
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 These were both untenable positions. At the mildest, one meant the surrender of 
Canadian sovereignty to rule from Geneva, and the other, a “partial life” of self-subordination as 
the “dog” to a British “master.” The third way, the “nationalist” way, was Lower’s own, and the 
application of its principles of self-interest, self-consciousness, and self-reliance offered the best 
possible answer to the “all important question of war and peace.”13 “We are not part of Europe,” 
he declared, repeating verbatim a line he used at Wesley the year before, “and European turmoil 
need not reach out and embrace us unless we deliberately go out to embrace it.” The choice was 
thus Canada’s, and to stress the correct path forward – that of the “nationalist school of Canadian 
foreign policy” – he placed the greatest of emphasis on the domestic consequences of war.14 
Recalling his own past, Lower insisted that he, like most veterans, was against “another 
crusade” both on personal and fiscal grounds. But the real dangers posed by war were social and 
demographic. The divisiveness of war would not only make Canada a less unified country, but 
the bloodshed itself would also make it a less British nation. Noting ruefully that British 
Canadians were already “unhappily a bare majority” of the population, he augured that in a 
future conflict, “they would be the first to go, they would be decimated as they were before, 
[and] those of them who came back would find their places in many cases taken by the non-
Anglo-Saxon.” Pushing his argument to the absolute limit, Lower painted war’s outcome for 
Canada as nothing short of apocalyptic; it would “probably destroy this country as we know it.”15 
This article set several important precedents for Lower’s writing. The first was its explicit 
integration of domestic concerns – specifically, a catastrophic future for Canada if it became 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 306-07. In that same passage, Lower contrasted the English Canadian “dog” with the French Canadian 
“cat.” He praised the latter for its “disinterested attachment” to the empire, offering loyalty only when convenient. 
14 Ibid., 309-10. 
15 Ibid., 308-09. 
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involved in war – into what was ostensibly a perspective on external affairs.16 The second was its 
synthesis of Canadian nationalism and an isolationist foreign policy. This went far beyond the 
subtle hint given in the title, “Foreign Policy and Canadian Nationalism.” His definition for that 
“nationalist school of Canadian foreign policy” – “quietly minding [our] own business, 
conscious that [we have] and need have no quarrel with anyone, giving this tender plant, the 
Canadian nation, a chance to grow” – made nationalism and isolationism so closely interwoven 
that they were virtually inseparable.17 
Lower’s nightmarish vision of war, combined with the infusion of isolationism into the 
heart of his nationalism, fixed his personal course for the rest of the decade. The first made 
avoiding conflict an existential necessity, while the second gave his otherwise gloomy 
perspective a positive and constructive center of gravity. Together, they were the pivotal tenets 
that kept him dedicated to the cause of non-intervention up to the eve of the Second World War. 
The pattern in Lower’s isolationist thought during the first half of 1935 – concentration 
on Canada itself and its internal development – was decisively broken by a major international 
crisis later in the year, the Italian-Ethiopian War. A conflict long in the making, Italy invaded the 
independent African state on October 3rd. Canada’s connection to the war became apparent not 
long afterwards. In early November, a Canadian diplomat at the League of Nations, W.A. 
Riddell, voiced his support for placing the heaviest economic sanctions – oil, coal, iron and steel 
– on Italy as an aggressor. Under pressure to act but out of contact with his newly-elected 
government (Mackenzie King returned in a landslide in mid-October), Riddell’s action was 
                                                 
16 Also of note is the rich irony that Lower, still so certain that continental European immigrants undermined 
Canada’s delicate national balance, was now using their presence to reinforce his argument that involvement in war 
would shatter Canadian unity. 
17 Lower, “Foreign Policy and Canadian Nationalism,” 310. 
153 
 
quickly misinterpreted as official Canadian policy. Only a public disavowal by King’s top aide, 
Ernest Lapointe, clarified the government’s real position. Canadian policy “‘has been and will be 
limited to co-operation in purely financial and economic measures of a pacific character,’” and 
only those accepted by “‘all of the participating countries’” in the League.’”18 
In late November, Lower agreed to give a lecture at Wesley on the conflict’s background, 
its course to date, and its potential outcome. He was not the only Canadian observer to address 
the war at its outset. Just a month prior, four members of the University of Manitoba’s student 
Debating Union butted heads on a provocative but timely motion, “That in the present Italo-
Ethiopian conflict, Canada should be prepared to go to war in support of the League.” The leader 
of the opposing side struck an unambiguously isolationist chord, urging his audience to 
“[c]onsider Canada’s geographical position,” predicting that the League would be as impotent in 
Ethiopia as it had been in Manchuria, and that as a nation, “Canada can do more towards keeping 
peace in the world by remaining neutral during European brawls.”19 The opposition won the 
debate (an unsurprising outcome on a campus already known for anti-war sentiment), but by a 
telling margin of 44 to 42.20 
For his talk, Lower focused on putting the war in historical perspective. He also had a 
clear underlying motive in discouraging his audience from becoming rashly hostile to Italy (and 
from that, being tempted to favor direct intervention in the conflict). Linking the war to 
nineteenth-century European colonization and the more recent division of Germany’s former 
                                                 
18 Quoted in C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Vol. 2, 1921-
1948, The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 185. Lapointe’s statement was 
announced on December 1, a full month after Riddell’s unilateral action in Geneva. For the full account of the 
“Riddell Incident,” see ibid., 179-187. 
19 Charles Bishop, “Should Canada Fight for the League? – No!” The Manitoban (October 29, 1935), 2. 
20 “The Debating Union,” The Manitoban (October 29, 1935), 4. 
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colonies, he found the Italians clearly short-changed of their due in African “spoils.” Recent 
hymns to the “doctrine of humanitarianism” coming from England, meanwhile, belied that 
country’s own sordid past. Merely following a well-trod path in its attack on Ethiopia, “Italy, 
too, yearns to share the white man’s burden.”21  
Lower waited until the following year to address Canada’s own connection to the East 
African conflict. This would put his isolationist principles to their first wartime test. Both during 
the war and in its immediate wake, he subtly refined his position on the League of Nations, now 
the international relationship which posed the greatest risk of war for Canada. Over and over he 
reiterated his acceptance of Canadian membership. But at the same time, he proposed affixing 
such stringent qualifications to it that Canadian participation in any “League war” would be 
effectively impossible.  
In a January article for a Winnipeg magazine, Lower affirmed that Canada would stand 
with the League when it “named the aggressor,” but insisted that it was Canada’s own right to 
decide what the “reasonable limits” of League measures were and how far it ought to go in 
upholding them.22 In the case of the Italian-Ethiopian War, he channeled the position Ernest 
Lapointe took shortly before the war’s outbreak.23 Ethiopia as a country “is nothing to Canada,” 
and might “equally well exist on the moon” as far as Canadian interests were concerned. The 
                                                 
21 “Some Implications of the International Crisis, Tuesday Lectures, November 26, 1935,” MS, page 8, 10, ALF Box 
20 File 120. Lower drew a merciless historical analogy for illustration: Britain once “amazed the world by suddenly 
becoming excited about the enslavement of negroes – after two centuries during which she herself had been the 
chief slave-trading nation – so now, after a century during which she has been by far the most imperialistic of 
nations, she suddenly dismays her friends by turning and rending her old idols.” Ibid., 9. 
22 A.R.M. Lower, “Canada and the League: How Far Should Canada Go?” The Country Guide and Nor’West 
Farmer 29 (January 1936), 10. 
23 At a September rally for the coming election, Lapointe said, with Mackenzie King by his side, that “‘in my 
opinion no interest in Ethiopia, of any nature whatsoever, is worth the life of a single Canadian citizen.’” Candidate 
King shared that sentiment, promising the crowd that “… any Liberal Government will see to it that not a single life 
is unnecessarily sacrificed in regard to any matter beyond what affects the safeguarding and rights of our own 
country.’” Quoted in Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict Vol. 2, 180.  
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burden of enforcing the League’s will militarily could only fall on “those member states most 
interested and closest to the scene of the disturbance.”24 Naturally, this precluded Canadian 
involvement in any conflicts whatsoever, short of a war between itself and the United States. 
An even more subtle clause to Canada’s League membership struck a populist tone. 
Speaking at a conference in August not long after the Ethiopian war had ended, Lower recoiled 
at any future prospect of Canadian military force being placed “with little reservation at the 
disposal of the League.” It was the responsibility of Canadian statesmen to ensure that “the 
power of the state is never used abroad except in the interests of the whole people, and in issues 
in which they are virtually unanimous.”25  
Arthur Lower knew his country when he made this statement. Canadian unity, and even 
more, Canadian disunity, were hallmarks of his historical work and social critiques in the 1930s 
and for the full breadth of his career. The idea that Canadian popular opinion – British, French, 
continental European and otherwise – could ever be “virtually unanimous” on an issue as 
contentious as war (particularly with the 1917 Conscription Crisis as a very recent memory), was 
to say that Canada ought never to go to war at all, lest the conflict offend any of its constituent 
groups. In this respect, at least, Lower’s isolationism was aligned with a key premise of Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King’s actual foreign policy for Canada during the 1930s.26 
                                                 
24 Lower, “Canada and the League: How Far Should Canada Go?” 26. Lower further stated that he partially agreed 
with the policy of “[o]ur Prime Minister,” that Canada ought to “give the efforts of the League our blessing, but to 
follow rather than to lead.” This could be an acceptable policy, but only if grounded on a clear qualification, “a 
resolute determination to remain out of war.” Ibid., 27. 
25 A.R.M. Lower, “General and Specific Aspects of Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Canada, the Empire and the 
League: Lectures Given at the Canadian Institute on Economics and Politics, July 31st to August 14th, 1936 
(Toronto: Nelson’s, 1936), 147. 
26 Lower’s CIIA colleague and fellow non-interventionist Escott Reid noted this fact in a contemporary article of his 
own, citing the maintenance of Canadian national unity as the cardinal tenet of King’s foreign policy. Escott Reid, 
“Mr. Mackenzie King’s Foreign Policy, 1935-36,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 3, No. 1 
(January 1937), 86-97. According to J.L Granatstein, King himself read the article and approved its description, 
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Only once did Lower show a break with his nominal acceptance of the League. It was 
also the moment when he revealed the very most of his true position before the Canadian public. 
As part of a series hosted by the League of Nations Society in Canada, Lower was invited to 
participate in the second of ten “round table” discussions on world organization and Canada’s 
role within it. Held in succession from January through March in cities across Canada and 
broadcast nationally on the radio, the talks featured some of the most prominent Canadian 
academics, lawyers, professionals and politicians of the day addressing broad range of 
international topics and dilemmas. The subject of Lower’s January 23rd round table, however, 
was not random, but tailored specifically to his personal worldview. Its title makes the point 
plain; “A Policy of Isolation for Canada: Is It Practicable? Is It Desirable?” 
The frankness of the title also foreshadowed the course of the round table, held in 
Winnipeg and refereed by a local rabbi, Solomon Frank. The discussion almost immediately 
escalated into grueling debate pitting Lower against two prominent Winnipeg lawyers: R.F. 
McWilliams as the advocate for British Empire loyalty, and E.J. Tarr (Lower’s colleague from 
the CIIA) as the advocate for the League. By participating, he was thus tasked not only with 
explaining his isolationist foreign policy, but also defending it in real time against two men with 
views diametrically opposed to his own. 
Lower’s explanation of the “‘isolationist school’ of Canadian foreign policy” was a 
familiar one. A Canadian isolationist was someone who wished to take “full advantage of the 
country’s geographical position, relying on it to avoid entanglement in political affairs beyond 
our borders.” Canada, Lower said with conviction, “is a North American country,” and “we stand 
                                                 
calling it “‘excellent’” in his private diary. “Becoming Difficult: Escott Reid’s Early Years,” Escott Reid: Diplomat 
and Scholar, edited by Greg Donaghy, (Montreal: Montreal-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 11-22. 
157 
 
in no danger from overseas.” He could accept membership in the League, but only on the 
condition that any action Canada took in that capacity would be of a “limited nature,” not a 
policy of “general crusading.” As for Britain, it would not do for Canadians to continue 
following blindly in its footsteps; “we shall have to be courageous and decide on a Canadian 
policy,” one based first and foremost “in the best interests of Canada.”27 
Lower had little pause before McWilliams’ and Tarr’s counterattacks. The arguments of 
the two shared strong similarities despite a rift over the issue of Canadian loyalty to Britain. Both 
claimed that world “interdependence” was an inescapable reality. Both believed that Canada had 
a moral responsibility to participate fully in world organization. And both accused Lower and his 
isolationist policy of the vice of “selfishness,” the same charge that stung him so personally in 
November 1934 when it burst from the pages of the Winnipeg Tribune.28 
Tarr was particularly insistent on that point; “It seems to me your policy of isolationism 
is one of unenlightened selfishness and that your better nature is seeking justification for it in a 
milk and water support of the League.” He was not far off the mark. Lower’s retort revealed just 
how thin his veneer of support for the League really was and where his true position laid. While 
efforts for “peace” and the “reign of law” in world affairs were noble ends, Lower wondered 
aloud whether the League was a noble enough institution to fulfill them. “If it proves in the 
future that Great Britain and France are only manipulating the League machinery for their own 
purposes,” he threatened, “I should say that there would not be much choice but to withdraw and 
                                                 
27 A.R.M. Lower, Solomon Frank, R.F. McWilliams, and E.J. Tarr, “A Policy of Isolation for Canada: Is it 
Practicable? Is it Desirable?” Interdependence 13 (1936), 13-14, 17. Familiar, too, was Lower’s apprehension about 
the label. “I am not an extreme isolationist” he insisted just before the sign off, a position he defined at the beginning 
of the broadcast as the kind of “complete aloofness” from Europe and the world embodied in George Washington’s 
Farewell Address. Ibid., 13, 22. 
28 Ibid., 19. 
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adopt the same logical attitude of isolation which you attribute to the U.S.”29 His subsequent 
comment that “[t]he League is what the great powers make of it and about all we Canadians can 
do is give it our blessing,” served as an implicit answer to that hypothetical.30 
As for the moral charge of “selfishness,” with a just a slight change of wording, Lower 
could cheerfully plead no contest. “Of course I stress national self-interest,” he said. Whether in 
“transactions between nations” or in the “private affairs of individuals,” a “decent regard for 
your own best interests, not too narrowly conceived, lies at the base of all ordered society. You 
must make a reasonable balance of the self-regarding and the altruistic.” Hence his calculated 
support for the League’s economic sanctions but nothing that verged on military action. Such 
limited cooperation served Canada’s “best interest in the long run” by showing its willingness to 
engage with other nations while also definitively keeping out of war.31 
In sharp contrast with Tarr – a friend of Lower’s since his arrival in Winnipeg in 1929 – 
McWilliams’ tone leaned towards open hostility. “The day of the small isolated nation is over,” 
he flatly insisted, and “an isolationist policy even if it were practicable would be destructive of 
much that is best in our Canadian life.” Isolation “deprives a nation of the stimulus of larger 
views” and “sinks it into the mire of selfishness and self-conceit.” McWilliams even drew an 
obviously loaded comparison; “The world is suffering today from national egoism gone mad. 
Heaven preserve us from deliberately choosing to aim at that goal.”32  
                                                 
29 Ibid., 15-16. 
30 Ibid., 21. 
31 Ibid., 16-17. 
32 Ibid., 17-18. McWilliams also inverted one of Lower’s own isolationist talking points to suit the interventionist 
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Harsh as those words were, the sharpest tension between Lower and McWilliams arose 
over a different point, Canada’s relationships with Britain and the United States. Lower chided 
those Canadians like McWilliams who “would readily yield to jingoistic appeals” of British 
loyalty, people “intoxicated on such well worn phrases as ‘an empire on which the sun never 
sets’ and so on.” That line of thought would only mean Canada “being dragged into a European 
war in the wake of the mother country.”33 But McWilliams had an easy counter. The policy of 
isolation from the British Empire had one logical conclusion, he said, “to cause us to gravitate 
into the American orbit.” Here Lower emphatically disagreed: 
There would be a certain tendency in that direction, Mr. McWilliams… but it does not 
follow that if we make our policy independent of that of Great Britain that we shall 
immediately become a satellite of the United States. It is only self-reliance that will save 
us or anyone else. If we have always got to be dependent on some other nation, whether 
Great Britain or the United States, then our fate is not worth while worrying about. If 
there is not enough in our national fibre for us to be ourselves independent in our 
decisions, in our policies and in our national life generally, if we are forever to remain a 
shadow of some stronger power, a mere imitative people… then I for one lose interest in 
the game and cease to care what becomes of the Canadian people. Self-reliance is the 
main thing that makes our experiment in nation-building justifiable.34 
One year to the day before this exchange, Lower made exactly these points in private. 
Now they were on the table in full, broadcast out of Winnipeg for any Canadian to hear who 
could tune in to listen. Coming out as part of a debate with so specific a topic, there could be no 
ambiguity as to just what was meant by a policy of independence and self-reliance. For all 
intents and purposes, isolationism and nationalism had assumed a symbiotic relationship in 
Arthur Lower’s thinking. Nationalism was intrinsic to his isolationism because, at root, 
detachment from Britain in any degree meant moving one step closer to genuine Canadian 
independence. Likewise, isolationism was the foreign policy of his nationalism because 
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Canada’s development could not be fulfilled without it. It was the ultimate expression of 
detachment from Britain, and thus, the ultimate measure of Canadian nationhood.  
Lower’s performance earned him a new surge of attention. Brooke Claxton – Montreal 
lawyer, future Minister of Defense, and a participant in one of the other round tables of the series 
– called the debate “better than any of the other broadcasts,” although personally his “sympathies 
were with Edgar Tarr” and he found Lower’s self-interested stance on the League “immoral.” 
Claxton also confided that on his recent visit to Ottawa he found the Department of External 
Affairs closer to Lower’s position than his own; “they are going to play a very safe policy, 
indeed.”35 Winnipeg’s Italian Consulate also took notice. Having received word from Ottawa 
that the Consul General, Luigi Petrucci, was “very interested” in the debate, Lower was 
“cordially” requested to forward him copies of it and the other broadcasts of the series.36 
Whether Lower followed through on that particular request is not clear, but he promptly 
sent a transcript to William Arthur Deacon. The critic’s response was extremely positive. By the 
time of his reply, he had already contacted a printer about turning out reproductions at “a rate per 
100 that will allow me to circulate this to many friends of our breed of nationalists.”37 Deacon 
also received a copy of Lower’s article from the previous year, “Foreign Policy and Canadian 
Nationalism.” He found the piece even more impressive than the debate, declaring it “the clearest 
and most persuasive statement yet made of ‘our’ position on foreign policy.” Again taking “high-
handed action,” he secured support from the owner of the Ontario newspaper Oakville Record to 
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run off several hundred copies; 250 for distribution to newspapers and 100 set aside for what 
Deacon called “my select bunch of nationalist friends.”38 Lower responded with enthusiasm of 
his own. Before he even contacted the editor of the journal for formal permission, he wrote to 
Deacon that “you have my full blessing in your plan to spread the gospel. I trust the reprints will 
reach as wide a circle as possible and only hope that the article will prove as effective as you 
very kindly say it appears to be to you.”39 
If this plan did not actually go through in the end, it did nothing to dampen Lower’s 
relationship with Deacon for the rest of 1936. Nor, for that matter, did Deacon’s continued 
warnings against a formal organization of nationalists. The idea of a unified nationalist group 
had lingered in Lower’s mind for over a year by this point. He was not the only one. In June, 
while he was in Quebec gathering material for an article on the province and its political scene, 
Lower received a “manifesto” from Dalhousie professor and fellow nationalist-isolationist R.A. 
Mackay for a group of his own conception. Reading and editing the document “carefully twice,” 
he returned it with his comments and support for the plan.40 It was not until several months later 
(after Mackay’s plan began to lag) that Lower finally ventured an organizing effort of his own. 
In late September, just as the fall term at Wesley was ramping up, Lower sent Deacon the 
first draft of what he hoped would become a “general statement representing the ideas of 
reasonably likeminded people and circulated to them.” With a target audience of high-profile 
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nationalists, Lower’s basic aim was to bring “a degree of unity to our thinking… clearing up our 
own ideas and out of it I would expect some writing to come.” Almost wistfully, Lower 
fantasized that if his group “could only start off with half a dozen people” – a core of dedicated 
men who he named in the letter’s postscript – “we might accomplish something.”41 
The two-page “programme” was well fleshed out. Only the name of the group and a title 
for document remained undecided. The group’s broad goal was to “make [Canada’s] divergent 
elements into one society” through “the bond of a common country.” Its role in facilitating this 
would be a “practical and philosophical defense of the principle of nationalism.” Beyond this 
high rhetoric, the “programme” also featured two lists of “general” and “particular” policies 
numbered by their level of priority. Crucially, the policies at the very top of both these lists were 
also integral to Lower’s isolationism; generally, “A change in loyalties. The old ‘loyalty’ to 
Great Britain must disappear… from English-speaking Canada, to be replaced by loyalty to 
Canada,” and particularly, a foreign policy whose “governing” principle was to “preclude any 
possibility of taking it for granted that we would be in the next British war.”42 
Lower pursued his organizing drive into November – corresponding intensely with 
Deacon, Ewart, and Mackay as prospective co-leaders, and also with potential supporters – but in 
the end, it came to nothing.43 There was no group, no coordinated writing, and no bold moves to 
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give Lower that sense of accomplishment and momentum he so craved.44 Yet even before this 
experiment petered out, his worldview was already beginning to show signs of change. He was 
fast coming to grips with just how difficult it would be to realize his nationalist vision. The most 
formidable obstacle to Canadian nation-building and an isolationist foreign policy alike was not 
lack of organization, but the very human material Lower was building with, English Canadians. 
That Lower was even contemplating such a scheme indicates a rising level of anxiety. He 
revealed it frankly to Mackay: “We are all cowards, no doubt, horribly afraid of injuring our own 
interests. One more speech here [in Winnipeg] from me and no doubt I would be nailed, would 
either have to shut up or go through with it, and going through with it would involve a frontal 
attack on the Empire connection and advocacy of complete separation.”45 In the main, though, 
this angst stemmed from dimming prospects for his own ethnic group. Canadian nationalism was 
now the undisputed center of Lower’s life, and as illustrated by his nationalist manifesto, 
isolationism as a foreign policy and a way of seeing the world was at the center of that center. 
But the hinge of this dual-armed project was the willingness of English Canadians to accept 
those positions, both of which ran directly counter to their still powerful sentiment for Britain. 
This problem weighed heavily on Lower’s mind in the second half of 1936. For his 
August conference talk addressing foreign policy, he dwelled on the issue at some length. 
Despite the “unsatisfactory” nature of Canada’s British relationship, there remained “certain 
elements in the nature of our people… the psychology of the English Canadian” that hindered 
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their ability to alter it. Their “long period of colonial servitude” had “robbed them of their self-
reliance,” while a lingering “nostalgic” affection for the mother land made even questioning the 
relationship almost out of bounds. The end result would only be conflict, and if Canada indeed 
became involved in war, it would have only itself to blame. “The plain truth of the matter,” he 
concluded, “is that if we did not keep out it is because we did not want to keep out. It is to be 
suspected that those who tell us we cannot keep out are those who, because of British or League 
sympathies, would really want us to go in.”46 
At the turn of 1937, Lower reformulated his isolationist strategy in response to this 
critical dilemma. Keeping Canada out of war remained his top priority (even more so now, as 
tensions between Germany and Britain began a slow but steady rise following the reoccupation 
of the Rhineland in March 1936 and German-Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War in 
July). Likewise, the social repercussions of war remained his greatest fear. But his mechanism 
for keeping Canada out – the crux of his non-interventionist platform – shifted dramatically. By 
the start of the new year, his stock phrase that to avoid war Canada had only to “mind its own 
business” disappeared completely from his writing. So, too, did his use of the term “isolation” to 
describe his general position. In their place, he substituted a new refrain as a compliment for 
Canadian neutrality: the build-up of Canada’s own national defenses. 
Lower had considered this idea before. It was present in some of his isolationist articles 
and speeches since 1934, but always in a marginal capacity. By taking center stage, however, 
such a focus risked undermining two of his main arguments against participation in war – that 
Canada faced no direct threats from overseas, and that it was already secure by virtue its 
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geography. Lower recognized this inherent danger in his defense plan from the outset of the 
shift: “I should say that as much as I would like to see this country a nation in its own right with 
its own services, self-reliant and self-respecting, depending on no one for its defence, defence 
measures just now will simply put the game into the enemies’ hands, for I cannot imagine a 
Canadian service man who is not tied body and soul by his afternoon teacups to imperialism and 
English society.”47 
Yet by his own admission, his promotion of defense was not necessarily a response to 
external threats at all. Lower understood that if English Canadians still lacked the self-reliance of 
an independent people, something would have to be done to instill it in them. This was the 
original function of his defense scheme. A strategic build-up of Canada’s defenses would 
certainly make the country safer. But more importantly, having “the sheer ability to defend 
ourselves” would finally inspire in Canadians the self-confidence they needed to declare their 
“strict neutrality.” To be effectively neutral, one first had to able to “defend that neutrality.”48 
Several of new articles published in April 1937 serve to illustrate Lower’s revised 
strategy. It was a well-timed burst of writing. In January, the King government announced its 
new military budget, ratcheting up the spending total from $23 million in 1936 to $35 million for 
the year.49 In a response before the Canadian Parliament that same month, the outspokenly anti-
interventionist social democrat J.S. Woodsworth decried the increase and proposed a resolution 
that, in the event of war, “Canada should remain strictly neutral regardless of who the 
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belligerents may be.”50 Although he was inevitably unsuccessful, the leader of the C.C.F. 
received a buoyant letter of support from Lower as a momentary political ally. “As things are,” 
Lower wrote, “we are as a matter of course belligerents and it would require a positive act to 
make us neutral.” But recovering some of his faded optimism, he smoothly reassumed his 
personal place in the struggle for Canadian neutrality. “Every debate, speech and article makes 
the position clearer and if we are given enough time, we may get through.”51 
Writing for the University of Toronto Quarterly, Lower issued his own call for a firm 
policy of neutrality to keep Canada out of “the next war.” He denied that Canada stood to lose in 
trade by not going in; its commodities would be in demand regardless of its belligerent status and 
without a merchant marine it had nothing to lose from seaborne warfare. The argument that 
Canada itself would inevitably be attacked he dismissed as ridiculous. An actual invasion was 
impossible. “[T]hose nervous and bellicose persons” who dreaded “a march on the nickel mines 
at Sudbury or the coal fields of Alberta” were simply living disconnected from the real world.52 
Canada could be neutral. The only question was, “[d]o we want neutrality?” For too 
many “Canadians of British descent,” the unfortunate answer was no. Still hamstrung by “the 
sentimental tie with the motherland,” they were blindly walking towards disaster.53 Again Lower 
described the demographic consequences in graphic detail. In the last war, “[t]he vast majority of 
our forces were of British decent, and it was these that suffered the most.” The next war would 
be no different; it “would hasten the process by which Canada is becoming less and less a British 
                                                 
50 Quoted in Lenarcic, “Where Angels Fear to Tread,” 108. Lenarcic makes clear that this proposal – “[t]he first 
Parliamentary effort by anti-interventionists” – very quickly “came to naught,” but it did offer Woodsworth a 
valuable opportunity for back-and-forth discussion with Mackenzie King and Ernest Lapointe on the floor of 
Parliament. Ibid., 119. 
51 Letter from AL to J.S. Woodsworth, January 29, 1937. Quoted in Lenarcic, “Where Angels Fear to Tread,” 120. 
52 A.R.M. Lower, “External Policy and Internal Problems,” University of Toronto Quarterly 6, No. 3 (April 1937), 
334-35. 
53 Ibid., 335-36. 
167 
 
country, and would thereby destroy one of the principle objectives of those who would be most 
anxious to take part.”54 The “‘call of the blood’” was no longer a sufficient argument for war. It 
was a disservice both to British Canadians themselves and to the rest of their countrymen. All 
Canadians’ allegiance must ultimately “lie in one place and to one object, one’s own country.”55 
Lower took a different tone in the niche journal Canadian Defense Quarterly. He now 
avoided an explicit call for neutrality and instead stressed Canada’s natural geographic security 
and a pragmatic policy of coast-focused defense. Lower scorned the “sentimental irrationalities” 
that blinded Canadians to their distinctly North American existence. Insulated by two oceans and 
“a medium” to their south “much more difficult to penetrate than water… Canada alone is so 
insulated that it is virtually an island.”56 But as an “island nation,” Canada ought to plan its 
security with that fact in mind. “If the future involves us in wars,” the only “logical basis” for 
Canadian defense was “to create and strengthen our sea and air traditions, [while] neglecting or 
at least carefully restricting our military traditions.” Such a policy would be fiscally responsible, 
ensure “the avoidance of the mass sacrifice [in Europe] which the last war entailed,” and best of 
all, it would give Canadians a much-needed “centre for national spirit to rest upon.”57 
If these articles indicate anything, it is that Lower’s foreign policy worldview had grown 
far more complicated than “let us mind our own business.” But with this new flexibility also 
came startling deviations from his old mindset. All through 1937, His writing was peppered with 
ominous hints of his future reorientation away from isolationism and towards interventionism. 
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In January, even as he sympathized with J.S. Woodsworth in his crusade for Canadian 
neutrality, he could simultaneously write to another politician that there was indeed “a clear line 
to be drawn between another ordinary war in which [Britain] is a belligerent and a struggle in 
which it becomes obvious that she has her back to the wall.” Although in any event he hoped for 
nothing more than “limited participation,” perhaps, he thought, it would be best to wait “until the 
character of the struggle declares itself.”58 Considering recent and prospective events, though, 
Lower could see the value of that “ordinary war” for Britain’s imperial interests. “If Canada were 
out of the empire, one could regard them [European events] with detachment,” he wrote to a 
fellow University of Manitoba professor of history summering in England. The reality, however, 
was that “as it is, we may one day find ourselves dragged in to fight something that could have 
been stifled two years ago… Every war avoided is a gain, no doubt, but from many points of 
view, it would have been better to have gone through with it over Abyssinia.”59 
Most conspicuous of all was his social commentary at the end of 1937. Even as he held 
out for neutrality, Lower subtly acknowledged a genuine benefit that war could offer Canada. 
This was the stark opposite of his perspective just a few months earlier and for the whole five 
years prior, that war could only rend Canada apart and reduce its British section to minority 
status. Writing for Maclean’s, Canada’s highest circulation native-produced magazine, Lower 
condemned his country’s reigning “shoddy ideals” of materialism and individualism.60 What 
Canada really needed, he wrote, was a “great unifying national purpose.” Crucially, he cited only 
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one instance when Canada actually had such a thing. “In the war years, we had just that – a 
creed, something that man could passionately believe in, fight for, and die for.” Although, he 
qualified, “that was a creed for an emergency, when that emergency passed, so did our fine 
idealism, gradually filtered away by the steady drip of pessimism.”61  
Lower knew those feelings all too well. Idealism defined his entry into the Great War, 
and afterward, bitterness and pessimism shadowed the long march toward his still elusive 
Canadian national vision. In his Dalhousie Review article of 1935, Lower had described his 
isolationist foreign policy as a “negative and sober” one, but still just the sort “this country 
needs.”62 By the end of 1937, that kind of “hard boiled” realism was clearly losing some of its 
appeal. What Canada needed now was not mere sobriety, but something rather different. “My 
analysis of the [social] situation is that what we need more than anything is a cause. Even a 
foolish cause seems better than none…”63 Lower may not have realized it here, but by this subtle 
change in his own sentiments, he had already put himself on an inner road to the war mentality. 
Ebb Tide, 1938-1939 
The last two years of the 1930s were the agonizing conclusion of Arthur Lower’s 
isolationist career. Under the strain of world events and the increasingly obvious impossibility of 
Canadian neutrality, his once hardline position gradually eroded away. In its place was left only 
a faint hope that world war might offer a new route to fulfilling Canada’s national destiny. 
Ironically, these two years were also the moment when Lower reaped the scholarly fruit 
of all his activism to date. As recognition for his prolific and strident writing, his work was given 
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a leading place in the initial historical record of the interwar Canadian foreign policy debate. In 
H.F. Angus’ Canada and Her Great Neighbor, a study Canadian public opinion of the United 
States compiled for the Carnegie Endowment’s series on Canadian-American relations, Lower’s 
Nineteenth Century article of September 1933 was cited as a choice example of the North 
American isolationist perspective.64 Lower’s erstwhile isolationist-nationalist comrade R.A. 
Mackay was even more generous. In Canada Looks Abroad, a CIIA-financed and -published 
study of Canada’s external affairs written with the input of Institute members from across the 
country (including Lower himself), Mackay cited Lower’s August 1936 conference talk at 
length, using its six-point platform as a model of the foreign policy of “non-intervention.”65 
University of Toronto professor F.R. Scott took a similar line. For his book, Canada Today (also 
a CIIA production), Scott referenced more articles written by Lower than any other Canadian 
author. Tellingly, he also made use of Lower’s old stock phrase – that Canada’s foreign policy 
ought to be centered on “minding her own business” – while describing the “non-interventionist 
or isolationist” section of Canadian opinion.66  
Lower had little opportunity to enjoy this recognition, though, when everything he had 
done to earn it had amounted to effectively nothing. Even before 1938, he knew that as the 
likelihood of another European war rose, the likelihood of Canadian involvement in that war rose 
in kind. In response, his view of the European situation grew bleaker than ever. His early 
sympathy for Germany and Italy faded rapidly. The pair were no longer aggrieved nations intent 
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only on readjusting the status quo, but predators threatening both their neighbors and the British 
Empire.67 The latter victim, however, he afforded no sympathy. Despite his recognition that 
Germany and Italy were less benign than he once thought, Lower saw their cold war with Britain 
as an amoral “international poker game” that Canada need not play a part in.68 
At the beginning of 1938, Lower continued to push his policies of Canadian self-defense 
and neutrality. Just as before, nothing abroad threatened Canada, and even in the unlikely event 
of attack, there was little to fear. By its natural geographic security, and with just a “small 
expenditure” to shore up its domestic defenses, “Canada could ward off an attack in force by a 
great power with little injury… even an attack by a great power which had wrested control of the 
sea from Great Britain.” This was what Lower desperately wanted his countrymen to see before 
it was too late. Realizing that they could defend themselves was more than just the surest way to 
keep Canada safe, it was another step they could take towards fulfilling their nationhood. But the 
next step was even more important. Canada also had the power to choose whether it “wishes to 
stay out of the next war.” There was now more reason than ever to say no. The “amazing record 
of the present British government” in East Africa and Spain showed that it was not “to be trusted 
by people three thousand miles away from it and who are not represented in it.” Ultimately, if 
“she really is a nation,” Canada must “make her own decision about the next war.”69 
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Such was Lower’s last hope for avoiding war and all it entailed. But this was still just 
wishful thinking. Regardless of British policymakers’ missteps, he knew all too well that 
Britain’s emotional sway over the English Canadian public and Canadian national policy 
virtually guaranteed the Dominion’s loyalty in a time of crisis. Exactly what he had feared at the 
start of 1935 had come to pass; Canada was tightly bound to Britain’s next war, whenever it 
came and whatever shape it came in. Lower confessed his morose perspective to Escott Reid: “It 
seems quite vain to discuss, say, Canadian neutrality when there is no chance of our even 
dreaming of maintaining neutrality in a British war… What then can we discuss in the real of 
Canadian foreign affairs these days? Some purely academic subject? It does not seem to me that 
these are the times for arm-chair debates. But if the debate is to have reality, one must be 
prepared to talk something that he will soon hear branded as treason.”70  
The persistence of Canada’s self-subordination drove Lower’s already intense resentment 
of Britain to explosive new levels. It helped that his outlook for world affairs at large was sliding 
deep into a valley of pessimism long before Munich. As early as April, he saw a geopolitical sea 
change on the near horizon. “It is very hard for me to keep in the remote regions of the 
academic,” he wrote to Canadian-born J.T. Shotwell of Columbia University. “All these things 
we are doing now will have no meaning within a few years. It seems to me that we are actually 
witnessing the second world war; it is going on bloodlessly at present but it is being fought none 
                                                 
from our thinking. But surely no people who value their self-respect can linger on in a dependent position, living on 
charity, as it were… If we cannot or will not defend ourselves, we deserve the fate that is sure to overtake any 
people who are willing to accept defeat or conquest.” 
70 AL to Escott Reid, September 6, 1938, ALF Box 52 File 21. For his part, Reid was slightly more optimistic. “It 
seems to me that the Isolationist feeling in Canada is rapidly decreasing but perhaps if we had to make a deliberate 
decision to enter a war we would be surprised at its latent strength here as in England… no matter what the 
Imperialists and Communists say in Canada I doubt whether the Canadian farmer or working man is going to rally to 
the colours with great enthusiasm.” Escott Reid to AL, September 8, 1938, ALF Box 42 File 21. 
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the less… Few people seem to see that a revolution is proceeding under our eyes, a revolution 
perhaps as significant as the fall of Rome itself.”71  
Lower would find his hyperbole confirmed by events later in the year, but again, the 
general thrust of his viewpoint was set prior to the nerve-wracking crisis over Czechoslovakia. In 
a pseudonymous article published in the September issue of Canadian Forum, he assigned the 
blame for Europe’s unease squarely to Britain. But in the process, he radically reversed some of 
his own positions from earlier in the decade. By condemning the British for their conciliatory 
attitude, he implicitly approved the alternative “French formula” to “win” the peace of 1918, the 
“realistic suppression and destruction of the defeated foe.” He gave similar implicit approval to 
conditions created by the Treaty of Versailles. Out of the Allies’ supreme triumph could have 
come “a world bound by rules of law.” But Britain, “the one nation capable of leading the 
peoples into the promised land… was too weak for the task history had put upon her.” Unable to 
achieve “dominance” over “a pack of mad men who need never have been permitted to emerge” 
in the first place, Britain’s policy of appeasement was simply “the last resort of the blackmailed 
rich man.”72 This brutal and self-righteous censure had an ulterior motive, though. Lower did not 
let the opportunity pass to push for a Canadian break with that “essentially unstable and 
unreliable” British policy. “The future,” he wrote, “is almost certain to bring more and more 
adherence to an insular and opportunist policy on the part of Great Britain, and to a continental, 
or North American policy, on the part of Canada.”73 
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The events of late September and early October reinforced and intensified these initial 
convictions. At the onset of the crisis over the Sudetenland, Lower was at the start of an 
extended leave-of-absence from Wesley. For the coming academic year, he was to occupy his 
friend R.A. Mackay’s political science professorship at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia 
while Mackay served on the Rowell-Sirois Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. His 
wife, however, had travelled alone to England in early September to visit her parents in 
Folkstone, a coastal town on the English Channel. Thus, through the worst of the crisis, Lower 
was frantically worried not just about the safety of his country but of his own spouse. 
“It looks as if we are going to get our war,” Lower wrote to one of his closest Wesley 
colleagues at his personal nadir. “I have little doubt but that Canada would at once come in, 
though I can feel no such passion as stirred the country before.” And just as he had long thought, 
the meaning of participation in a British war was the negation of his entire nationalist project. “I 
can see no probability of our acting as a nation,” he despaired. “We shall be a colony again, 
carrying out a superior will. If one shall cease to be exerted upon us, we shall fall under the 
domination of another, the American. There is no conception of independence in this country, 
and I am afraid [there] never will be. Our fate is to be either colonials or provincials.”74 
The passing of the “immediate crisis” offered Lower much needed relief, and a valuable 
moment for reflection. Writing to his wife – now safely out of any potential “line of fire” – he 
briefly harkened back to his old perspective of 1933 and then abruptly departed from it: 
I tried my best to believe that a peace (at almost any price) is better than a war. That is 
the Chamberlain our savior line. On the other hand, Hitler got rather more (peaceably) at 
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of the Mediterranean,” “a showdown in Spain,” “wide action by the Japanese navy” and “India bursting into flame” 
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last than he demanded. The fact cannot be blinked that England took it full on the chin 
from Germany, France too. It was a defeat that may well change the face of the world, 
and Chamberlain was the architect of that defeat… As far as her continuing to be a power 
in the world, that day it seems is almost over. Nobody would take England or the English 
government’s word very seriously now.75 
 After he wrote these lines, Lower implored his wife not to misinterpret him; “I for one 
was never at any time for suggesting to the people of England that it was their duty to fight. 
Certainly I didn’t feel that way myself… Perhaps a peaceful old age is best [for England].”76 But 
this qualification was only half the reality. It was true that he chided his own sister in Toronto for 
personally “feeling humiliated” that Britain did not go to war, asking her why she behaved as if it 
“were your country, which of course it isn’t.”77 Yet he clearly laid a heavy moral judgement on 
Chamberlain and England for conciliating Germany, which even before the crisis he described as 
a dangerous country that ought to be reined in. Indeed, through the coming months and into the 
following year, he would cite the events at Munich as further justification for Canadian 
detachment from Britain. Lower could take these conflicting positions because they both served 
his ultimate end. Above all, the only country whose involvement in war he had any real stake in 
was his own, and the only result he really wanted was to keep Canada out.78 
 Lower was not alone in this driving concern, a fact which became more apparent than 
ever in the months following the Munich Crisis. When Britain stood at the very precipice of war, 
there was no still no question that Canada stood there with it. Prompted by this near disaster, a 
small group of Canadians mounted what would become, according to David Lenarcic, “the most 
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ambitious and organized campaign” of Canadian non-interventionists of the entire 1930s.79 The 
project was spearheaded by F.R. Scott and CBC Board of Governors-member Alan Plaunt; both 
socialists, members of the League for Social Reconstruction (a leftist think tank), and close 
affiliates of the C.C.F. Their “neutrality league” began as a long form letter circulated to 
potentially sympathetic individuals across English-speaking Canada. Lenarcic notes that the 
group’s numbers came mainly from “west of Winnipeg” and were largely lawyers and university 
figures like T.S. Ewart and Arthur Lower. Its ranks also counted many business and professional 
men, though, as well as a handful of French Canadians and several women.80  
Through the winter of 1938-39, the correspondence group drafted and signed an official 
manifesto, “Canadian Unity in War and Peace.” Released to major Canadian newspapers in early 
March of 1939, it called on Parliament for a “positive assertion of [Canada’s] right to decide 
upon her belligerency or neutrality,” a demand coordinated with the proposal of an actual 
“neutrality bill” in February by Jack Thorson, a Liberal M.P. from Manitoba. Crucially, the 
manifesto’s last paragraph framed the value of such “clarifying legislation” in explicitly 
nationalist terms: “Canadian control over Canadian war policy would merely complete a century 
of gradual development of democratic control over all aspects of Canada’s domestic and foreign 
affairs. This final democratic right is a natural conclusion to her development into a sovereign 
nation, linked by feelings of sentiment and a common crown to other British people.”81 
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 Despite that last mollifying clause, this was still a proposition Lower could endorse. But 
while he readily signed the document and helped in its revision, his personal role in what he 
called “the neutrality drive” – the work of finding signatories for the manifesto – was a smaller 
one than the other key members of the group.82 There was an obvious reason for this. From the 
outset, Lower recognized that his new environment was not a fertile ground for neutrality. The 
social “atmosphere” of Nova Scotia was so “overwhelmingly Imperialistic, colonial and 
military” that there was little he could realistically hope to accomplish there.83 Indeed, after 
weeks of futile effort, he reported back to a leading organizer in Winnipeg that garnering 
signatures for neutrality in Halifax was “really equivalent to getting people in this church going 
community to sign a statement to the effect that there is no God.”84  
Lower’s skepticism about the project went much farther than “colonial” Halifax, though. 
His existing doubts about English Canadians’ ability to hold themselves apart from Britain had 
not disappeared, but had only grown stronger since the Munich war scare.85 They influenced his 
important contribution to revising the original manifesto written by F.R. Scott. Writing to Alan 
Plaunt just over a month into the project, Lower voiced his concerns and issued 
recommendations accordingly. The statement would easily appeal to those who already favored 
neutrality, but he doubted “that it would be of much avail to the unconverted. There is a very 
large body of persons in this country who not only do not wish to remain neutral but also actually 
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wish to fight… Probably nothing can be done with them.” As for the “large body of undecided 
opinion… I doubt very much if it could be converted to the idea of neutrality put point blanc 
[sic].”86 
The only viable path forward for Canadian neutrality was not to promote it as an actual 
foreign policy, but as an “abstract right” clearly tied to Canada’s “complet[ion] of her edifice of 
responsible government.” Genuine “neutrality legislation” had “not the slightest chance” of 
passage and was a non-starter in public discourse; “[t]here is no sentiment whatsoever in 
[English-speaking] Canada, beyond a very small circle, for such an attitude.”87 Despite this very 
cautious posture, Lower’s true goal remained the same: keeping Canada out of war. And as 
before, drawing ordinary Canadians over to the side of neutrality was the prerequisite for 
success. “[I]f we disguise the thing in innocuous legal language,” Lower confided to Scott, that 
effect might yet be achieved.88 
 Ultimately, Lower biggest contribution to promoting neutrality in those critical post-
Munich months came not through this organization, but through his continued individual 
activism. Although he did not publish any new foreign policy articles until the following spring, 
from December 1938 into April 1939, Lower made his voice heard through a remarkable string 
of radio debates discussing the ongoing hurricane of world events. In all but one of the seven 
programs – each recorded in Halifax and broadcast nationally by the CBC – Lower shared the air 
with two prominent Halifax academics: Dalhousie professor of philosophy H.L. Stewart, and 
A.S. Walker, President of the University of King’s College. As in his 1936 League of Nations 
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Society roundtable, each participant took a distinct side on foreign affairs; in Lower’s words, 
“Walker being our imperialist, Stewart our collectivist, and myself the nationalist.”89 
 The opening debate on December 11th set the tone for the series. Addressing the 
unresolved dispute over the return of the former German colonies, Lower’s policy position for 
Canada was one of total detachment, but even as a “student of international affairs” he viewed 
the issue as one of power politics and nothing more. While he favored “international 
administration” as an ideal settlement, the reigning reality was that “the only people who have a 
good title to colonies (or anything else) are those that are strong enough to retain them.” 
Although he belittled Walker’s “bulldog” mentality of “naked imperialism,” Lower agreed with 
him on one serious point; “if [Britain] and France go on surrendering much more… they are very 
likely to lose everything.”90 In the next debate, held on New Year’s Day 1939, he took the same 
line. Chamberlain’s upcoming visit to Rome could only mean yet another “surrender.” Just as he 
“sold out” the Czechs, he would do so again with French colonies as the next probable sacrifice. 
The “only satisfactory explanation” Lower saw for British policy to date, “seems to be a desire 
on the part of the Chamberlain government to have England commit suicide as a world power. 
Mr. Chamberlain may yet go down as the great undertaker of Empire.”91 By mid-March there 
was no doubt left. The whole nation of England now stood in disgrace before his eyes. 
Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement, Lower concluded, “represents well the nervous and 
almost hysterical people of England, who think no sacrifice too great for peace.” Hitler and 
                                                 
89 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 217. 
90 “CBC National Network, Roundtable Broadcast, December 11, 1938,” ALF Box 20 File 131. 
91 “Events in Europe, January 1, 1938,” ALF Box 20 File 124. 
180 
 
Mussolini, he grimly predicted, would exploit this fatal weakness to the limit, “forcing 
concessions indefinitely” until they eventually achieved “something like world domination.”92 
 Brash statements like these can easily be misread. Taken out of their broader context, 
they suggest that Lower – despite an explicit denial – did want Britain to fight in Europe, even as 
he knew with certainty that Canada would be dragged in behind it. Thus it bears repeating that 
through the post-Munich months Lower was still dedicated to keeping Canada out of war. On 
that basis, he could even show private appreciation for Chamberlain’s appeasement policy while 
publicly decrying it as an embarrassing “surrender.”93 At key moments in the debate series, too, 
he made his preference for Canadian non-involvement totally clear. In late January, he urged 
Stewart and Walker to consider Canada’s German and Ukrainian populations in the event of a 
potential British-Russian war against Germany. “You can see that if half a million of our people 
became decidedly pro-Hitler in their sympathies, that might create a very nasty internal situation 
for us.”94 The following month he flaunted his admiration for the “clear sighted” and national 
interest-based American policy of isolation; “Every nation would choose isolation if it could. I 
except Canada, many of whose people seem actually to want to get into wars.”95 
 Most revealing of all was his radio lecture in March. Undeterred by the German 
annexation of the remainder or Czechoslovakia just a few days prior, Lower gave what amounted 
to a swan song for his isolationist-nationalism. His refrains were familiar ones: a call for a self-
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defense program attuned to Canada’s “North American nature,” an assurance that “Canada 
itself” was still “an island” insulated by two oceans and an indomitable southern neighbor, and a 
demand that Canadians finally choose to take their fate out of British hands and into their own. 
Canada is a self-governing nation, and I hope, a self-respecting nation, and must make its 
own decisions. Canadians find that very difficult to do, for while we are self-governing 
by law, many of us, perhaps most of us, are still colonials in our own minds; we find it 
hard to realize that we are indeed responsible for our own actions, and like growing 
children, hate to face the trials and tasks of adult life, hate to leave the warm parental 
abode and go off to make our own way. Yet somehow or other we, each and every 
Canadian, must bring his or her mentality into line with our responsibilities. We all know 
what happens to the son or daughter who lingers too long in the warm shelter of the 
family home, leaving all their important decisions to their parents; such children never 
develop any power of decision of their own, they become mentally inert and feeble of 
heart: they never really grow up. So with nations. We shall refuse to grow up at our peril. 
And one of the most necessary aspects of growing up in this troubled age is to have the 
courage to face a very nasty, hostile, perplexing world for yourself. Hence we Canadians 
must face the question, what is the national interest of Canada, and be prepared to answer 
it fearlessly.96 
 Lower rarely exhibited his favorite metaphor – the child-nation – at such prodigious, 
uninterrupted length. But this passionate outburst concealed an inner sadness. In fact, he had 
already slid back into the same valley of pessimism he occupied the previous year. Writing to 
one of his closest friends, Jack Pickersgill (formerly of Wesley College but now in Ottawa as a 
civil servant in the Department of External Affairs), Lower admitted the total futility of his 
efforts to date. “What is the use any longer talking about Canadian defense, or Canadian policy, 
when it is so obvious that as a nation we have neither will or purpose, except to rush in 
obediently and help the British out of the mess they themselves have gotten into? I have to do a 
good deal of talking, too, down here, so am getting more and more embarrassed.”97 
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 Loath as he was to admit it, he rightly recognized that British sentiment still dominated 
English-speaking Canada. Indeed, by his pessimistic discounting of immigrants, he actually 
underestimated its breadth and potency.98 Lower was now in a dangerous corner. His conviction 
that Canada’s nationhood hinged on Canadians’ willingness to stand firmly apart from Britain 
even in its hour of need, was simply untenable. If war came and Lower still clung to this 
dogmatic principle, he might be forced to follow through on the terminal threat he made 
privately in 1935 and publicly in 1936. Ultimately, if Lower was to remain a Canadian 
nationalist through Canada’s next British war, adaptation to the hard realities was necessary.  
 Such a transition could not (and did not) happen overnight, but the solution lay within 
those concluding lines of Lower’s March radio address. His vision of a “nasty, hostile, 
perplexing world” was not a contrived rhetorical device. Events abroad during and after Munich 
deeply troubled him as they never had before. Through the years since 1933, he observed the 
upheaval in Europe with keen interest, but also with the confidence that it was truly none of 
Canada’s business and if Canadians wanted, they could comfortably remain uninvolved. The 
phenomenal ascent of Germany – and the corresponding decline of Britain – in late 1938 and 
early 1939 cracked this wall of confidence beyond repair. Gradually, his decades-old resentment 
of the one was massively outweighed by his newfound fear of the other.99 
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 An inkling of this came through in a May article for Canadian Forum. By no 
coincidence, it was also Lower’s last published plea for a Canadian self-defense program, for a 
North America-centered foreign policy, and for willful detachment from Britain. If the title of the 
piece – “Canada and the New World Order” – failed to hint at its thesis, Lower made it brutally 
clear in the opening paragraphs. Although the day had not yet come, “the crushing series of 
defeats” Germany had dealt England and France symbolized a geopolitical revolution. “Europe’s 
future,” he strongly suggested, would soon “lie under a great Pax Germanica.” While he coldly 
noted that such a system might also mean an “order and efficiency” that Canadian trade could 
benefit from, the article’s concluding paragraph radiated fear of the volcano across the 
Atlantic.100 
The only appropriate response to “the new world being born” was to reorient Canada 
away from Europe and towards its own continent. But in sharp contrast to his articles of the last 
four years, Lower’s domestic nightmare was no longer fixated on Canada’s social stability under 
the strain of another war effort or its racial composition afterwards. Now, and for the first time in 
the decade, he saw a vague but glaring overseas threat to Canada’s national security. Only by “an 
intelligent appreciation of the nature of that new world,” he warned, “shall we be able to keep 
away from our soil the illiberalism, the oppression, and the ruthless cruelty with which it seems 
to be associated.”101 Since one of this article’s main arguments was that Canada could still be 
made totally invulnerable to external attack, that ominous final line might have referred only to 
totalitarianism arising within Canada as a response to the “new world order.” This was a fear 
much on Lower’s mind through March and April, as University of Toronto professors Frank 
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Underhill and George Grube (the latter was also editor of Canadian Forum) narrowly avoided 
dismissal from their posts after some of their recent non-interventionist remarks were denounced 
as “subversive” speech in the Ontario Legislature.102 Nevertheless, the undercurrent of Lower’s 
statement was clear. After six years of adamant denial, he had finally conceded that something 
abroad posed a real danger to Canada – even if its effects were only indirect ones. 
In private, Lower vented his angst in even franker terms. “I write as if war were certain. 
Is it not? Can you see any way out of it? These magnificent fools who are in charge of 
England… seem to think they can stop Hitler without fighting Hitler. It is obvious that the only 
way they can prevent these continental aggressions is to prevent them by force.” Strikingly, 
Lower now extended blame for the European situation to his own nation’s leader, Mackenzie 
King, but not for his unwillingness to detach Canada from the sinking British ship. Rather, 
Lower faulted King for not edging Chamberlain on to take a harder line against Germany when 
the time was still ripe. If Canada “cannot afford to see that kind of world [i.e. the “Pax 
Germanica”], then I maintain that we should have been controlling British policy in the last five 
years… One has such a consciousness of impotence these days. Why is it that it is always, or 
nearly always, the half-informed and the half-wise and the half-brave who are in command? 
There is a good deal to be said for heroes, especially when you have heroes to deal with.”103 
 This was a significant new perspective for Lower – and a remarkable turnabout, 
considering that four years ago he himself dismissed the prospect of Canadians shaping British 
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policy as an imperialist fantasy. But its broader impact would not be felt until the following 
spring, when the desperate need for “heroes” moved to the forefront of Lower’s thinking. In the 
meantime, he spent the remaining pre-war months of 1939 coming to terms with the futility of 
his old isolationist convictions. The “neutrality league” followed a similar path after Jack 
Thorson’s bill was talked out of the House of Commons by April. In his final analysis of the 
group, Lenarcic summarized the league as “simply a temporary pooling of resources” among 
Canadian neutralists. After its moment passed, they “reverted to the pre-Munich state of 
affairs… publiciz[ing] their views on an essentially ad hoc basis.”104  
 For his part, Lower reduced his foreign policy activism to a bare minimum during the 
summer of 1939. After closing out his year at Dalhousie, he made his last pre-war statement of 
principles that July in Canton, New York for the third biennial Conference on Canadian-
American Affairs. Speaking on the subject to of the two countries’ interests in the Pacific, Lower 
gave his American audience a jarring (but prophetic) ultimatum. Extending his lecture’s topic to 
both sides of the old world, he warned that the Pacific and Europe were in the same state of 
extreme flux. “For the first time since the expansion of the English-speaking peoples began, the 
world they created is in serious danger of being pulled down and another erected in its place.” 
Americans must soon decide whether their country would continue its traditional policy of 
“isolation,” or assume the “world leadership” that Great Britain was so “anxious, almost 
pathetically anxious, to surrender” to it. Whether they admitted it or not, the United States was 
and “must necessarily be a great power, but if it abandons the outer world to such powers as 
Germany and Japan, it certainly will not be the greatest of powers, the arbiter of destiny.” The 
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question Lower put before the American people was a simply one, but it demanded a firm 
answer. “‘What kind of a world do we Americans want to live in?’”105 
This was not enough to argue his point, though. For added emphasis, Lower used his own 
country as a counter example; the path a great nation like United States could not take: 
No such fate rests upon small powers: they must follow, they cannot lead. No stronger 
illustration exists than the present passive acquiescence of the Canadian government and 
people in the policies of Great Britain and their result. Canada has given up one of the most 
elementary aspects of self-government almost without a second thought (the right to decide 
the issue of peace and war). In international affairs Canada is not a man but a woman. 
‘Whither thou goest,’ she says to her father, John Bull, ‘I will go.’ Like other women, she 
will pay. She is not even an American woman, for she is not spoiled: she holds her tongue 
and prepares to do her duty as it is pointed out to her. Her men-folk make her decisions for 
her – at present it is her father who does, but that other male, her neighbor, Uncle Sam, is 
increasingly important. It is not clear whether he is an elder brother, long ago estranged, or a 
fiancé. I think Australia is an adolescent boy, but Canada, I am afraid is a woman, who will 
always be under the direction of a man… It comes down again to saying that Canada, thanks 
to the sentimentalism and traditionalism of her own people is in no sense in control of her 
own destiny.106 
One can only imagine the pain Lower felt saying such a thing in public, and even more, 
coming to that conclusion in private. So supremely dismal is this sentiment when contrasted with 
his earlier, confident, and deeply personal metaphor of Canada the youth – a proud symbol of its 
ascent to independent nationhood – that this passage almost seems drained of nationalism 
entirely. In resigning himself to war, he simultaneously resigned himself to Canada’s national 
inferiority; its colonial nature was apparently inescapable. His plea for Americans to assume the 
mantle of British world power meshed with his new metaphor of Canadian submission. Lower 
hoped that the United States would meet his great challenge not just for the sake of “destiny,” but 
for Canada, too. In doing so, that new and stronger “man” might give Canada a place in the 
                                                 
105 “National Interests in the Pacific, American and Canadian,” MS, speech delivered at the Canton, New York 
Conference on Canadian-American Affairs, June 1939, pages 12-13, AFL Box 12 File 77. 
106 Ibid., 6-7. In the very next paragraph, Lower strove to make his new metaphor even more degrading. “There is a 
considerable danger that the present dutiful daughter will wither into an embittered and devitalized old maid. (Such 
as Scotland)” 
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world that it could never achieve on its own. In a more than just a sense, this somber speech in 
July of 1939 was the closest he ever came to “paying up” on his great threat of five years prior. 
But Arthur Lower’s faith in Canada was only bent, not broken. The opening years of the 
Second World War would revitalize his nationalist spirit not in spite of the great conflict, but 
because of it. The seismic events of 1940 in particular offered Canada a dangerous, but fulfilling, 
new path. It was also the path opened to Lower. Looking down it, he would see a new purpose, a 
new future, and a new destiny for himself and his nation together. 
The Reversing Current, 1939-1940 
 Lower’s sharp lurch towards internationalism and interventionism – the remarkably 
comprehensive reversal of his isolationism – did not happen all at once. His letters from the late 
fall of 1939 reveal his ambivalence about the nature of the conflict, what Canada was fighting 
for, and what the costs of fighting would be. There were still heavy traces of his old cynicism 
and certainties; that it was just another great power struggle (not a uniquely moral war), that it 
would end as unsatisfyingly as the last war (rather than produce a new and better world order), 
that its pressures might throw Canada into ruinous civil strife (rather than unify the country with 
a common purpose and a grand mission in the world).107 
 In the war’s second year, though, the residue of this old mentality was wiped clean from 
his thinking. From April through June, Lower observed the lightning-pace German advances 
through Norway, the Low Countries, and eventually France with unbridled alarm. In his memoir, 
he recalled “how deeply the events of the war were penetrating me” during this trying period. “I 
                                                 
107 Lower’s correspondence from the opening months of the war illustrate these themes in full. See ALF Box 1 File 
13. For a more concentrated picture of his mixed image of the early war, see a talk he gave in Winnipeg in mid-
October. “Canada and the Present War. National Club. October 13, 1939,” ALF Box 1 File 13. 
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saw it all so clearly… the world revolution that would occur with Great Britain defeated… [an] 
unready North America waiting for the blows to fall.” Through “those horrible days in June… 
things infinitely deep were waking up inside me, things over which I had little control. The spirit 
of my ancestors, I suppose! I could not cut myself off from my past and my father’s past. In the 
hour of danger I was one with them.”108 
Well before that crisis point, though, the now fifty-year-old Lower felt the urge to insert 
himself into the war, only to be rejected for service by the Department of National Defense.109 
The pain of inaction simply became intolerable with the events of spring 1940. Confined to his 
camp at the Lake of the Woods in far western Ontario after the end of Wesley’s semester, Lower 
boiled over with angst at events abroad and their implications. “The old familiar world is being 
destroyed,” he wrote to a close friend, “and God alone knows what is going to be erected in its 
place… I thought I had in the last five years reconstructed my own world-outlook on a basis 
rational enough to endure this shock. I find I have not succeeded.”110  
 Indeed, he had not. Lower’s outlook had changed radically since 1936. Europe, Canada, 
and the whole world were all in a state of “extreme emergency” that demanded a response at 
every level, including from individuals in North America. “It is maddening to me personally to 
have to be so passive in this emergency,” he fumed to J.T. Shotwell; “academic research and 
writing are out of the question.” Lower was not exaggerating. For the remainder of May and long 
into June, he devoted himself entirely to the one solution he could see to the European war: the 
                                                 
108 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 242-43. 
109 Lower letter of application requested that he be considered for the Naval Service of Canada, though he admitted 
that his age made him doubt his prospects. The official reply offered him only the mundane option of giving lectures 
at its divisional headquarters in Winnipeg. AL to Department of National Defense, November 3, 1939, ALF Box 1 
File 13. J.O. Cossette (Naval Secretary) to AL, November 10, 1939, ALF Box 1 File 13. 
110 AL to Arthur Phelps, May 20, 1940, ALF Box 1 File 14. 
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involvement of the United States. For nearly a full month, Lower shot off frantic letters to 
Americans he knew personally, to several United States Senators, and to the New York Times, 
impressing upon all of them Britain’s desperate need of their aid and the terrible consequences of 
withholding it. “Many Canadians went into this war very reluctantly,” he admitted to Senator 
Claude Pepper of Florida, “but there are hardly any of us who do not realize that… we have got 
to overthrow Hitler to prevent him from overthrowing us. You as a great power have more 
responsibility for that, more to gain and more to lose, than we have… We Canadians are at 
present fighting your battle: the little fellow is protecting the giant.”111 
 Just as this war “madness” reached its peak, Lower wrote his close friend and colleague 
Harold Innis to give confession for his prewar past: 
I examine my conscience from time to time, wondering whether I have been wrong the 
last few years and the Tommy Church’s right. I don’t think so: my whole ambition has 
been to see a people created in Canada first, policy afterward. Neutrality I have always 
known to be impossible, but it has at times seemed right to look it fully in the face and 
even use its possibility as a brake to our unthinking jingoes, in the hope that our war 
program when it came would at least have some common sense. That I think is what we 
nationalists did accomplish: government was rather slow but it has not made any 
egregious mistakes, and its efforts are in the right direction, munitions and the air. So my 
conscience is clear, though I suppose I have at times overstated the case.112 
 Later in the year, well after his passions had cooled, Lower reiterated that sentiment in an 
article for Queen’s Quarterly. 
Those persons who, like the present writer, claimed that Canada, if she so desired could 
shape her own fate, knew very well that nothing was less likely than that she would do 
so: their position was never more than educational, an attempt to arouse their countrymen 
to the necessity of making their own decisions and primarily in their own national 
interests, if Canada were ever to occupy a place in the world and in the Empire worth 
having.113 
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112 AL to Harold Innis, June 16, 1940, ALF Box 1 File 14. 
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These mea culpae were cleverly constructed. Both contained some honest self-reflection 
on the nationalist core of Lower’s isolationist activism. The minds of the Canadian people were 
the target of his activism, and urging them on towards independent thinking and self-interested 
decision making was his basic ends. Indeed, so elemental were those national goals that in 1940 
he could completely reverse his old course on the fundamental issues of Canadian international 
responsibility and involvement war itself when both seemed to offer a new path forward to 
Canadian nationhood.114 Writing much farther in hindsight, Lower could even take some half-
hearted pride that by waiting a symbolic seven days before following Britain into war the 
Canadian Parliament, “in the slithery [Mackenzie] King way,” had finally asserted Canada’s 
right to “decide the issue of war and peace for ourselves.”115 But the claim that his isolationism 
was nothing more than an exercise in national “education” was simply insincere.  
It was true that doubts about its ultimate viability nagged him through decade, just as it 
was true that he showed a great deal of flexibility in altering the ideology as he saw fit. Yet 
through the period of 1933-1939, he advocated for it with remarkable consistency. Far more than 
that, a policy and a public mentality of isolationism was something he demanded of Canada in 
the strongest terms – up to and including the implosion of the country if it failed to heed his 
warnings against war. It was also insincere of Lower to suggest that his isolationist principles 
existed apart from his nationalist ones. This was not the case. He chose to interweave them in a 
fundamental way; the two were inseparable within his broader Canadian vision because they so 
neatly complimented one another.  
                                                 
114 “The sooner our authorities learn that our responsibilities extend to every sphere of the war, the better; the sooner 
they get out of the Canadian parish and into the stream of world affairs, the better. Canada can never pull her full 
weight until Canadians overcome the notion that their place is a subordinate one, their business mainly to work hard 
and think little, until in short they accept the full burden of nationhood.” Ibid., 425. Emphasis added. 
115 Lower, My First Seventy-Five Years, 222. 
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Lower did know that participation in another British war was Canada’s future by default. 
But until the very eve of that war’s actual outbreak, he did not resign himself to that fate. For six 
years he promoted a cause so radical it nearly cost him the professorship that was the dream of 
his youth. For six years he passionately defended that cause in print and in person, spreading his 
message in every outlet he could access. For six years he believed isolationism could prevail in 
Canada because it had to, for his nation’s sake and for his own. Even though it could not survive 
the very war it intended Canada to avoid, it was Arthur Lower’s faith. 
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CONCLUSION 
No historical comparison is without flaws, and the one to be drawn between Lincoln 
Colcord and Arthur Lower is no exception. Besides the fact that they were men of different 
countries, they also had different upbringings, educations, and professions. Even within their 
careers as isolationist activists they had different levels of output as writers, used different 
mediums for airing their views, and in the end, reacted entirely differently to the outbreak of the 
Second World War and each of their nations’ involvement in it. The degree to which they can be 
used to represent the ideology of isolationism in America and Canada is also open to question. 
Writing in the 1960s, historian Manfred Jonas notably delineated American isolationists into no 
less than five distinct subgroups.1 A Canadian observer of the 1930s, on the other hand, saw 
three variations within his country’s isolationist movement versus just two in the United States.2  
Yet the facts remain in support of the comparison. Colcord and Lower were isolationists 
by their own definitions and were fully conscious of where they stood in contemporary politics. 
The ideas they espoused under the banner of that worldview were generally clear, 
comprehensive, and showed strong similarities to those of other isolationists of the interwar era 
in their respective countries. Furthermore, they were connected to a breadth of those likeminded 
people directly by correspondence, group affiliation, and even attempts at coordinated activism. 
By their efforts, Colcord and Lower helped to shape an intellectual and political current far 
bigger than either one of them alone. Their writing, activism, and even their personal characters 
                                                 
1 Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990), 34-35, 41-42. 
2 “Isolationism has two meanings for the United States, but three for Canada. For the United States, it may, or may 
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Sociological Surveys of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada Concerning the United States, H.F. Angus, ed. (Toronto: 
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all offer many strong points of comparison – ones which reflect isolationism in the United States 
and Canada as an ideology of North American themes with national variations.  
Realism, for instance, was the sine qua non of their isolationisms. In fact, both men 
identified as “realists” far more often than they did as “isolationists.” And in tandem with that, 
they derided their ideological foes as mired in “emotionalism,” “intellectual dishonesty,” or 
British-colonial “sentiment” to emphasize the contrast. Realism to Colcord and Lower meant the 
frankest consideration of international circumstances and a dedication to framing that 
consideration in the context of their own countries’ national interests.3 All the way through their 
isolationist careers, the principle of doing what was best for America and Canada first was their 
guiding light. To that end, they were intensely interested in foreign events and the appropriate 
distance their own countries ought to have from them.4 Yet they were not single-mindedly 
focused on the wider world. On the contrary, both cared about domestic politics just as deeply. 
For Colcord, his original concerns during the 1930s were the socially and economically 
corrupting effects of the New Deal; for Lower, they were the base materialism and degrading 
colonial mentality which he saw as endemic among his fellow English Canadians. In both their 
cases, these internal affairs of their nations regularly overlapped with external concerns within 
their larger worldviews. 
Colcord and Lower were true hardliners who pushed their positions as far as they could 
and asserted them as aggressively as possible. They took isolationism so seriously because it was 
                                                 
3 In his memoir, Lower himself defined the “Realpolitik” he followed in the 1930s as “the frank facing that the 
foreign policy of a nation must turn upon its own interests and, still more, that external politics rest relentlessly on 
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dislike for particular foreign powers, but studied indifference to all of them.” Jonas, Isolationism in America, 184.  
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a matter of the highest national interest to stay out of foreign wars in Europe and Asia. This is the 
most consistent common theme of their writing. From the time of their very first forays into 
interwar isolationism – 1932 for Colcord and 1933 for Lower – there was always this imperative 
in their appeals. If America and Canada as nations, and Americans and Canadians as peoples, did 
not heed their warnings against intervention in wars abroad, the consequences – which did vary 
between the two men in crucial ways – would be dire and even existential. Furthermore, the best 
means both men could see to keep their countries out of war was a foreign policy and public 
attitude of neutrality. To achieve neutrality in the latter, popular capacity – which would lay the 
groundwork for neutrality as an actual policy – Colcord and Lower both focused their isolationist 
polemics on demystifying international affairs and revealing the legitimate and practicable bases 
for non-entanglement and non-intervention. 
As for the specifics of their arguments, a keen awareness of geography was almost 
inevitably a shared position. Both men argued that North America was naturally secure against 
all threats from abroad. Lower, however, was stressing this point from the very start of his 
isolationist career whereas Colcord only began to do so in early 1939. They stressed the 
geographic security of their nations because both viewed the political and military struggles of 
the Old World as problems which the New World could never help to resolve. In their long-term 
visions, they felt it best to leave Europe and East Asia to fight their own battles while America 
and Canada stood on the sidelines. Historians of isolationism on both sides of the border have 
noted the importance of a North American (or in the U.S. case, sometimes Western Hemispheric) 
outlook and a pervasive hostility to Europe as central elements of the ideology.5 Neither man, 
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however, believed that isolationism entailed economic detachment from the rest of the world. 
Lower recognized that Canada’s dependence on foreign trade was an unignorable factor 
precluding a “rigorously” isolationist foreign policy, but also argued that its economy would not 
be negatively affected by neutrality. Its commodities would always be in demand and could just 
as easily be sold to both sides of a given conflict rather than just the one it was allied with. 
Colcord took a similar line. He, too, advocated for supplying both sides, but for the simpler 
reason that this was the only policy consistent with “true” neutrality in the first place. He also 
showed even less concern than Lower did with the possibility of American economic suffering 
amidst a radically changing global status quo. His only advice was to accept it and carry on.6 
As a kind of hedge to their arguments for geographic security, Colcord and Lower also 
asserted that their countries faced no direct threats from anywhere abroad and none that could be 
realistically carried out in any event. Again, though, there was a difference in timing. Lower was 
driving this point home continuously from the very beginning in 1933, while Colcord only made 
the argument from 1939 on – ironically, at just about the same moment Lower began to shift his 
position and see a threat to Canada from Germany. Additionally, both men reacted to growing 
                                                 
isolationism” as a distinct and prominent strain of the continentalist school of thought, one typiﬁed by the writings 
of Lower, Frank Underhill, and F.R. Scott. Damien-Claude Bélanger, Prejudice and Pride: Canadian Intellectuals 
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6 It bears noting that many American isolationists took the economic issue more seriously than Colcord did. 
Between 1939 and 1941, as Germany and Japan looked primed to dominate Europe and East Asia long into the 
future, isolationists fleshed out a diverse array of strategies for their own country to survive the new status quo. For 
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abroad as worth war. For the full catalogue of these views, see Chapter 9 of Justus D. Doenecke, Storm on the 
Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 139-49. 
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German power in Europe by accepting (and in Lower’s case, enthusiastically promoting) the 
build-up of American and Canadian national defenses. But yet again, this shift occurred at 
different times, early 1937 for Lower and the summer of 1940 for Colcord.  
This fact also raises another important point of comparison: their mutual focus on Europe 
over Asia. Granted, Colcord’s first isolationist article was a commentary on the invasion of 
Manchuria, and Lower was a well-published and recognized expert on Canada’s connection to 
the Pacific region. Yet the looming struggle between the great powers of Europe was always 
their primary concern. This was simply because the anxiously awaited renewal of hostilities 
between Britain and Germany specifically (and to a lesser extent, between Britain and Italy) was 
anticipated by both men as the foreign conflict that posed the single greatest danger of pulling 
the United States and Canada into its vortex of destruction. 
As part of their efforts to keep their countries out of that second Great War, Colcord and 
Lower also emphatically denied that there was any moral justification for intervention in a war 
between Germany and Britain or any other foreign war. In keeping with their realism, they saw 
conflicts abroad as driven by power politics and nothing more.7 They even seemed to relish the 
toppling of old idols dearly held by Americans and English Canadians – Britain and its Empire, 
the League of Nations, the illusory ideal of international cooperation itself. But this became a 
tremendously difficult feat as world events piled up, and neither of them could do it consistently. 
Colcord decidedly favored one side of the Spanish Civil War and made that feeling public. And 
under questioning in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he admitted that Britain had far 
more of his personal sympathy than Germany did. Lower, likewise, put his name to a public 
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Jonas and Cole. Ross Kennedy, “The Ideology of American Isolationism, 1931-1939,” Cercles 5 (2002), 57-58. 
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letter condemning the Japanese war in China, and after the outbreak of war between Britain and 
Germany in 1939, he threw his full support behind the “motherland” in its struggle for survival. 
Colcord’s and Lower’s convictions about the futility of involvement in foreign wars and 
the eternal nature of power politics were largely based on their jaundiced memories of the First 
World War. Both men used this war and its failures as a solid anchor for their isolationist 
arguments. There is a major difference, though, in the timing that they came to their conclusions. 
Before 1933, there was not a trace of Great War skepticism in Lower’s writing. His revisionism 
emerged simultaneously with his isolationism. This presents a stark contrast with Colcord, who 
questioned the morality of the war while it was ongoing. Colcord was a “revisionist” in 1915, 
and in conjunction with that, an anti-interventionist as well. He turned a blind eye to his own 
initial perspective after the U.S. entered the war and his youthful idealism was stoked to a white 
heat. But as Wilsonian internationalism slowly proved hollow, he returned to anti-
interventionism with a strongly anti-Wilson slant in 1919 and 1920. It was from this personal 
foundation that Colcord belatedly constructed his ideological isolationism of the 1930s. 
The first major difference between Colcord’s and Lower’s isolationisms is also a national 
difference between their two countries. While American foreign policy during the 1920s and 30s 
was far from devotedly isolationist, the United States was not a member of the League of 
Nations and thus had no legal obligation to defend its collective security system as it was tested 
by conflicts in China, Africa, and Europe (all tests which the League ultimately failed). Canada, 
on the other hand, was a member of the League from its establishment in 1919 and was a fairly 
enthusiastic participant both on its own and as an ally of Britain.8 Colcord and Lower harshly 
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criticized the League and the flaws of the collective security idea. But only Lower had to 
accommodate the reality of his country’s membership. The challenge for him was to balance the 
potential beneﬁts with Canada’s attendant responsibility to confront “aggression” wherever the 
League found it. 
Far more serious than the League, though, was Canada’s place in the British Empire. 
There was no American parallel for the relationship Canada had with Britain in the 1930s.9 Even 
after the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, which gave Canada the legal right to 
decide its own course in world affairs, English Canadians as people were still indelibly bound to 
Britain by ties of empire, race, history, and sentiment. Lower recognized this fact even before he 
began his isolationist career, and he made it his mission in life to erode those ties by every 
rhetorical means at his disposal. Lower’s hostility towards Britain was truly colossal, and the 
only conceivable parallel for Colcord’s case would have to be his intensely personal resentment 
of Woodrow Wilson – the man he held responsible for facilitating the unstable world situation of 
the 1930s and for poisoning the American mind with his impossible internationalist idealism. 
This difference between American and Canadian external commitments no doubt played 
a part in the difference of output for Colcord’s and Lower’s isolationist work. Far from a flaw to 
this study, the gulf is an appropriate reflection of that national divide. Both men wrote in reaction 
to the danger of their nations’ involvement in wars overseas, but the ebb and flow of that danger 
was different for the two of them. Colcord wrote only when certain spectacular events – both 
foreign and domestic – raised the danger to a momentary pitch. Hence his public activity spiked 
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American Anglophobia between the World Wars (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 5, 94-96. 
199 
 
around the time of the Manchurian invasion, the Italian-Ethiopian War, the passage of the three 
successive Neutrality Acts, the Munich Crisis, the German military triumphs of spring 1940, and 
the Lend Lease fight, but went largely dormant during the lulls in between. Lower, by contrast, 
wrote and spoke regularly on foreign affairs year after year, but this was more than just a result 
of his generally high productivity. He wrote because the possibility of foreign war for Canada 
came through its connections to Britain and the League. These were more dangerous at some 
moments than others, of course, but they were constants nevertheless, and addressing them even 
during the more tranquil moment of that raucous decade was not overzealous on his part. 
Another major point of difference is also a point of comparison: their conceptions of 
national responsibility. Both men explicitly argued their nations had no moral, political, or 
strategic obligation to intervene in foreign conflicts. Indeed, even while accepting Canadian 
involvement in the League of Nations, Lower methodically contrived multiple ways to ensure 
Canadian non-involvement in potential “League wars.” But in justifying isolationism for Canada, 
Lower also argued that his country had a better claim to it than its southern neighbor, which, as 
he often described with open admiration, actually had installed isolationism as its foreign 
policy.10 Canada, in Lower’s thinking, was a small power which could not hope to affect the 
course of events abroad. And even better than the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, it also had the 
world’s most powerful buffer state to guard its southern flank. The United States, on the other 
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hand, was undeniably a great power and thus did have a responsibility to participate in the 
organization of any international system. This convenient and self-serving conclusion was the 
polar opposite of Colcord’s. He could agree that America’s power was great, but it was precisely 
that vast power which demanded American neutrality. Here Colcord’s memory of the First 
World War was crucial. Its lesson to him was that the United States could only be a disruptive 
force in world affairs. American involvement in other nations’ conflicts created imbalances in 
the fighting and encouraged outcomes (like the Treaty of Versailles) that could not be sustained. 
By staying out of foreign wars, not only would they end sooner and thus with less devastation, 
they would also conclude with a status quo based on the realities of the region rather than 
temporary American intervention. 
Ultimately, however, if the comparison this thesis presents is to have any value, it ought 
to be in three critical points. The first is that for Colcord and Lower, American and Canadian 
involvement in foreign wars during the interwar period was always a matter of choice, and that 
the American and Canadian peoples themselves played a critical role in the choosing. Neither 
Colcord nor Lower saw neutrality – applied isolationism – in a purely or even predominately 
legal light. Just as the Statue of Westminster had not “given” Canada its sovereign nationhood 
(and thus, the right to be neutral), so too had the Neutrality Act done nothing to make America a 
“neutral” nation. Isolationism, neutrality, and realism alike all came only from within, and both 
men thus gave tremendous attention to “converting” their countrymen to those ways of thinking.  
That they attempted this at all illustrates the second critical point: neither of them saw the 
current of public opinion trending in their direction. Rather, they saw Americans and Canadians 
(or more specifically, English Canadians) as mired in fundamentally flawed ways of thinking 
about foreign affairs that could only lead their countries into foreign wars. Just once, in 1933, did 
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Lower ever expect that his countrymen would choose to be neutral in the next British war. The 
dominant theme of his isolationist writing through the decade was a bitter rage that they would 
inevitably do just the opposite, and no matter how catastrophically Britain failed in managing its 
own foreign policy. Remarkably, considering the popular conception of interwar American 
public opinion as dominated by “isolationist” sentiment, Colcord was not much more convinced 
of his people’s “good sense” than Lower was.11 In Colcord’s eyes, the public was only fooling 
itself by thinking that the Neutrality Act, “cash-and-carry,” or “aid-short-of-war” for Britain 
were in any way consistent with authentic neutrality or that they would somehow stave off the 
real dangers ahead. Ever the Cassandra, he warned that both the American government and the 
American people had already taken sides in the coming European war as early as 1937. He 
continued in that vein in 1939, 1940, and all the way up to Pearl Harbor. Though he believed 
even in late 1941 that most ordinary Americans still did not want their country to be part of 
actual warfare in Europe and Asia, he also saw all too clearly that no other conclusion was 
possible with the policies and sympathies of the nation as they were. 
That terrible conclusion raises the final critical point of the comparison: just what exactly 
Colcord and Lower were afraid would happen to their countries if they went to war abroad. 
Manfred Jonas has written that a deep-seated fear of war (along a preference for unilateralism) 
was the bedrock of American isolationism during the interwar period.12 This same principle 
holds true for the Canadian variety as well. The basic function of isolationism in both countries 
                                                 
11 Granted, Colcord’s career did not suffer in any noticeable way from his isolationist activism, although he 
complained often that views such as his did not get a full hearing in the American press. This was not necessarily the 
norm, though. In early 1941, two of Colcord’s closest isolationist colleagues, Oswald Garrison Villard and John T. 
Flynn, both lost their columns in the New Republic and the Nation (respectively) because of their views. Their 
experience comes closer to matching that Lower, who received tremendous pushback from the public after his loud 
declaration of isolationist sentiment in 1934. Although he gloried in the controversy and remained an aggressive 
isolationist long into the decade, he did show fear for his professional future at least privately by 1936. 
12 Jonas, Isolationism in America, 23. 
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was to keep them out of war, but the motivation for that priority was different in crucial ways. 
The divide is perfectly embodied in the work of Lincoln Colcord and Arthur Lower.  
Colcord’s isolationism was primarily focused on preserving American democracy at 
home, and in the secondary position, not letting his country affect international affairs for the 
worse as it had in the Great War. His fear for American democracy was a logical extension of his 
intense criticism of the New Deal. Colcord had suspected FDR of harboring dictatorial intentions 
long before the president’s political pivot away from domestic affairs and towards Europe and 
Asia in late 1938 and early 1939. But beyond just this, war in Colcord’s eyes opened the door to 
a far more terrible fate than a Roosevelt dictatorship alone. By instigating another period of 
international and domestic chaos (as had arose in 1918 and 1919), the American nation itself 
would be fundamentally changed for the worse. Colcord’s writing from 1937 on – not just that 
with an isolationist focus, but also his commentary on domestic politics – was often heavily 
laden with regret that the America he knew and loved seemed to be fading away. All through the 
1930s and into the early 40s, he loathed the prospect of a “new world” as false, impossible, and 
loaded with hidden dangers – just as it had been in the Wilson era. But all through those very 
same years, a new world is exactly what loomed on America’s fast-approaching horizon.  
Colcord’s views after 1936 fit in with two of Jonas’ isolationist subgroups, the 
“conservatives” and the “liberals.” His concern with the preservation of the American social and 
economic system made him a “conservative.” His concern with the preservation of American 
democracy and the threat of dictatorship made him a “liberal.”13 The latter of these two 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 71-86. Additionally, Colcord’s fear that American economic power could be a disruptive force in foreign 
wars shows some similarity to what Jonas describes as the “timid” isolationist position. Proponents of this branch of 
isolationism argued that by remaining at peace, the United States could show the rest of the world that “not all 
conflicts had to assume global proportions.” Ibid., 68-69. 
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subgroups could also be tied to Christopher Nichols’ contention that a vital element of the “new 
isolationism” of the 1930s was preserving of America’s “exceptionalist and domestic mission” as 
a beacon of democratic government and domestic morality.14 But no matter how it is framed – 
liberal, conservative, or exceptionalist – American isolationism as Colcord practiced it was 
fundamentally a preventative measure. Much like his opposition to the New Deal, its central 
purpose was to keep America as it already was. If war could only precipitate negative domestic 
change, then forestalling American intervention was the highest national imperative. 
Ironically, though, it was Lower who regretfully recognized his isolationist platform was 
essentially “negative,” meaning a defensive foreign policy that was not bold enough to capture 
the Canadian people’s confidence and respect.15 The irony of this is not that Lower was totally 
wrong. Far from it. A reasonable analog to Colcord’s fear of the decay of American democracy 
under the strain of war would be Lower’s fear of Canada being rent apart in civil war between its 
British, French, and continental European components. But in crafting his isolationism, Lower 
gave it something more than a mere defensive posture to preserve what Canada already had (its 
real but precarious social unity). Rather, what most distinguished his Canadian isolationism from 
Colcord’s American was its comprehensive merger with Canadian nationalism. With this fusion, 
isolationism assumed an additional role that was essentially positive rather than negative. A 
policy and public attitude of isolationism – as expressed by Canada’s government and people 
choosing not to follow Britain into its next war – was the last and most difficult step towards 
fulfilling the long evolution of Canada from a colony to a nation. Lower was not alone in 
                                                 
14 Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 350. 
15 Writing in 1940, he described this as the principle cause of the Canadian isolationism’s ultimate failure. The 
“speed and ease” with that arguments like his “were forgotten” indicated “what little impression the essentially 
negative and passive policy of isolationism had made in Canada” A.R.M. Lower, Canada and the Far East – 1940 
(New York: Institute of Paciﬁc Relations, 1941), 105. 
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innovative strategy for justifying isolationism. This was the final argument of the Canadian 
“neutrality league” of 1939 in its brief campaign to enunciate the “right” of Canada to a neutral 
foreign policy. Lower’s brother-in-arms Frank Underhill made the same point as well. In an 
article praising Prime Minister King for “an admirable exposition of the case of the so-called 
‘isolationists,’” Underhill stressed that “‘isolationism’ is not a mere selfish negative desire to 
escape from the outer world but is based upon a positive ideal of Canadian achievement.”16 
But Lower and his cohort also knew that even with this potent argument, their task was 
still a daunting one bordering on impossible. The arguments and invective of Canadian 
isolationism simply could not keep the country from aiding Britain when the call ﬁnally came. Its 
promotors like Lower could easily fantasize in times of peace, and with the added stimulus of 
intense revulsion toward contemporary British policy, that Canada might resist the powerful 
impulse to support its mother country. But despite years of hypothesizing and preparation, even 
Lower himself could not help reversing course in the face of real events. “Not yet,” the poet-
isolationist F.R. Scott wrote in 1939, “has the tide of public feeling turned sufficiently to make a 
policy of neutrality dominant in the country. Tradition and sentiment die hard.”17  
Indeed, they did. So hard, in fact, that it took nothing less than the full course of 
Canadian participation in the Second World War to mortally weaken them. The tradition of 
isolationism in America died hard, too, and from the very same cause. The dual forces of 
dramatically worsening circumstances abroad and FDR’s authoritative leadership at home 
combined to cripple the efforts of Colcord and his allies in and out of government. From 1939 
through to Pearl Harbor, writes Wayne Cole, the isolationists were “relentlessly” driven back 
                                                 
16 F.H. Underhill, “Mr. King’s Foreign Policy,” Canadian Forum 18, No. 210 (July 1938), 105. 
17 F.R. Scott, “A Policy of Neutrality for Canada,” Foreign Affairs 17, No. 2 (January 1939), 412. 
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back in “engagement after engagement… They never gave up, but Roosevelt won his war 
against them as decisively as led the United States towards victory against the Axis.”18 Justus 
Doenecke seconds the conclusion. At the great crossroads American foreign policy, the anti-
interventionists were “defeated at every turn.” By 1941 the tide of public opinion was turning 
against isolation as the dangers posed by the Axis surpassed the dangers of war itself.19 
In the final assessment, the comparison of Lincoln Colcord’s and Arthur Lower’s 
isolationisms reveals the essential weakness of that ideology in the United States and Canada. No 
matter how passionate, incessant, and elaborate the arguments of people like them, isolation was 
resoundingly rejected in both countries as a viable foreign policy and as a popular outlook. On 
the whole, Americans and Canadians alike found greater security and moral satisfaction in 
policies of support for Britain and opposition to the terrifying advances of the Axis nations. But 
while American and Canadian isolationism diﬀered in many respects, they were still passionate 
struggles waged in the name and best interests of the American and Canadian peoples. The 
decisive collapse of Lower’s isolationism, and Colcord’s futile insistence on retaining his, thus 
serves as an especially apt metaphor for isolationism in their two nations. The timing of their 
defeats may have been diﬀerent, but ultimately, both came to the same end.
                                                 
18 Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 
410. 
19 Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon, 327-28. 
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